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Foreword
One of the greatest challenges facing developing coun- building and information-sharing were identified as are
tries is to enhance growth while finding the most cost- key factors that promote intra- and intergovernmental
effective way to reduce negative environmental impacts. integration and public participation, thereby helping to
remove legal and political barriers and merge institu-
The traditional and most direct approach to environmental tional strengths.
management is to impose restrictions, guidelines, penal-
ties, and fees. But this "command-and-control" (CAC) Future work will look more closely at valuing the quan-
method can be difficult and expensive to implement, titative costs and benefits of various types of MBIs in
monitor, and enforce, especially in countries with weak different economic, administrative, and political con-
institutional capacity. texts. This will provide clearer guidance on which MBIs
are most appropriate for specific conditions and policy
Experience has shown that market-based instruments objectives.
(MBIs), which broadly speaking provide economic in-
centives to modify behavior, may be a more effective With support from the Economic Development Institute
way to achieve many environmental goals. Though not (EDI), the World Bank has held three regional work-
necessarily less expensive than CAC instruments, MBIs shops (in 1995, 1997, and 1998) as part of its broader
often yield better results by harnessing the powerful initiative on MBIs in Latin America and the Caribbean,
cost-benefit motivations of businesses and individuals. and will continue to sponsor in-country workshops in the
future. In addition, an internet semninar was organized
This study of MBIs, focusing on 11 countries in Latin that focused on fostering greater regional cooperation
America and the Caribbean, is a work in progress. It is and coordination on environmental issues and MBIs, and
part of a wider effort to disseminate knowledge, share providing further knowledge on institutional structure,
experience, and facilitate the development and use of MBIs, and efficient resource management.
MBIs throughout the region.
-The purpose of this multifaceted dissemination strategy (of
The investigation's results far exceeded expectations. The which this study is one element) is to:
authors found that a wide range of MBIs already have
been developed and applied in the region, and that most of * STIMULATE ideas on how MBIs can be further
them represent genuine attempts to adapt the instruments introduced into environmental policymaking;
to each country's individual economic, social, and cultural * LEARN cross-sectoral, country-specific approaches
characteristics. Very interesting MBI cases were reported to cost-effective pollution control and voluntary
and a clear picture was drawn of the current status of MBI compliance;
enforcement and the problems these instruments face. * IDENTIFY specific cost-effective programs and
interventions that engage the community, busi-
Gradualism and flexibility emerged as fundamental issues nesses, and government agencies in improving
in successful implementation of MBIs. Also, information- environmental quality.
Maritta Koch-Weser
Director
Sector Management Unit
Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development
Latin America and Caribbean Region
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driss. Any opinions or conclusions expressed herein are and the need to generate earmarked revenue.
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the * A clear understanding of the current status of en-
positioii of the World Bank or its affiliated agencies. forcement problems in selected Latin American
and Caribbean countries. Most of the cases of
Preparation of the report relied extensively on a series of economic instruments that were discussed pro-
background papers initiated in early 1995, as well as on vided good examples of tailoring incentives to fit
helpful consultations and insights received during two the particular economic and cultural characteris-
workshops: one in 1995 in Miami, Florida with the authors tics of each country.
of the country studies, and another in Buenos Aires, Ar- * An understanding that economic instruments are
gentina in 1997 supported by EDI (Economic Develop- tools to solve problems and not an end in them-
ment Institute of the World Bank) involving World Bank selves. For example, Chile's air pollutant trading
staff, goverrnent officials, and representatives from the experience was discussed as an instrument to
private sector, academia, and nongovernmental organiza- solve metropolitan air pollution problems and not
tions (NGOs). The background papers, most of which are as a study of Chile's policies. Others who had
summarized in Appendix A, are listed separately at the experience with similar air pollution problems
beginning of the Bibliography. The participants in the then contributed their views within this context.
Buenos Aires seminar are listed in Appendix B. Consensus was also reached on seeing economic
instruments not as replacing command-and-
Good planning and design made the July 1997 seminar control approaches but rather as complementing
in Argentina focused and productive: direct regulation.
* The seminar brought together a highly qualified * Confirmation that the Bank, through its eco-
group of participants with experience in using eco- nomic and sector work and environmental tech-
nomic instruments and working on Bank projects. nical assistance projects, should take a leadership
This fostered a rich dialogue between Bank staff, position in promoting economic instruments for
partner institutions, and other participants within environmental policymaking in the region.
the context of a shared community of practice. * Broadened understanding of issues concerning
* Participants were able to provide examples of the use of economic instruments, particularly
good (and not so good) practices derived from by sharing participants' experiences as well as
actual experience. This permitted a smooth transi- comparing them with the use of such instru-
tion between modules and purposeful interaction ments in the OECD countries and Asia. The
with other practitioners-all from Latin America. seminar also permitted the participants to
* The seminar focused on the desire expressed by update country case studies, and new examples
Latin American countries engaged in institutional, were presented for Colombia and Ecuador.
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Abstract
This paper summarizes a series of country studies this in itself does not lead to successful environmental
addressing the use of market-based instruments (MBIs) management. These revenues must be channeled to local
and command-and-control (CAC) measures for authorities so that they can build the institutional
environmental management in Latin America and the capacity required to effectively implement MBIs.
Caribbean. MBIs can be an important means for Finally, international donor agencies are prone to
introducing added efficiency to existing CAC recommend OECD solutions without considering local
mechanisms. However, the scope of MBIs must match institutional conditions, and the flow of information
countries' institutional capacity to implement them. MBI regarding MBIs has mostly been from "North" to
approaches that introduce gradual and flexible reforms "South." This study seeks to share experiences,
are therefore more likely to succeed within the current successes, and difficulties in the use of MBIs by
regional context of ongoing institutional changes. countries throughout the region, and to promote a
Revenue collection is often a key function of MBIs, but beneficial "South-South" dialogue on these issues.
vii
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Summary
In general, environmental policies try to reduce environ- There is by no means a single standardized def-
mental degradation at the lowest possible social cost. A inition of an MBI. The definition used in this study
key means for achieving this is to somehow align private builds on the commonly held understanding that an
costs with social costs in such a way thai "externalities" MBI must, foremost, attempt to align private costs
become part of decisionmaking. Market-based instruments with social costs to reduce negative environmental
(MBIs) are receiving increased attention in many countries externalities. The particular strength of an MBI then
as a way to improve environmental quality. depends on the degree of flexibility that a polluter has
MBI approaches span a wide range of potential in achieving a given environmental target. A "weak"
mechanisms, and the literature lists literally hundreds of MBI essentially dictates through regulation the type of
individual instruments. At one extreme, they include process that must be used; failure to comply results in
fines or sanctions that are linked to traditional command- economic sanctions. A "strong" MBI would allow
and-control (CAC) regulations. At the other extreme, market forces to determine the best way to meet a
they include laissez-faire approaches that depend on given standard or goal. Flexibility is operationalized by
consumer advocacy or private litigation to provide equating it to the level of decentralization that occurs
incentives for improving environmental management. in transferring social (or state) decisions to the private
Between these extremes are the more familiar tax-and- (individual) level. A strong MBI thus decentralizes
subsidy approaches as well as less commonly used decisionmaking to a degree that the polluter or
mechanisms that rely on traded property rights. All resource user has a maximum amount of flexibility to
of these approaches, in their own fashion, attempt to select the production or consumption option that
internalize environmental costs. minimizes the social cost of achieving a particular
level of environmental quality.
Market-Based Instruments Are A commonly held belief is that strong MBIs areGaining WiderApplicationmore economically efficient and environmentallyGaining Wider Application effective than weak MBI or CAC approaches. The
theoretical literature shows that by providing incen-
tives to control pollution or other environmental
CO8 g - <,5 - - damages, MBIs have lower private compliance costs
a Iq A? o 5E °8 and can provide much-needed revenue for local
m m m u : t > government coffers. These factors have been largely
responsible for the early enthusiasm for using MBIs. In
practice, however, many countries are finding that
Tax/Tariff Relief 0 * * * * * * administrative costs associated with MBIs may
Deposit-Refund Schemes * 9 * 0 0 0 * 0 0 0 0 actually be higher. Monitoring requirements and other
enforcement activities characteristic of CAC measures
Waste Fee and Levies * - - * o - . o * - still are necessary for MBIs, but additional admin-
Fores . Taxation 0 * 0 6 istration efforts may also be required to cope with the
Forestry Taxation * * * odesign and institutional changes arising from MBI
Pollution Charges * * o * application. Recognition of this extra institutional
Earmarked Renewable * * * burden is one of the main subjects of this study.
Resource Taxes The main purpose of this work is to investigate the
Earmarked Conventional v v use of MBIs in the Latin American and Caribbean
Tax Levy context. The investigation covers a panel of 11 countries
Tradable Permits 0 0 0 (Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
Eco-Labeling * - - * * Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and
Venezuela) and a cross-section of issues (water supply
Liability Instruments * * * and abstraction, water quality, air quality, energy, solid
* In Place and liquid waste management, toxic substances, noise,
o Being Introduced and agriculture) within an urban setting.
1
2 Summary
Key F:indings: Existing Market-Based Instruments trade liberalization, public sector commercialization, and
fiscal reform are key features of recent experience in
The review revealed some general conclusions that Latin America and the Caribbean. In some cases, these
applied to the sample of study countries as a whole. MBRs provide an economic environment that is
7'here has been substantial experimentation with conducive to implementing MBIs; this is most often the
MBIs in Latin America and the Caribbean. MBIs across case where removal of subsidies more closely aligns
a wide range of mechanisms have been developed and private costs with social costs. In other instances,
applied in all of the countries investigated. however, MBIs may be inconsistent with ongoing
The primary historical role of MBIs in the region is reforms; deregulation often strikes down regulations that
to raise revenue. The major impetus behind using many are necessary for MBIs to operate, and public sector
of the MBIs in Latin America and the Caribbean has reforms may limit the amount of institutional
been to raise revenue. Other potential objectives-such strengthening that is required for MBIs to operate
as reduction of environmental impacts or improving the effectively. In either event, failure to take into account
cost-eiffectiveness of regulations-have been under- the linkages between MBIs and MBRs inevitably
emphasized or not attained. undermines MBI implementation.
Public awareness is low and uncertainty is high.
Weak participation among stakeholders, largely Specific Design Issues and Opportunities
inherited from authoritarian regimes of past decades,
poses a real constraint to the rapid implementation of The review also provided insights into five specific
complex MBI mechanisms. design areas.
Distribution, poverty, and tax implications. The
Exploding a Myth: MBI or CAC? social dimensions of MBIs-as expressed through their
potentially regressive nature or repercussions-is a
A common assumption regarding MBIs is that they form significant concern in the region, which has one of the
a ready substitute for outdated or inefficient CAC highest levels of inequality in the world.
regulatory procedures. This substitution opportunity is Perverse incentives. Some of the MBIs reviewed
not shared in Latin America and the Caribbean. For a had demonstrably perverse effects. For example, while
number of reasons, the implementation of MBIs will not the intent of a water pollution charge may be to reduce
providle a quick panacea for the problems often pollution, it may increase pollution if it is based on
associated with CAC procedures; MBIs also require effluent concentrations.
strong institutions, adequate legislation, and effective Tradable permits. There are opportunities for
monitoring and enforcement. Although there is definite introducing tradable permits in Latin America and the
scope for careful and timely implementation of certain Caribbean; a major constraint to their implementation is
MBIs, significant constraints will persist in three areas. finding an equitable initial allocation and trading regime
Institutional constraints to MBI implementation that is consistent with local market reform processes.
remain pervasive. Most of the countries surveyed had Earmarking. Specifically earmarking revenues from
existing legislation that established environmental MBIs to explicit environmental objectives is gaining
institutions and that provided for the use of economic increased favor in the region. The programs are most
incentives in environmental management. On paper, successful where (a) taxes or incentives are linked to
therefcre, everything is in place to use MBIs. In reality, existing collection mechanisms, and (b) amounts are made
however, institutional weaknesses-such as underfunding, available to decentralized authorities for environmental
inexperience, unclear jurisdiction, or lack of political programming or for institutional strengthening.
will-limit the effective implementation of MBIs. Advocacy. Consumer advocacy through voluntary
Administrative intensity of MBIs remains high. measures and public pressure (at times linked to formal
Monitoring requirements, legal design requirements, or voluntary liability instruments) plays a potentially
public consultation needs, and enforcement or collection critical role as an MBI in Latin American and Caribbean
needs of MBIs are not always noticeably different from countries. To a large degree, these mechanisms are
strict CAC approaches. MBIs are therefore not a interpreted as substitutes for historically weak insti-
substitate for weak institutions or for CAC; some tutional capacity.
regulatory elements are inevitably required, and a strong
institutional base is a prerequisite to MBI imple- Future Focus
mentation.
Market-based reforms (MBRs) may hinder or help Because the countries and issues reviewed were not a
MBI imnplementation. Macroeconomic reforms such as complete cross-section of all Latin America and the
Summary 3
Caribbean, most of the conclusions drawn in this study Second, while the revenue collection task of MBIs
are broad recommendations rather than definitive pre- has been highlighted, there still is a strong need to
scriptions. The MBI experience does, however, point channel revenues to local authorities to assist in
to some important areas for future work. building institutional capacity.
First, in some areas MBIs can be an important Finally, international donor agencies are most prone
means, if not the only one, for introducing some added to recommend OECD solutions with little regard to
efficiency to existing CAC mechanisms. The scope of institutional issues; to date, most of the information flow
the MBIs must, however, match the institutional regarding MBIs has been of a "North-South" variety. An
capacity to implement them. To this extent, MBI important opportunity has been missed to share
approaches that introduce gradual and flexible reforms environmental management experiences among
are more likely to be consistent with ongoing countries in the region. Increased information sharing in
institutional changes. a "South-South" dialog will benefit all parties.
Resumen
En general, las politicas ambientales intentan reducir la menos familiares basados en derechos de propiedad
degradaci6n ambiental al costo social mas bajo posible. comerciables. Todas estas aproximaciones, en su propio
Un medio clave para lograr esto es, de algun modo, estilo, intentan intemalizar los costos ambientales.
alinear los costos privados con los costos sociales de tal No hay una definici6n standard particular de un
forma que las "externalidades" Ileguen a ser parte instrumento de mercado. La definici6n usada en este
integral de la toma de decisiones. En muchos paises los estudio se construye sobre el entendimiento usualmente
instrumentos de mercado estan recibiendo una creciente sostenido de que un instrumento de mercado debe,
atenci6n con el fin de mejorar la calidad ambiental. primero, intentar equiparar o alinear los costos privados
Las aproximaciones basadas en instrumentos de con los costos sociales para reducir las externalidades.
mercado comprenden una amplia gama de mecanismos La "fortaleza" particular de un instrlmento de mercado
potenciales, y la literatura lista centenares de entonces depende del grado de flexibilidad que un
inst.rumentos particulares. En un de extremo, ellos contaminador tiene para lograr una meta ambiental
incluyen multas o sanciones que se vinculan con las determinada. Un instrumento de mercado "debil"
regulaciones tradicionales de "comando y control" esencialmente dicta mediante la regulaci6n que tipo de
(CAC). En otro extremo, ellos incluyen enfoques proceso debe usarse; el fracaso en el cumplimiento de la
basados en el "laissez-faire" que requieren la norma o regulaci6n resulta en sanciones econ6micas. Un
participaci6n activa del consumidor o el litigio privado instrumento de mercado "s6lido" permitirfa que las
como formas de incentivos para mejorar la gesti6n fuerzas del mercado determinen la mejor manera de
ambiental. Entre estos dos extremos, es posible curnplir con una meta o norma deterninada. La
encontrar aproximaciones mas familiares basadas en "flexibilidad" es operacionalizada si se ve como
"impuestos y subsidios" asi como los mecanismos equivalente al nivel de descentralizaci6n que ocurre al
transferir las decisiones sociales (o piblicas) al nivel
privado (o individual). Asi, un instrumento de mercado
Los instrumentos de mercado "'s6lido" descentraliza la toma de decisiones al extremo
estan experimentando una mayor en que el contaminador o el usuario del recurso tiene un
aplicaci6n en America Latina grado maximo de flexibilidad para seleccionar la opci6n
de consumo o producci6n que minimiza el costo social
de lograr un nivel particular de calidad ambiental.
8 g . F <,, Una creencia usualmente sostenida es que los
U i' °<Eo E n- ax instrumentos de mercado "sl6idos" son econ6micamente
mmmm cuYo L -i a mas eficientes y ambientalmente mas efectivos que los
Subsidios crediticos * * * e * instrumentos de mercado "debiles" y que las
Excneracirn t ibutana/arancelaria * * * * * * * aproximaciones de comando y control. La literatura
te6rica muestra que, al proveer incentivos para controlar
Esquemas de dep6sfto-devoluci6n 0 o 9 o 0 0 0 0 0 & o la contaminaci6n u otros dafios ambientales, los
Cobros e impuestos por desechos * * * * * * * * * * instrumentos de mercado han abaratado los costos
Impuestos forestales * - * privados de cumplimniento y pueden proveer gran parte
de las rentas necesitadas en las arcas de los gobiernos
Cargos por contaminaci6n 0 0 0 locales. Estos factores han sido largamente responsables
Impuestos a la expolotaci6n de
rec:ursos naturales renovables cuya * * * del entusiasmo inicial por usar instrumentos de mercado.
recaudaci6n es para un fin especifico En la practica, sin embargo, muchos paLses estan
Recaudaci6n onvencional de 0 e qimpuestos para un fin especfico encontrando que los costos administrativos asociados
Permisos comercables o * o con los instrumentos de mercado pueden ser altos. Los
Etiquetado ecol6gico ("verde") 0 * * * * requerimientos de monitoreo y las demas actividades
para asegurar que las leyes son observadas son similares
ins trumentos de responsibilidad 0 a aquellos requerimientos asociado s con los
* En aplicaci6n instrumentos de comando y control. Asimismo, pueden
o Bajo introducd6n requerirse esfuerzos adicionales de administraci6n para
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abordar el disefio y los cambios institucionales surgidos legislaci6n adecuada, y un efectivo monitoreo y
a partir de la aplicaci6n del instrumento de mercado. El verificaci6n del cumplimiento de la ley. Aunque hay un
reconocimiento de esta carga institucional adicional es alcance definido para la implementaci6n cuidadosa y
uno de los temas principales de este estudio. oportuna de ciertos instrumentos de mercado, sin embargo,
El prop6sito principal de este trabajo es investigar persistiran limitaciones importantes en tres areas.
el uso de instrumentos de mercado en el contexto de Existen restricciones institucionales generalizadas
America Latina y el Caribe. La investigaci6n cubre un a la implementaci6n de instrumentos de mercado. La
grupo de once paises (Barbados, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, mayorfa de los pafses estudiados tiene una legislaci6n
Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Perd, Trinidad y existente que establece instituciones ambientales y
Tobago, y Venezuela) y una secci6n transversal de contempla el uso de incentivos econ6micos en la gesti6n
temas (abastecimiento y extracci6n de agua, calidad de ambiental. En el papel, por lo tanto, todo esta listo para
agua, calidad de aire, energia, gesti6n de desechos usar instrumentos de mercado. En la realidad, sin
s6lidos y liquidos, sustancias t6xicas, ruido, y embargo, las debilidades institucionales -tales como
agricultura) dentro del ambito urbano. deficit presupuestal, inexperiencia, jurisdicci6n o
competencias poco claras, o la falta de voluntad
Hallazgos claves: instrumentos de mercado politica- limitan la implementaci6n efectiva de
existentes instrumentos de mercado.
La intensidad administrativa de los instrumentos de
La revisi6n revel6 algunas conclusiones generales que se mercado es alta. Los requerimientos de monitoreo, los
aplicaron a la muestra de paises estudiados como un todo. requerimientos de disenio legal, las necesidades de
Ha habido una experimentacion considerable con consulta puiblica, y las necesidades de recaudaci6n o
instrumentos de mercado en America Latina. En todos verificaci6n del cumplimiento de la ley asociadas con la
los paises investigados se han desarrollado y aplicado implementaci6n de instrumentos de mercado no siempre
instrumentos de mercado a traves de una gama amplia de son marcadamente diferentes de requerimientos y
mecanismos. necesidades de las aproximaciones estrictas de comando
El papel hist6rico principal de los instrumentos de y control. Por lo tanto, los instrumentos de mercado no
mercado en America Latina es generar rentas. En son un sustituto para instituciones debiles o para
America Latina el impulso principal detrds del uso de instrumentos de comando y control; inevitablemente se
muchos de los instrumentos de mercado ha sido generar requiere de algunos elementos regulatorios; y una base
rentas. Otros objetivos potenciales -tales como la institucional fuerte es un prerequisito para la
reducci6n de los impactos ambientales o la mejora en el implementaci6n de instrumentos de mercado.
costo-efectividad de las regulaciones- han sido Las reformas basadas en el mercado pueden estorbar
pobremente enfatizados o no se han logrado. o apoyar la implementaci6n de instrumentos de mercado.
La conciencia publica es baja y la incertidumbre es Las reformas macroecon6micas tales como la
alta. La debil participaci6n entre los sectores de la liberalizaci6n del comercio, la comercializaci6n del sector
sociedad involucrados, mayormente heredada de publico, y la reforma fiscal son caracteristicas importantes
regimenes autoritarios de decadas pasadas, pone una de la reciente experiencia latinoamnericana. En algunos
limitaci6n real a la rdpida implementaci6n de casos, estas reformas del mercado proporcionan un
instrumentos de mercado complejos. ambiente econ6mico que es apropiado para implementar
instrumentos de mercado; este es frecuentemente el caso
Refutando un mito: &instrumentos de mercado donde la eliminaci6n de subsidios hace que los costos
o comando y control? privados esten mas cercanos a los costos sociales. En otros
casos, sin embargo, los instrumentos de mercado pueden
Un supuesto comdn con respecto a los instrumentos de ser inconsistentes con reformas en marcha; la
mercado es que ellos constituyen un sustituto para los desregulaci6n frecuentemente relaja las regulaciones
procedimientos regulatorios de comando y control necesarias para que operen los instrumentos de mercado, y
obsoletos o ineficientes. Esta oportunidad de sustituci6n las reformas del sector pdblico pueden limitar el grado de
no es compartida en America Latina. Debido a un fortalecimiento institucional requerido para que los
numero de razones, la implementaci6n de instrumentos instrumentos de mercado operen efectivamente. En
de mercado no proporcionara una rdpida panacea para cualquier caso, la falla en considerar los vinculos entre
los problemas frecuentemente asociados con los instrumentos de mercado y reformas de mercado
procedimientos de comando y control; los instrumentos inevitablemente socava la implementaci6n de
de mercado tambien requieren instituciones fuertes, instrumentos de mercado.
6 Resumen
Asuntos relativos al disefio especifico de en los paises de America Latina. En un mayor grado,
instirumentos de mercado y oportunidades estos mecanismos son interpretados como sustitutos para
existentes la capacidad institucional hist6ricamente debil.
La revisi6n tambien proporcion6 conocimientos en cinco Enfasis futuro
areas especificas relativas al disefio.
Distribuci6n, pobreza e incidencia tributaria. Las Debido a que el grupo de paises y los temas revisados no
dimensi6nes sociales de los instrumentos de mercado - representaron una secci6n transversal completa al no
expresadas a traves de su naturaleza o incidencia cubrir todo America Latina y el Caribe, las conclusiones
potencialmente regresiva- es una preocupaci6n alcanzadas en este estudio son mayormente sugerencias
importante en America Latina, regi6n que tiene uno de y no tanto prescripciones definitivas. La experiencia con
los niveles mas altos de desigualdad en el mundo. instrumentos de mercado, sin embargo, apunta a algunas
Incentivos perversos. Algunos de los instrumentos areas importantes para un futuro trabajo.
de mercado revisados de hecho tuvieron efectos Primero, en algunas areas los instrumentos de
perversos. Por ejemplo, mientras la intenci6n de un mercado pueden ser un medio importante, si no el unico,
cargo por contaminaci6n de agua puede ser reducir la para introducir alguna eficiencia adicional a los
contaminaci6n, sin embargo, tambien puede aumentar la instrumentos de comando y control existentes. El
contaminaci6n si dicho cargo estd basado en las alcance de los instrumentos de mercado debe, sin
concentraciones del efluente. embargo, equipararse con la capacidad institucional para
Permisos comerciables. Hay oportunidades para implementarlos. En este sentido, las aproximaciones
introducir permisos comerciables en America Latina; basadas en instrumentos de mercado que introducen
una limitaci6n importante para su implementaci6n es reformas graduales yflexibles probablemente seran mas
encontrar una asignaci6n inicial equitativa y un regimen consistentes con los cambios institucionales en marcha.
de in,tercambio (de los permisos) que es consistente con Segundo, mientras la tarea de recaudaci6n de rentas
los procesos locales de reforma del mercado. de la aplicaci6n de instrumentos de mercado ha sido
Destino especifico de los fondos recaudados. El resaltada, todavia existe una fuerte necesidad de
destinar las rentas provenientes de los instrumentos de canalizar las rentas a las autoridades locales para
mercado especificamente para objetivos ambientales ayudarlas a construir la capacidad institucional
explicitos esta ganando fuerza en America Latina. Los requerida.
programas son mas exitosos cuando (a) los impuestos o Finalmente, las agencias donantes intemacionales
incentivos estdn vinculados a los mecanismos de mayormente estan dispuestas a recomendar las
recolecci6n existentes, y (b) los montos son puestos a soluciones de la Organizaci6n para la Cooperaci6n y el
disposici6n de las autoridades descentralizadas para Desarrollo Econ6mico (OCDE) con poca consideraci6n
progiramas ambientales o para el fortalecimiento a los asuntos institucionales. A la fecha gran parte del
institucional. flujo de informaci6n con respecto a instrumentos de
Defensa del consumidor. La defensa hecha por el mercado ha sido del tipo "norte-sur". Se ha perdido una
cons amidor mediante medidas voluntarias y la presi6n oportunidad importante para compartir experiencias de
pdblica (a veces vinculada a instrumentos de gesti6n ambiental entre los paises latinoamericanos. Un
responsabilidad voluntaria o formal) juega un papel mayor intercambio de informaci6n en un dialogo "sur-
potencialmente crftico como un instrumento de mercado sur" beneficiara a todas las partes.
1. Introduction
Background More recent reviews by the OECD indicate that
many of these are also gaining favor in developing
In 1989 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and countries (OECD 1991). The use of MBIs has also been
Development (OECD) identified more than 100 different endorsed within the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environ-
types of market-based instruments (MBIs) at a time ment and Development as an important component of
when such environmental management policies were sustainable development (Box 1.1).
first being considered in many countries (OECD 1989). But there is increasing evidence that, as with
Examples of these included packaging taxes, effluent command-and-control (CAC) procedures, MBIs are facing
taxes and charges, capital or operating subsidies, trad- constraints-even in industrial countries-by limited
able permits, deposit-refund schemes, performance institutional capacity to oversee them (OECD 1994a, 1994b;
bonds, liability instruments, and many others. Early Scott and others 1995). Many countries are therefore
OECD experiences showed that relying on MBIs can taking a closer look at how MBIs might be applied.
(a) decrease compliance costs by industry, (b) decrease The purpose of this work is to review the practical
administrative burdens on the public sector, (c) improve application of MBIs in the context of Latin America and
environmental conditions in urban air quality and urban the Caribbean. A panel was selected of 11 countries-
water quality, (d) decrease emissions and effluents of Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador,
toxic and nontoxic wastes, (e) improve human health Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and
conditions, which in turn improves economic produc- Venezuela-in which to investigate the current use of
tivity and decreases health care costs, and (f) contribute MBIs in the region and to determine whether there are
to institutional sustainability by supporting cost-effective particular opportunities or constraints in their
public sector institutions that cooperate with the private implementation. The study provides input to various
sector and nongovernmental organizations. countries' planning processes and provides a mechanism
Box 1.1 The Road from Rio
Solutions to environmental problems require improved management of the developmental process, with a greater
emphasis on internalizing environmental costs. Policymakers face the challenge of identifying policies and
strategies that make it in everyone's economic interest to utilize environmentally sound products and services.
Market-based systems of incentives and disincentives that motivate economic behavior are emerging as powerful,
cost-effective methods of achieving environmental goals.
The intemalization of environmental costs in sustainable development, and the role of economic instruments in
this process, has become well-entrenched in documents emerging from the Earth Summit in 1992:
"National authorities should endeavor to promote the internalization of environmental costs and the use of
economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost
of pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade and
investment."
-Principle 16, Rio Declaration, United Nations, 1992
"Governments are encouraged to apply economic and regulatory instruments ... to support the principle
that generators of waste pay for their disposal."
-Chapter 21, Agenda 21, United Nations, 1992
"Countries are encouraged to develop fiscal and policy incentives and other measures to encourage
environmentally sustainable imports and local products with low waste or degradable waste content."
-Programme of Action on the Sustainable Development of
Small Island Developing States, United Nations, 1994
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for information sharing within the countries of Latin * Urban poverty and environmental degradation
Ameiica and the Caribbean. are strongly linked. The poor pay more for envi-
In each country, two or three "high-priority areas" ronmental services, have poorer access, and often
were selected. These were selected from a list that live in the most hazardous areas.
included issues such as water supply and abstraction, * Spatial location provides important opportunities
water quality, energy, air quality, solid and liquid waste and constraints to sound management. Concen-
management (including toxic substances), noise, and tration of industries can facilitate cost-effective
urban agriculture. Because there were limits to the pollution control, while a highly dispersed in-
number of countries selected and the number of issues formal sector can be mostly unmanageable.1
addressed, many of the conclusions and recommenda- * High-income cities have different problems from
tions drawn in this work should be regarded as indicative low-income cities. All cities are plagued by sur-
rather than definitive and prescriptive. face water pollution and inadequate solid waste
management. Basic sanitation tends to be a
The Urban Challenge common problem for low-income cities, whereas
hazardous waste management and ambient air
About 50 percent of the world's population lives in pollution control are typical high-priority prob-
urban centers, and in most parts of the world this lems for high-income cities.
proportion is increasing as people are attracted to the * Environmental management is complex and in-
opportunities and services offered by such centers. But stitutions are usually not synchronized. Overlap-
urbanization has, in both industrial and developing ping jurisdictions and lack of accountability will
countries, often created a concomitant rise in con- often undermine management efforts.
gestion, crime, urban poverty, and environmental * Urban problems often have impacts that reach far
degradation that has stymied the best efforts of city beyond urban areas. Cities draw in resources and
planners. Responses to this environmental and social dispose of wastes in surrounding areas, degrading
degradation have been mixed. A small number of cities environmental quality in these and "peri-urban"
are starting to come to grips with the full extent of the and raral zones.
challenge of addressing these myriad urban problems. These observations are simply a synopsis of the
Others attempt to address the problems through low- growing realization that achieving "urban sustainability"
cost, piecemeal solutions: for example, Jakarta city will require concurrent management of economic, envi-
administrators recently announced a ban on highly ronmental, social, and institutional change. To be
polluting (but highly popular) motorized three- implemented successfully, MBIs also must conform to
wheelers to reduce congestion and pollution. Many goals within each of these dimensions.
jurisdictions simply ignore the problems. In Latin America, the need for an urban focus be-
The decline in quality of life in some cities has led comes clear, however, because of the health benefits that
some to argue that the process of urbanization should could be derived from cleaning up pollution in urban
itself be discouraged. At one extreme this may even areas (Table 1.1). The estimates clearly show that
imply a complete laissez-faire approach that allows (a) urban pollution problems are a relevant priority in
urban quality to decline to the extent that people are environmental management, (b) the higher health costs
eventually forced out by economic necessity; this due to water pollution indicate that sanitation is still the
occurred, for example, in Lagos and some other cities main environmental priority, and (c) air pollution prob-
where urbanization declined for a brief period as the lems cannot be neglected.
urban poor moved to rural areas to escape urban poverty. A central focus of all of the country studies was
But for the most part the pressures that lead to urbaniza- therefore to investigate the use of MBIs within an urban
tion are expected to persist well into the next century, context. But in many cases the review of MEBIs also
and the well-being of countries and economies will de- showed that they were being applied in areas dealing
pend on the existence of vibrant urban centers. The with mining, petroleum, or renewable resource devel-
challenge is thus not to prevent urbanization, but to opment.
manage it in a way that is consistent with the sustainable
development goals of the country as a whole. 1. Recent work suggests, however, that the relative size
Many studies have been done of how best to man- and extent of the informal sector shrinks with higher income
age urban problems (Davey 1993; Kingsley and others levels (World Bank 1995e, p. 35); this implies that interven-
1994; McGranahan and Songsore 1994; Leitmann 1995). tions for environmental management of some components of
Such studies generally concur that: this sector may be of lower priority.
Introduction 9
Table 1.1 Cost of Health Impacts Associated with Urban Pollution in Latin America
Annual Cost of Health Impacts (US$ million)
Country Area Covered by Estimate Water Pollution Air Pollution
Brazil Nationwide 130-389
Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Cubatao - 2.4-3.5
Chile Santiago 96-149 100
Colombia Bogota 16.9 4.9-15.6
Ecuador Pichincha, Guayas, and El Oro 133
Quito 57
Mexico Nationwide 3,600
Mexico City - 1,077
Peru Nationwide 500-1,000
- Not available.
Note: Similar methods were used in calculating the costs for different countries and cities. The estimates are based on
foregone output caused by cases of morbidity and mortality plus respective hospital costs. Each country study reflects local
conditions corresponding to (a) regional coverage consistent with data availability, (b) dose-response functions to correlate
pollution level to health impacts, (c) diseases according to highest incidence, (d) rates of discount reflecting local productiv-
ity, and (e) local income levels for foregone output.
Source: Estimates by Seroa da Motta and Mendes 1995a, 1995b, 1996.
Outline applied to analyze conditions.2 This paper summarizes
and interprets the findings as follows:
The general project methodology is to use a case study * Chapter 2, Regulations, Market-Based Instruments,
approach that highlights the major trends and develop- and Macropolicies, provides a general framework
ments in managing urban environmental quality. Within for investigating the use of MBIs in Latin Ameri-
high-priority areas, this helps identify potential regu- can and the Caribbean. MBIs are defined and a
latory and market-based mechanisms (for example, classification of the different approaches is pro-
pricing interventions) that are socially, environmentally, vided. The issue of linking MBIs to general
and economically beneficial (these are often referred to market-based reforms (MBRs) through the macro-
as "win-win-win" strategies.) economic policy regime is also introduced here.
The specific scope of the work is to compare-in * Chapter 3, Institutional Frameworks in Latin
the urban sector-different environmental management America and the Caribbean, describes the legisla-
methods, focusing on options that use some form of tive and institutional setting in the study countries.
MBI, and where possible comparing these options to Major lessons are drawn within a context of pro-
highly centralized regulatory approaches. One concern is moting "institutional sustainability." The key
that in Latin America and the Caribbean, as in many theme of this chapter is that various institutional
developing countries, the institutional capacity to constraints will continue to plague implementation
implement a wider range of management techniques is a of environmental management whether it is in the
major constraint to implementing environmentally form of a CAC or strong MBI approach.
effective and economically efficient reform. The study * Chapter 4, Market-Based Instruments in Latin
therefore address this concern by analyzing the institu- America and the Caribbean, describes the current
tional requirements in light of institutional capacity experience with MBIs in the study countries. It
constraints. demonstrates the relatively wide experimentation
A key audience for this work are the practitioners with MBIs, and their focus as a revenue-
involved in institutional design, as well as decisionmak-
ers working within such institutions in Latin America
and the Caribbean. ~~~~~~~~2. Executive summaries of the country studies are ap-and the Caribbean. pended to this report. The full studies are available from the
In all of the case studies some common themes country study authors or from the project task manager,
have been pursued, and a consistent methodology was Richard M. Huber (LCSES).
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generating device. It also reveals the importance of ticular, this chapter summarizes findings about the
strong institutions and consistent MBRs in making (a) social issues relating to distribution, poverty,
implementation of MBIs successful. and tax implications, (b) prevalence of "perverse
Chapter 5, Additional Issues in Design of Market- incentives," (c) role of tradable pernits, (d) role of
Based Instruments, addresses selected MBI design earmarking, and (e) role of legal redress through
issues that often arise in the theoretical literature advocacy.
and that have additional interesting dimensions in * Chapter 6 provides concluding remarks relating to
the Latin American and Caribbean context. In par- the main lessons extracted from the country studies.
2. Regulations, Market-Based
Instruments, and Macropolicies
This chapter provides a general framework for investigating MBI essentially dictates through regulation the type of
the use of MBIs in Latin America and the Caribbean. MBIs process that must be used; failure to comply results in
are defined and a classification of the different approaches is economic sanctions. A very "strong" MBI would allow
provided. The issue of linking MBIs to general market- market forces to determine the best way to meet a given
based reforms (MBRs) through the macroeconomic policy standard or goal.
regime is also introduced here. Flexibility is operationalized by equating it to the
level of decentralization that occurs in transferring social
Regulations and Market-Based (or state) decisions to the private (individual) level. A
Instruments-A Framework strong MBI decentralizes decisionmaking to a degree
that the polluter or resource user has a maximum amount
There are a number of general economic principles that of flexibility to select the production or consumption
form the background philosophy for an economically option that minimizes the social cost of achieving a par-
and environmentally sustainable strategy. The two most ticular level of environmental quality; profit- or utility-
often enunciated include the maximizing behavior in this case
polluter-pays and precautionary also generates a "lowest social
principles. The polluter-pays (or "A STRONG MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENT cost" outcome. This study thus
user-pays) principle assigns decentralizesdecisionmaking toa degree focuses on the cost-effectiveness
rights that allow internalization that the polluter or resource user has a of reducing externalities in de-
of costs that would not normally maximum amount offlexibility to select the fining an MBI. This interpreta-
be incurred by the polluter or production or consumption option that tion provides scope both for
user (externalities). The precau- minimizes the social cost of achieving a internalizing the costs or benefits
tionary principle provides a particular level of environmental quality." of any externality while allowing
mechanism for dealing with the - Study Definition the freedom of choice that will
uncertainty of impacts (Perrings permit users to select an appro-
1991; O'Riordan and Cameron 1995). priate technology for optimizing envirmmental quality.
A number of mechanisms have been developed and Table 2.1 illustrates the broad spectrum of instru-
used to promote these principles (Asian Development ments that might be available, all of which implicitly or
Bank 1990a, 1990b, 1990c; Tietenberg 1990; Erocal 1991; explicitly have some incentive effect. These fall across a
Kreimer and others 1993; Bates and others 1994). At one continuum ranging from very strict command ap-
extreme they include fines or sanctions that are linked proaches to decentralized approaches that rely more on
to traditional command-and-control (CAC) regulations. market or legal mechanisms. Even traditional CAC
At the other extreme they include laissez-faire ap- regulations, with heavy fines, create a presumed incen-
proaches that require consumer advocacy or private liti- tive effect because the polluter would be compelled to
gation to act as incentives for improving environmental comply with the regulations to avoid the sanctions.
management. In between we find more familiar tax-and-
subsidy approaches as well as the less familiar mecha- Goals of Market-Based Instruments
nisms relying on traded property rights. All of these
approaches, in their own fashion, attempt to internalize In principle, therefore, there are a wide range of methods
environmental costs. available for attempting to regulate or manage urban
There is by no means a single standardized defini- environmental quality. Each of these intend to address a
tion of an MBI. The definition used in this study builds variety of goals.
on the commonly held understanding that an MBI must, One goal associated with decentralized decision-
foremost, attempt to align private costs with social costs making relates to cost-effectiveness. The asymmetry of
to reduce externalities (Panayotou 1995). Within this information, for example, often implies that private
definition, the particular strength of an MBI then de- firms are more likely than governments to identify the
pends on the degree of flexibility that a polluter has in most cost-effective means for achieving a given level of
achieving a given environmental target. A very "weak" pollution control (Box 2.2). This forns the basis for the
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Box 2.1 OECD Environmental Taxation in the 1980s
The role of environmental taxes has been growing both politically and economically. In the 1980s it was foreseen by
many observers that reduced government intervention could lead to a more prominent role for economic instruments,
particularly taxes, providing incentives to change polluter behavior.
When MBIs were proposed, they were often regarded as a potential substitute for command-and-control ap-
proaches. Moreover, they were frequently touted as having strong incentive effects that could, if properly estimated,
be harnessed to achieve a socially optimal level of pollution abatement or environmental degradation. Experience
within the OECD, however, shows that neither of these presumed roles of MBIs have been widely applied:
"[OECD surveys indicate that] the role of charges has been extended, although their revenue raising capabili-
ties have remained the dominant function. . . . Although an increasing number of charge schemes show
incentive purposes, not much evidence exists that such instruments will replace direct regulation as part of the
process towards reducing government intervention."
Source: OECD 1994b, 1995.
common theoretical result that-if one focuses entirely ment (Box 2.3). A policy decision must be made relating to
on private costs-strong forms of MBIs are more cost- how much additional revenue (beyond the maximum) a
effective than their weaker counterparts or than CAC govenmment is willing to give up to generate higher levels of
approaches (Tietenberg 1992). abatement. The answer to this policy question should be
Another fundamental goal of most environmental related to the marginal benefits of pollution abatement, but
regulatoiy systems is to decrease externalities. Extemali- in fact it typically is more a function of government budget-
ties exist where the agent making the production or con- ary realities that regard such taxes as a convenient means for
sumption decision does not bear all of the costs or benefits underwriting environmental management efforts.
of this decision. Externalities abound in environmental Finally, policymakers are continually faced with high
issues. P'ollution disposed of into a waterway may be a levels of scientific uncertainty in designing regulatory
low-cost solution to waste disposal for the polluter, but systems; one goal of intervention is to address uncertainty.
firms and individuals downstream may suffer conse- This has caused some analysts (Lonergan, Ruitenbeek, and
quences through higher costs from lost fishery production, Dearden 1994) to recommend the use of surcharges to deal
higher vvater treatment costs, lower amenity values (for with some of the uncertainties of resource use in a com-
recreation), or loss of critical drinking water supplies. plex system.
Most economic incentive structures attempt to transfer
some of this cost back to the individual responsible for the
decision. A similar situation could exist with environ- Box 2.2 Firms' Compliance Costs: MBIs
mentally beneficial decisions; a firm that cleans polluted versus CAC
intake water and then discharges clean water after using it A study undertaken for the industrial sector in the
in its internal process would, in fact, be creating a positive state of Sao Paulo reveals that the use of a pre-
externality, and in such cases it could be argued that it is sumptive tax for organic matter-to achieve a
optimal to provide subsidies to such a firm in direct pro- certain level of total abatement in the state's main
portion to the value of this external benefit. river basin-may reduce by 70 percent the total
A third goal that many policymakers have when de- private abatement costs incurred by the sector
signing an appropriate economic incentive system is revenue when compared with a traditional command-and-
generati.onL There are, however, practical tradeoffs to con- control approach. The private cost savings, esti-
sider between revenue generation and incentive effects. In mated as an annual value of approximately
principle it would be possible to levy a very high charge that US$6 million, are paid by firms as taxation for
effectively discourages all polluting activity. Abatement their residual pollution. That tax revenue may be
levels would be very high in such a case, but no revenue small when compared to other fiscal revenue
would be generated. Similarly, very low charges would sources, but it is a source of public revenue that can
generate little revenue and generate little abatement because be used either for other purposes (such as education
there is no incentive for firms to reduce pollution. Typically, or health care) or for environmental expenditures.
the abatement-revenue function is an "inverted U" in which
revenue is maximized at some intermediate level of abate-
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Table 2.1 Classification of Policy Instruments Based on Decentralization and
Flexibility in Individual Decisionmaking
-------Minimum Flexibility------> <------ Moderate Flexibility ------> <------ Maximum Flexibility ------>
<--- Maximum Government Involvement --- > <--- Increased Private Initiative --- >
<-Control-Oriented-> <---------------------Market-Oriented----------------------> <-Litigation-Oriented->
Regulations Charges, Taxes, Market Final Demand Liability
and Sanctions and Fees Creation Intervention Legislation
General Examples
Standards: Government Effluent or User Tradable Permits: Gov- Performance Rating: Strict Liability Legisla-
restricts nature and Charges: Government emment establishes a Govemment supports a tion: The polluter or
amount of pollution or charges fee to individual system of tradable per- labeling or performance resource user is required
resource use for individ- polluters or resource mits for pollution or rating program that re- by law to pay any dam-
ual polluters or resource users based on amount of resource use, auctions or quires disclosure of ages to those affected.
users. Compliance is pollution or resource use distributes permits, and environmental informa- Damaged parties collect
monitored and sanctions and nature of receiving monitors compliance. tion on the final end-use settlements through
imposed (fines, closure, medium. Fee is high Polluters or resource product. Performance litigation and the court
jail terms) for noncom- enough to create incen- users trade permits at based on adoption of system.
pliance. tive to reduce impacts. unregulated market ISO 14000 voluntary
prices. guidelines (for example,
zero discharge of pollut-
ants, mitigation plans
submitted, pollution
prevention technology
adopted, reuse policies
and recycling of wastes).
Eco-labels are attached
to "environmentally
friendly" products.
.............................. ........................... ............................................................. ........ ........ .. .... .. ................ ................ . ............. ..... ....... ........................................... .......... _ .
Specific Examples of Urban Applications
* Pollution standards * Noncompliance . Market-based expro- * Consumer product . Damages compensa-
* Licensing of economic pollution charges priation for construc- labeling (eco-labels) tion
activities * Greening of conven- tion, including relating to problem * Liability on neglecting
. Land use restrictions tional taxes "environmental materials (for example, firm's managers and
* Construction impact - Royalties and financial values" phosphates in deter- environmental
regulations for roads, compensation for natu- * Property rights at- gents) authorities
pipelines, ports, or ral resources exploita- tached to resources * Education regarding * Long-term perform-
communications grids tion potentially impacted recycling and reuse ance bonds posted for
* Environmental - Performance bonds by urban development . Disclosure legislation potential or uncertain
guidelines for urban posted for construction (forests, lands, requiring manufactur- hazards from infra-
road alignments standards fisheries) ers to publish solid, structure construction
. Fines for spills from . Taxes affecting . Deposit-refund sys- liquid, and toxic waste . "Zero net impact"
port or land-based intermodal transport tems for solid and generation requirements for road
storage facilities choices hazardous wastes . Blacklist of polluters alignments, pipelines
* Bans applied to . Taxes to encourage * Tradable permits for or utility rights of way,
materials deemed reuse or recycling of water abstraction and water crossings
unacceptable for solid problem materials (for rights, and water and
waste collection example, tire taxes and air pollution emissions
services battery taxes)
. Water use quotas * Source-based effluent
charges to reduce
downstream water
treating requirements
* Tipping fees on solid
wastes
* User charges for water
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Examples of Market-Based Instruments such a case. In practice, however, analysts typically find
that public firms are the least accountable and have little
Within the MBI definition, there are a number of differ- internal incentive to meet even their own environmental
ent approaches that might be construed as incentive standards and guidelines (Ser6a da Motta 1991).
systems.
Strict Legal Sanctions
Public Sector Monopoly Environmental laws in most countries provide-in the-
Traditional models of public sector monopoly have ar- ory-for severe penalties in the event that prescribed
gued that an "environmentally friendly" public firm, regulations are not followed. In practice, however, such
which looks after all production levels, can be designed penalties are often not enforced because of a wide vari-
such that all of its production decisions are optimal, in- ety of constraints, and they must be implemented in
cluding those relating to environmental costs and bene- conjunction with less adversarial procedures to be effec-
fits. In theory, no specific MBIs would be required in tive. These problems have been addressed through vari-
Box 2.3 Revenues versus Incentives: An Example of the Tradeoffs
One means of raising incremental revenue can be through an incentive-based tax, such as a presumptive tax, that is
based on presumed levels of pollution from specific polluters. To explore the potential contribution of such a charge,
an estimate was made of annual revenues if applied to light and medium industry in Guyana. Generic "cost versus
abaterment" models were used for typical industrial structures, and were applied to industries in Guyana.
Low taxes generate few revenues and little abatement. High taxes can achieve higher levels of abatement, but they
do nol: necessarily generate a large degree of revenue; the higher tax levels create an incentive to cut back on pollution
and thus also will not generate much net revenue. As shown below, the maximum (assuming 100 percent collection
efficiency) that might be collected through such a tax on the entire Guyanese manufacturing industry is approximately
US$137,000 annually. The resultant annual revenues arising from a presumptive tax, at different levels of abatement,
are shown below.
It is notable that in Latin America and the Caribbean, as in many OECD countries, revenue generation is often a
central goal of MBIs. MBIs are generally not used to generate a "social optimum," which may be defined as that level
of abatement at which marginal social costs equal marginal social benefits. On the accompanying diagram, such an
optimum would require the estimation of costs and benefits at each level of abatement: such an exercise is typically
beyond the institutional capacity of many government environmental agencies.
Pollution Abatement versus Tax Revenue from MBIs in Guyana
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Source: Estimates by Ruitenbeek (1995).
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ous mechanisms. In Trinidad and Tobago, for example, often limited because of inadequate human resources, or
the use of an Environmental Tribunal, coupled with a inadequate supportive infrastructure such as environ-
focus on consensus building and voluntary (incentive- mental information or monitoring networks. Third, local
based) structures has the advantage that it avoids an financing constraints arise because authority for envi-
adversarial system wherever possible. Also, a require- ronmental regulations is often delegated to lower (local)
ment for self-monitoring in Trinidad and Tobago de- levels of government without adequate sources of fi-
creases administrative costs substantially. nancing for implementing and monitoring the regula-
tions. Fourth, conflicting standards often prevail where
Regulations, Fines, and Penalties individual ministries or departments have been responsi-
Centralized control-oriented approaches relying exten- ble for setting environmental regulations within their
sively on regulatory guidelines, permits, or licenses have own departments; lack of coordination often leads to
traditionally been the preferred mechanisms for control- conflicting or overlapping regulations. This is often most
ling environmental impacts in urban areas (Box 2.4). pronounced for water-related issues because of the nu-
Although it is technically simple to impose regulations merous stakeholders involved in water use. Finally, con-
with specific fines for noncompliance, the problems flict of interest within government programs exists
associated with implementing them and achieving com- where government agencies are themselves the imple-
pliance are for many developing countries insurmountable. menting or investing authority; self-regulation becomes
First, "regulatory drag" can occur when the regula- problematic under such circumstances and seldom are
tory approval system, because it is overburdened, unnec- there built-in incentives to ensure compliance. This is
essarily holds up critically important investments, and in especially a problem with common infrastructure facili-
so doing acts as a drag on economic development pros- ties (such as roads and ports), which typically are a gov-
pects. Second, the capacity to implement regulations is emient mandate.
Box 2.4 Air and Water Quality Regulations in Mexico
The most significant example of increasing environmental problems is in the Mexico City Metropolitan Zone
(MCMZ), which harbors more than 30,000 polluting companies. Three million vehicles circulate daily and 20 mil-
lion people reside there. The high incidence of atmospheric pollution, as well as the greater water demand for resi-
dential and industrial use, put the well-being of a large number of people in danger. Increased incidence of pulmo-
nary disease and gastroenteritis is occurring.
The environmental problems in Mexico City are not restricted to the valley because 30 percent of the water used
comes from places more than 100 kilometers away. In other cases, the discharges of wastewater are deposited in ag-
ricultural lands causing water quality deterioration.
In addition to the high levels of atmospheric pollution and water demand in the MCMZ, the border area with the
United States presents a widespread problem of toxic and hazardous substances. This area has rapid industrial and
population growth from assembly factories.
To date, the Mexican authorities have faced the problems of environmental deterioration by imposing laws and
operational norms. The environmental administration in Mexico is based legally in the country's constitution and
detailed in the General Environmental Protection Law of 1988. There are also several related laws and regulations,
the most important being the water law and the regulations on hazardous wastes.
The main instruments derived from the Mexican laws are the Official Mexican Norms (OMNs); these give spe-
cific guidelines for the quality of natural and environmental resources. There are 33 water OMNs that set specific
standards for wastewater discharge and establish limits for pollutant emissions in each industrial sector. There are 18
OMNs for atmospheric contamination: 5 for monitoring, 5 for stationary sources, and 8 for mobile sources. Norms
have also been published for solid wastes, hazardous materials, and use of natural resources. Authorities require
environmental impact studies and operating licenses for different activities.
Besides the OMNs, there are selected measures to control air pollution in Mexico City. The most important is the
"Don't Drive Today" program that prohibits circulation of 20 percent of vehicles in the MCMZ on a revolving basis.
Verification of vehicular emissions is required at least once per year. Catalytic converters have been required since 1991.
Source: Belausteguigoitia and others 1995.
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User Charges and Taxes (or Subsidies) Deposit-refund systems are also based on a market
Some of the greatest opportunities for improved envi- created to buy back sources of solid wastes. These have
ronmental management include those arising from ap- been used extensively to promote recycling. Such
propriate market-oriented instruments. The application schemes are also appropriate for difficult problems such
of these mechanisms typically has a number of goals. as toxic and hazardous waste management.
First, incentive effects which provide economic reasons
for polluters or resource users to lower their impacts are Market Creation (Eco-labeling, Disclosure Require-
reflected in user charges for typical infrastructure serv- ments, or Environmental Awareness)
ices such as sanitation and water provision. Incentives A last form of market-oriented incentive involves in-
can also be used to affect intermodal choices: environ- tervention in final demand through educating or
mental taxes on fuels can discourage private automobile informing consumers. Eco-labeling that attempts to
use, and concomitantly reduce demand for complemen- promote environmentally sound production and pack-
tary public goods such as roads. Second, market-oriented aging is a relatively passive form of intervention; it
approaches can be used as a recurrent revenue base; this decentralizes decisionmaking to the final consumer. A
is especially important where local institutions are ex- more aggressive form involves promulgating disclo-
pected to be financially autonomous, or are themselves sure requirements; firms are required to publish pre-
required to fund selected regulatory functions. cisely what they pollute. There are no sanctions
An important variant of the user charge is a attached to such disclosure but consumers are then
"presumptive tax." The basis of the tax is an effluent given the choice of how to deal with the products of
charge that is sensitive to a presumed level of pollution. particular firms. Another example of education and
A firm is compelled to pay the tax, and no specific awareness building, targeted to industries, is the
monitoring is conducted. If the firm wishes to reduce its UNIDO waste minimization program that assists in
tax burden, it must conduct monitoring at its own ex- identifying appropriate technologies for specific plant
pense (but still subject to regulatory audit) to demon- and industry types. The programs typically improve
strate that its actual pollution loads are less than the pre- energy and material efficiency for plants, while at the
sumed loads. same time reducing waste generation. All such inter-
Subsidies can also be used as an economic incentive ventions can effectively reduce urban infrastructure
for environmental management. Subsidies on environ- requirements, improve environmental quality, and have
mentally appropriate behavior are analytically identical important spin-offs in other social sectors. Their major
to taxes on inappropriate behavior. Such subsidies have disadvantage is that they typically require some form
been especially common in developing countries for the of subsidy.
importation of pollution control technologies or for
credit subsidies where the credit is used for environ- Liability Legislation
mental investments. Litigation-oriented approaches to environmental man-
agement require only that legislation be in place that
Market Creation (Permits and Deposit-Refund) confers relatively straightforward rights and obliga-
At a more complex level, market-oriented approaches tions to resource users.3 These approaches form a legal
can include some form of market creation. The most umbrella for court cases, which then consider the
complex system involves tradable permits where nature and extent of environmental damages on a case-
user/ipolluter ights are assigned, according to a desirable by-case basis. Most of these approaches are relatively
total level of use or pollution, and compliance is new, and have seen very limited application in devel-
achieved by trade. One potential advantage of such sys- oping countries (quite often because legal systems are
tems is that they may reduce bureaucracy and govern- themselves weak in such countries). Even in industrial
ment participation in the process. Such decentralization countries they are hampered by the analytical difficul-
of decisionmaking is particularly important in high ties of establishing cause and effect, or of ascribing
growth economies where regulatory drag might other- blame or negligence.
wise be a problem.
Another potentially important type of market crea-
tion involves reform of property rights to confer some 3. One close (though nonlitigative) variant of this is afiormnole rf o property rights(ihridvda tor joint)r inoaea Coasian world, where polluters and affected people reach
forrn of property right (either individual or joint) in areas solutions for externalities by trading rights with strictly zero
of great environmental sensitivity; this requires that any liability rule. Such a system has also been advocated as a strict
entity undertaking infrastructure development (roads or laissez-faire nonregulatory approach, where government acts
other rights-of-way) in such areas negotiate compensa- only to reduce transaction costs or to act as a neutral arbiter in
tion with a well-defined landowner. the event of rights disputes.
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There are, however, two potentially useful Macroeconomic Policy Linkages
applications of this approach in an urban setting. First,
requirements for operators to post long-term Market-Based Reforms and the Environment
"performance bonds" have often been used for mining For many reasons, increasing attention is being paid to
projects, which may require some reclamation at an the linkages between macroeconomic policies and envi-
unspecified future date; similar performance bonds can ronmental quality. First, within foreign aid programs,
be applied to road construction, pipeline construction, there has been a fundamental shift occurring from direct
or other urban infrastructure potentially affecting water investments to policy-oriented programs such as struc-
resources or soil erosion. In principle, such tural adjustment or other MBRs. Second, environmental
performance requirements could even be applied to degradation has been extensive in some regions of the
government agencies, although in such cases funds world where much of the policy-oriented programs have
need to be held in trust by an independent trustee and been targeted (Convery 1995). Finally, good evaluation
some effective incentive must exist for these agencies practice dictates that the environmental impacts of
to limit environmental disruption and recover the bond. macroeconomic policies be considered just as we tradi-
Second, "zero net impact" legislation has been applied tionally considered the environmental impacts of projects.
in a number of jurisdictions: its intent is to ensure that, The primary purpose of this section is therefore to
if some unavoidable environmental disruption is show that macroeconomic policies-or "economywide
caused in one area, a compensating investment is policies" as described by Munasinghe and Cruz
undertaken elsewhere. For example, if a road or bridge (1995)-can offset the impacts of other more targeted
disrupts a river course and affects water availability, interventions such as MBIs, if they are not adequately
an investment is required that restores water to those considered. Some key lessons from the literature are
affected. summarized; a major message is that linkages between
One significant objection to using litigation- MBRs and environmental quality exist, but that-with
oriented mechanisms is neither environmental nor eco- the= exception of certain types of macroeconomic price
nomic: it is social. Because such systems assume that all subsidies-the direction of such impacts is typically
have equal access to the courts, the mechanisms often highly irregular or uncertain.
discriminate against the poor and others with limited
access to legal recourse. Monetary Policy
There is an extensive debate over whether policies
Lessons and Implications linked to interest rates and credit have had a positive or
negative direct impact on environmental quality
In each of the above cases there is usually both an in- (Munasinghe and Cruz 1995). On a theoretical level,
centive element as well as a control element. Simply interest rates are simply the price of capital, hence the
stated, there is no getting around the classic "carrot and issue-to a degree-translates into whether capital in-
stick." Experience with these types of mechanisms vestment is itself environmentally beneficial, and
around the world has shown that they have different whether monetary policy itself contributes to higher or
advantages and disadvantages, and that depending on the lower interest rates. For example, at an economywide
goals of the government, some mechanisms are better level, lower interest rates would encourage investment in
than others. The following general conclusions can be many types of schemes, from highly polluting industrial
drawn from this experience: investments to beneficial national park projects. But
* Systems based solely on control-oriented even at a microproject level, the availability of low-cost
approaches impose high private costs and often credit does not necessarily have positive impacts. In
are not enforceable given existing institutional some cases, credit has been used to buy inputs (such as
capacity. chain saws) that facilitate clearing of land at the exten-
* Litigation-oriented approaches require the devel- sive margin (which may contribute to deforestation)
opment of a strong legal system to which all while in other cases it might be used to purchase inputs
members of society have equal access. that promote intensification and investments in soil con-
* Market-oriented instruments allow polluters and servation (Lutz and others 1994). In brief, it is generally
resource users to find their own best mix of con- impossible to generalize whether the direct environ-
trols or responses, and therefore result in lower mental impacts of monetary policies are fundamentally
private costs than other approaches. good or bad for environmental quality.
* Local authorities and strong institutional support The issue is further complicated if one considers
play an important role in the success of market- indirect impacts after various input substitution effects
oriented mechanisms. occur. One important role of monetary policy reform is
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to eliminate interest rate subsidies; this will generally Trade Policy
increase labor intensity as real interest rates rise. For The primary environment and trade issues have included
some processes, the direct consequences of lower discussions about "pollution havens" that establish per-
capital intensity (and higher labor intensity) may in- missive investment regimes to attract foreign investment
volve an environmental improvement, as noted above. (Folke and others 1994). Most of the empirical literature
In other cases the indirect consequences of higher la- suggests, however, that such generalizations are again
bor intensity may, in fact, reduce environmental qual- not valid. The extent of environmental subsidies is typi-
ity (Table 2.2). This is particularly true with waste cally insufficient (compared to the costs of other inputs)
recovery systems. Adding more labor is generally not a to induce major shifts in industrial location (Low 1992).
technologically appropriate means for recovering Trade policies more typically encourage lower polluting
wastes from already labor-intensive industries such as industries (Box 2.5), and current international trade
textiles, metalplating, and metalworking. These are protocols (such as NAFTA) tend to encourage environ-
among the most polluting industries in the world and mentally responsible production policies in countries of
are among the most difficult to regulate because indi- origin, many of which are developing countries. In addi-
vidual operations are often small-scale activities. In- tion, local subsidies that decrease import tariffs for envi-
creased capital intensity in such industries, through ronmental technologies-such as those in Barbados-
some form of mechanization, provides scope for im- can have a positive environmental impact.
proved waste recovery and reduced pollution levels.
Many of UNIDO's programs of waste management are Fiscal Policy
based precisely on such substitution away from labor The environmental impacts of general fiscal policy,
and towards capital. In short, it is again not possible to which includes primarily the personal and corporate
generalize whether increases in real interest rates will income tax regimes, are also coming under greater scru-
cause indirect substitution effects that represent net tiny (Doern 1990; Dewees 1992). These policies are
gains or net losses in environmental quality. primarily of concern where they inadvertently distort
Table 2.2 Main Environmental Linkages of the Major Current Economywide Policies
in Liatin America and the Caribbean
Policy Positive Linkages Negative Linkages
Macroeconomic Stabilization
Public price control Induces efficiency into the management of resource- Creates banriers to including environmental costs in
oriented public utilities public tariffs to avoid inflationary consequences
Public deficit control Induces removal of credit and fiscal subsidies in Reduces scope for improvement of public servant
sectoral polices perverse to environment; stimulates remuneration and budget allocation in the environ-
cost-recovery pricing in public tariffs mental management sector
Tight monetary policy Induces recycling and conservation to offset high Reduces financing capacity of firmns to undertake
based on high interest rates capital costs environmental expenditures in abatement procedures
and capital stock conversion
................................................................................................................................................. ....................................................................................................................... ...................................
Privatization Creates opportunity to introduce efficiency, eliminate Reduces the scope, in the short-run, to impose
subsidies, and correct environmental liabilities in environmental costs on private firms
privatized state-owned economic activities (such as,
the provision of electricity, oil products, clean water,
sanitation services, and solid waste collection)
,..................... ...................  ..................... .......... .............................................................................
Tradle Liberalization
Export promotion and Induces dynamic export-oriented industrial and Induces rapid depletion in export activities based on
globalization strategies commercial companies to comply with international natural resources, such as mining, logging, fishing,
standards in environmental management, such as and agriculture
ISO 14000 and eco-labeling
Import tariff reductions Induces imports of capital goods with embodied Creates opportunity for hazardous waste imports
clean technology from developed countries
..................................................................... ........... I................................................................... . ..................................................................................................................... 
Fiscall Reforms Creates opportunity for the introduction of environ- Reduces the scope of specific enviro=nental fiscal
mental criteria into conventional taxation instruments that have earmarked revenue, as reforms
aim to decouple revenue from expenditures
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investment decisions in a manner that penalizes envi- More recent urban sector management has been more
ronmental quality. In some cases, general fiscal policy commonly concerned with water charges and fuel pric-
can be used to encourage environmentally appropriate ing regimes (including electricity) that typically discour-
investments, such as through the provision of fast capital age sound resource use and encourage pollution.
depreciation rates for pollution abatement equipment. Reform of input price subsidies within sectoral fiscal
The role of sectoral fiscal policy has received the policy is, generally, the one type of MBR that does pro-
greatest attention because of the potential distortions it duce positive environmental benefits. In many cases
has on sectoral investment decisions, and because these around the world it has been shown that environmental
policies are already generally strongly targeted to en- conditions improve as a result of removing pesticide
courage selected types of activities (Pearce and others subsidies, fertilizer subsidies, energy price subsidies, or
1989). Most of the original concerns-relating to un- subsidies of material inputs used in favored industrial
sustainable forestry and agriculture practices-focused processes. Recent work in Russia, for example, illustrates
on sectoral fiscal policies such as stumpage fees on tim- further that removing such subsidies can have greater posi-
ber, chemical fertilizer subsidies, or pesticide subsidies. tive environmental impacts than imposing pollution taxes.
Box 2.5 Macropolicy Linkages and Environmental Quality in Mexico
Studies of the impact of economywide policies on environmental quality in Mexico show that it is not possible to
draw a priori conclusions that such impacts are inherently negative or positive:
* Foreign trade policies did not contribute to increased industrial pollution. Such policies generally favored
less polluting consumer-goods industries. Most increases in pollution were attributable to structural shifts
such as increased public investment in petrochemical and agrochemical industries.
* Fuel and electricity subsidies amounted to implicit subsidies of 4 to 7 percent of GDP from 1980 to 1985.
This contributed to increased energy intensity, industrial pollution, and poor air quality in Mexico City.
Source: Based on Munasinghe and Cruz 1995, and Eskeland and Jimenez 1991.
Removing subsidies may be more effective than introducing MBIs
Box 2.6 Subsidies, Emission Charges, and Institutions: Lessons from Russia
Recent studies and observations in Russia show that energy pricing policy aimed at removing macroeconomic subsi-
dies results in larger emission reductions than MBIs introduced in the form of fees and taxes. The reasons for this are
closely linked to the responsiveness of firms to changes in subsidy patterns, and to the ongoing need for adequate in-
stitutional capacity to implement a fee and tax system.
* A system of national emission charges was introduced in Russia in 1991. The charges, set at a very low level,
are levied on over 300 air and water pollutants and a large number of stationary sources. Available capacities
for reliable monitoring and inspection fall well short. Although a central government body oversees the pro-
gram, negotiated agreements between polluters and local authorities determine the collection of charges. A
common practice is to waive fees on the amount enterprises invest in pollution control or to exempt payment
by those polluters experiencing financial difficulties. Collection rates are thus low, and many cases appear to
contradict the legislation.
* Analyses of energy subsidies and potential pollution taxes shows that firms and end-users will be more re-
sponsive to changes in the subsidy regime than they will to increased pollution fees. Over the period from
1995 to 2010, energy use and greenhouse gas emissions are projected to decrease by about 15 percent as a re-
sult of removing all prereform (1990) energy subsidies. Introducing fees or taxes, even at the maximum level
politically feasible, would not have as large an effect on emissions as would simply eliminating energy subsidies.
For example, removal of subsidies would generate a 16 percent reduction in SO2 and a 14 percent reduction in
C02 ; imposition of a pollution fee would reduce these emissions only 7 percent and 2 percent respectively.
Source: Lvovsky 1996; Gurvich and others 1996.
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Market-Based Reforms in Latin America tionally, most interventions will need to be based on
and the Caribbean case-specific work to determine the precise magnitude
Mcst recent work concludes that, with a few selected and direction of linkages.
exceptions related to price subsidies inherent in sectoral In the case of Latin America and the Caribbean, the
fiscal policies, it is not possible to generalize whether background studies showed that macroeconomic linkages
macroeconomic policies have positive or negative im- are important and can generate positive as well as negative
pacts on the environment (Rock and O'Keefe 1994; impacts on the environment, on environmental institutions,
Mtnasinghe and Cruz 1995). This implies that, opera- or on the potential success of MBIs (Table 2.2).
3. Institutional Frameworks in
Latin America and the Caribbean
This chapter describes the legislative and institutional many countries, administrative jurisdiction over certain
setting in the study countries that will form, as here de- areas continues to be open to interpretation. Finally, the
nominated, the environmental management sector. Ma- high cost of enforcement and regulation often placed
jor lessons are drawn within a context of promoting unacceptable burdens on state coffers. In all of these
"institutional sustainability." A key theme of this chapter cases the institutions that were meant to promote envi-
is that various institutional factors will continue to con- ronmental sustainability were, themselves, not sustainable.
strain the implementation of any form of environmental The goal of rationalization and reform has, in essence,
management, regardless of whether it takes the form of a been to reestablish institutions that are themselves sus-
CAC or MBI approach. tainable (Box 3. 1).
The means of achieving sustainable institutions
Institutional Sustainability in Theory vary, but the following trends are notable:
* Smaller institutions. A smaller institution is often
Although the history of environmental institutions is quite more sustainable when it relies on existing insti-
complex and varies substantially between countries, a tutions to carry out required environmental man-
number of trends are detectable. The first phase of most agement functions. This results in lower incre-
institutions relied heavily on strong regulatory instru- mental costs, while also allowing the agency to
ments-such as regulations, standards, or environmental identify and concentrate on selected high priority
impact assessments-as a basis for preventing environ- environmental problems.
mental damage. Also, initially * Decentralization of authority.
"environmenf' was often treated "LEGISATION is really not the critical factor Decentralization to regional,
as a stand-alone sector, in isola- n nvironmt Improvement Legislatio state, provincial, or municipal
tion from other activities; a single in envro ntea improveents. Le governments streamlines cen-
institution was therefore often c g t t i tral operations while transfer-legislator will be implemented in practice.
regarded as adequate for dealing leg iatorwilblemented in pracice. nng some of the financial
with environmental issues. But as fThe majr problems result from the dnffculty responsibility to local author-
of establishing control and enforcement
these institutions became more m . ities (which are often more
developed, their mandates often cn tp te lal prvisons, amenable to financing local
expanded and the meaning of -UnitedNationsEnvironmental initiatives rather than seeing
"environment" also became more Programme, 1976. local taxes go to a central
broadly defined. In this second agency).
phase, environmental issues be- * Focus on spatial planning.
came institutionalized-in some form-within multiple In lieu of sectoral management (forestry, mining,
public sector ministries or departments. This often resulted agriculture, etc.), many institutions are most effec-
in substantial duplication of effort and uncertainty in juris- tive at providing a coordinating role with a spatial
diction. A final phase has therefore involved a form of basis. This has resulted in the proliferation of wa-
"rationalization" that spelled out clear environmental pol- tershed management authorities, coastal zone
icy objectives (Rodgers 1991) and concomitant institu- management institutions, and other such spatial
tional reforms that involved more than one institution in planning organizations. The result has often been
the entire management process. greater effectiveness because environmental issues
The need for the rationalization was driven, fore- also typically extend across sectoral boundaries.
most, by the observation that existing structures were not * Reliance on nonregulatory mechanisms. Non-
always effective or sustainable. In many countries, envi- regulatory instnuments are becoming more com-
ronmental assessment processes produced unacceptable mon as a means for improving compliance without
barriers to economic development with little noticeable adding to public administrative costs. These
improvement in environmental quality (resulting in mechanisms include a wide range of instruments,
regulatory drag). In others, regulations and standards from effluent charges to enhanced public educa-
were so stiff that they were virtually unenforceable. In tion programs to dispute resolution mechanisms.
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* Reliance on technology transfer. Trade and numerous common elements in the panel. Most of the
information-sharing agreements with foreign countries rely on an umbrella environmental law and
firms provide opportunities for the transfer of have already established executive environmental agen-
environmentally appropriate technologies to de- cies. Countries such as Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela
veloping countries. Environmental institutions have environmental targets entrenched within their na-
can provide a low-cost service through facilitat- tional development plans; these plans also include refer-
ing information exchange, and through providing ences to economic instruments.
a central focal point for the distribution of con- In addition, and particularly in South America, the
tact information. new constitutions promulgated during the recent democ-
ratization period present specific chapters and amend-
Institutional Development in Latin America ments on environmental issues regarding conservation
and the Caribbean goals, use of natural resources, and liability measures.
Codified legislation is basically very similar across
Many of the countries in the panel have been proceeding the panel. The various laws and acts typically provide
through a similar rationalization process. But the cross- guidelines for environmental management by establish-
section suggests that the full movement to a completely ing guiding principles, goals, and instruments for envi-
streamlined environmental management sector in each ronmental policies. Based on the laws, enabling regula-
country is far from complete. tions, norms, and procedures are defined by the envi-
ronmental agencies. The proposed instruments are
Legislative Basis mainly command-oriented ones. Standards and sanc-
As would be expected, while the legal frameworks are tions, licensing permits, zoning guidelines, environ-
based on international parameters, they have been tailored mental impact assessment (EIA) requirements and
according to each country's pattern of resource exploita- liability actions are found in most cases with only slight
tion and degradation. For example, countries with a design differences. They are longer established and more
larger industrial base-such as Mexico and Brazil- numerous in Mexico and Brazil, perhaps due to a higher
have been more prone to address industrial issues as a degree of industrialization and urbanization.
priority. Peru and Chile, by contrast, have focused on The main regulated areas are also very similar.
mining and fisheries while Caribbean states have con- Conservation norms, such as preservation areas and
centrated on environmental impacts associated with clearing restrictions, have generally been in place for a
tou:rism activities. In Bolivia, where social concerns and long time; in some instances they were first proposed
poverty often dominate the national agenda, public par- more than 60 years ago. The exploitation of natural re-
ticipation mechanisms play a dominant role. sources, such as fisheries, mining, and forestry, are usu-
But in spite of local nuances, environmental poli- ally highly regulated through zoning and licensing
cies in Latin America today can be regarded as highly schemes. Also, water use is an area of traditionally in-
sophisticated by international standards and there are tense regulation throughout the panel.
IBox 3.1 Institutional Sustainability
'The concept of "institutional sustainability" is a recent addition within the sustainable development philosophy
('Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 1992). It essentially underlines the idea that for environmentally, economically, and
socially sustainable development to be achieved, institutions that promote these goals must themselves be
sustainable. Lessons from a number of places around the world have shown that where institutions are themselves
unstable or not adequately endowed, the broader mandates of economic development, environmental protection, and
social well-being can not be realized. The concept of institutional sustainability is therefore an underlying goal of
many modern-day environmental agencies and management policies.
Experience has shown that the chances of achieving long-term institutional sustainability increase if three
conditions are met. First, there should be flexibility in institutional structures and mandates to deal with changing
circumstances; this is best achieved by relying as far as possible on existing capacity and mechanisms. Second,
mechanisms should be available that provide for adequate financing of these institutions; this is best achieved
through making the institutions cost-effective and through providing them with some form of long-term self-
financing. Third, initial development should focus on areas where early successes are likely to occur; this is achieved
through phasing development of institutional capacity and through outlining high-priority targets for intervention.
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Pollution issues have been introduced more recently. agencies are also in place at regional levels. Although
Due to the rapid industrialization and urbanization of most countries have created executive agencies, over-
many of these countries from the 1970s onward, pollution lapping mandates among related sectoral agencies are a
from wastewater discharges and air emissions was imme- common feature in the panel. General roles and respon-
diately fit into the 1974 Stockholm Conference's environ- sibilities might include diverse functions such as imple-
mental management pattern; this resulted in the promul- mentation of economic incentives, preparation of envi-
gation of standards, sanctions, EIA requirements, and ronmental assessments, delegation to local authorities, or
licensing procedures that were heavily targeted to the in- initiation of public participation processes (Table 3.2).
dustrial sector. Mobile sources of air pollution currently
are a high priority because of the growing car fleet and Intersectoral Authorities. In some countries-such as
unsolved public transport problems. Brazil, Chile, and Peru-regulations are discussed by
The most recent legislative development concerns cross-sectoral councils, on which different governmental
solid waste collection and treatment from households and private sector agencies have representatives. In Peru
and commercial activities. Sanitation, traditionally tar- the environmental sector has only recently been organ-
geted within the public investment arena, now has been ized to address urban sector pollution issues. But the
introduced into the environmental agenda at the highest degree of integration among the various agents, within
priority level as water supplies and aquatic habitats are all of these countries, is very low.
being seriously threatened and as health costs increase. Sanitation and water companies are usually con-
trolled by states and municipalities whereas solid waste
Institutional Basis collection is run mainly by municipalities. Energy matters
Institutional fragility remains a well-recognized key bar- are typically regulated within energy agencies without
rier to successful governmental management in the region. effective participation of the environmental agencies. Usu-
The case of environment, rather than an exception, can be ally green (forestry, fishery, and fauna/flora protection)
seen as a typical example since environmental manage- and pollution issues are empowered to distinct agencies
ment demands strong governmental integration, public within the environmental sector and sometimes, as is the
participation, and budgetary needs. Although the institu- case of Peru and Barbados, within distinct renewable re-
tional rationalization process has progressed to accommo- source subsectors. Such arrangements have led to multiple
date both intersectoral and decentralized authorities, many instances of conflicting jurisdiction with existing agencies,
of the institutions are still very weak. and to inconsistent norms and sanctions.
Some type of specific environmental sector within In general, integration between the environmental
the govemment is found in all countries in the panel sector and other governmental sectors is very weak. Be-
(Table 3.1). Federal management today is concentrated cause of this, environmentally harmful sectoral incen-
at the ministerial level or in national councils (as in tives are often designed with the exclusion of input from
Chile and Peru). Environment secretariats and executive the environmental sector.
Table 3.1 Environmental Management Sectors in Selected Latin American and Caribbean Countries
National Ministry of Environmnent Chapter Executive
Country Environmental Law Environment in Constitution Environmental Agency
Barbados V in process
Bolivia V 1992/95 v 1992 v
Brazil V 1981 v 1991 v V
Chile V 1994 v 1994* v v
Colombia V 1993 V 1993 v v
Ecuador V 1996 V 1996
Jamaica v 1991 v
Mexico V 1988 V 1994 V v
Peru v 1990 V 1995*
Trinidad and Tobago V 1995 v
Venezuela V 1976 v 1976 v v
* National Commission.
24 Chapter 3
Table 3.2 Roles and Responsibilities of Selected Environmental Institutions in
Latin America and the Caribbean
Market-Based Approach to
Incentives Mentioned Environmental Mechanismsfor
Country in the Legislation Assessment Decentralized Role Public Participation
Barbados Economic instruments Planning agencies No Not defined
permitted
Boli via Economic instruments Specifies self-assessment for Water and forestry Extensive; permits public
permitted existing activities; requires decentralized; municipalities review and public civil
EA on all new activities with have major responsibility for actions in all environmental
five-year compliance local conditions issues
deadline
Bra2il Allows contributions from Operating licenses issued State agencies maintain EA reports and licensing
users of environmental based on EA requirements major responsibility require public input
resources
Chile Advocates polluter-pays Relevant law not yet No Present in law
principle implemented
Colombia Economic instruments for Required before licenses and Implementation and Consultation required under
user-pays and polluting permits are issued enforcement through the the constitution and Law 99
industry regional and urban agencies
Ecuador No Sectoral responsibilities in Municipalities of major As required in specific
different ministries cities are beginning to take sectoral laws, such as the
increased responsibility mining law
Jamaica No Planning agencies No Not defined
Mexico No INE sets national standards Some in Mexico City Not defined
and norms; PROFEPA Metropolitan Zone and in
enforces the border area with the
United States
Peni No General criteria for EA to be No Local and regional
established government coordination
Trinidad and Incentive programs or To be defined No Environmental clearance
Tobago mechanisms that encourage certificate requires public
the use of effective comment
environmental systems
Venezuela No Three permits required for In process Not defined
land use, resource
exploitation, and pollution
control and mitigation
Decentralized Authorities. Since the 1970s countries like interests. Parliamentary initiatives on environmental leg-
Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico have had a islation are often passed without the active involvement of
decentralized management structure where regional the relevant agency. The failure to establish channels of
agencies are responsible for applying federal norms and expertise within these legislatures has hampered possibili-
for introducing appropriate regional adjustments. How- ties for designing or promulgating easily enforceable laws.
ever, weak integration between federal and regional These intra- and intergovernmental integration issues
levels is often identified as a serious institutional problem. reflect the degree of institutional capacity in the region.
Regional decentralization is mostly to the state level The environmental sector in these countries has been fac-
and in some cases to the municipality level in cities that ing serious budgetary problems. Even in cases where ear-
have a very high proportion of the national population marked resources are available, the amount reaching the
(such as Quito, Santiago, and Bogota). sector is usually reduced by accounting devices within the
governmental financing bureaucracy.
Competence and Uncertainty Because of public and political pressure, services
required from the environmental sector are growing fast.
Human Resource Constraints However, budget allocation has not followed this same
Relationships within and among legislatures in Latin pattern. Even if investments in laboratories, monitoring
American countries are characterized by a tendency to networks, and other equipment are made available from
overlegislate. Parliamentary participation on executive external sources (earmarked revenue, international
bills is usually passive by ignorance and reactive by lobby agency loans, foreign aid, and NGO funds), environ-
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mental agencies still lack appropriate human resources public to accept governments' otherwise arbitrary re-
to make efficient use of them. Because of the low level laxation of sanctions. Frequently, this results in the over-
of public servant remuneration-imposed throughout the ruling of penalties and defaults or the postponement of
region because of the need for macroeconomic stabiliza- abatement and preservation measures established in offi-
tion policies-the public sector in general has difficulty cial agreements.
keeping qualified workers and cannot rely on expertise Finally, when enforcement does succeed, the court
available in the private sector. system-historically clogged with other claims-imposes
Goals, norms, and instruments are therefore set its own delays in prosecution.
higher than the cuffent managerial, monitoring, and en-
forcement capabilities of environmental agencies. Political Barriers and Market-Based Reforms
Finally, environmental public awareness has in- The above difficulties faced by environmental manage-
creased in urban areas where certain environmental costs ment in Latin America and the Caribbean can only be
have already affected the majority of the population. But overcome by addressing certain political barriers.
the costs of protection are not yet fully grasped by the As noted earlier, environmental management faces
population as a whole. In areas where the environmen- the effects, in terms of budget constraints, resulting from
tally regulated activity is the main source of income, the general crisis affecting the public sector in the re-
political barriers are reinforced by public opposition. gion. Consequently, structural adjustment policies re-
main part of the development agenda in the region.
Uncertainty Macroeconomic stabilization plans attempt to limit
Environmental legislation in the region is generally con- public expenditure and eliminate sources of price esca-
sidered to contain the same types of advanced norms and lation. Consequently, environmental policies that seek to
procedures implemented in richer countries. But lack of internalize environmental costs (either through CAC or
systematic and qualified monitoring-and consequent MBIs) within the economic system are not easily ac-
lack of reliable inventories, databases, and indicators- cepted politically, even if they have economically and
detracts from the effective enforcement of reliable stan- environmentally beneficial consequences (Box 3.2).
dards. For example, failure to compile data and indica- Further, the need to find short-term incentives for
tors has made zoning and permit instruments completely rapid growth tends to create opposition to any environ-
ineffective. Lack of staff and expertise to analyze ElAs mental regulation that restricts investment. Although
and auditing reports turn such monitoring exercises into new capital stock normally includes cleaner technolo-
costly procedures with very ineffective results in terms gies, bureaucratic procedures often impose delay costs
of environmental improvement. This lack of enforce- through regulatory drag. Even though the production
ment creates uncertainty within the investment commu- system as a whole may not be heavily affected by
nity and tends to perpetuate noncomp]iance. stricter environmental enforcement, some sectors and
Political constraints often impede the use of strong some firms may be hit hard because of their historical
sanctions for noncompliance, particularly in sensitive investment patterns. For example, environmental prob-
economic sectors. The threat of job losses in small cities lems may be intractable where old capital investments
or in declining regions-arising from the enforcement of included inefficient and dirty technologies and where
sanctions-represents a very powerful reason for the environmental conversion costs are very high.
Box 3.2 Conflicting Market-Based Instruments and Political Priorities in Argentina
In 1980, Argentina attempted to introduce an industrial effluent discharge fee. The tariff included a fee for dis-
charges within the maximum allowable level and a much higher penalty for discharges above the maximum allow-
able threshold. There were provisions for increasing the fee levels gradually over a 10-year period. The aim was to
eventually set the fees at a level equivalent to abatement costs.
In practice the fees were never widely applied and the system was modified in 1989 to lower the fees and revise the pen-
alties. Environmental groups sued the government on the grounds that the fee system amounted to a license to pollute
beyond legal limits. The court declared the decree introducing the fees to be unconstitutional, and the issue remains un-
resolved in legal terms to this day. It appears that the court regarded the fee as exceeding the powers of the national gov-
ernment to levy taxes because it concluded that the fees could not be justified as a payment for service.
Source: von Amsberg 1995.
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In short, both MBI and CAC procedures face simi- hamper effective management. Foremost, institutions
lar difficulties: even if such procedures appear to be themselves are still weak and lack an adequate degree of
environmentally and economically beneficial, they may participation among stakeholders: new norms and stan-
be politically unacceptable if they appear to be incon- dards often conflict with existing conventions or with
sistent with other political priorities and MBRs. current structural adjustment efforts.
The major implications this has for continued
Sumimary development of either CAC regimes or MBI regimes
are that: (a) institutional strengthening, in particular
Countries within the panel have undergone substantial through human resource development and through
environmental reforms over the past decades, both in financial support to local agencies, is a high priority
terms of their legislation and their institutions. On paper, in all Latin American and Caribbean countries; and
it would appear that everything should be in place to (b) the implementation of either MBI or CAC regimes
enable improved environmental management. In reality, must take into account existing political priorities
however, a number of persistent constraints continue to and MBRs.
4. Market-Based Instruments in Latin
America and the Caribbean
This chapter describes the current experience with MBIs Subsidies for resource inputs, however, have been
in the study countries. As previously discussed, envi- successful MBIs in dynamic markets. Reforestation sub-
ronmental management in these 11 countries has histori- sidies have been an important factor for forestry sector
cally been based on CAC instruments. However, the expansion in Chile (reforestation of 1.7 million hectares
study survey presents a number of market-oriented expe- in 20 years), whereas energy subsidies have succeeded
riences already in place in the region. The survey dem- in Barbados and Ecuador to foster energy substitution.
onstrates the relatively wide experimentation with MBIs,
and the focus on using them as a revenue-generating Cost-Recovery Tariffs
device. It also reveals the need for strong institutions to
implement MBIs. Since additional detail is provided in Pricing of water supply, sanitation, solid waste collec-
the Background Paper Summaries for each country tion, and energy can play an important role in pollution
study, this chapter highlights some of the more com- control and resource use. Moreover, a full cost-recovery
monly used instruments; tradable permits (which have approach is essential for service expansion and it allows
seen only limited application) are discussed in the fol- for cross-subsidies to low-income groups.
lowing chapter because of their added complexity.
Sewage
Credit and Tax Incentives In Brazil, industrial sewage tariffs based on the content
of organic-matter and suspended solids have been in
Most of the countries in the panel offer subsidized credit place since 1983 in the states of Sao Paulo and Rio de
and taxation relief for environment-related investments, Janeiro. In the case of the Greater Sao Paulo Region,
as shown in Table 4.1. They cover abatement invest- the sanitation company has included only 95 big firms
ments or clean technology adoption in the industrial in the new tariff scheme because of monitoring diffi-
sector in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia, the tourism culties. Even with this small spatial coverage, revenue
sector in Barbados, reforestation activities in Chile and raised represented more than 11 percent of total in-
Colombia, mercury emission control in artisanal mining
in Ecuador, cleaner energy uses in the Caribbean, Ecua- Table 4.1 Credit and Tax Incentives
dor, and Brazil (solar, wind, and gas/hydroelectricity Taxation and
sources, respectively) and chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) Country Credit Subsidies Tariff Relief
phaseout in Colombia, Chile, and Brazil.4 Only in Bo-
Barbados To defray costs of envi- Income tax rebate forlivia and Peru, where environmental management is very ronmental technologies water conservation and
recent, is no experience reported, although the new leg- in the tourism sector solar energy use in the
islation has generated some initiatives. tourism sector
Subsidies for abatement investments have, however, Brazil For abatement invest- Income and value-addedSubsidies for abatement ~~~~~~~~~~~ments in the industrial tax rebates for adoption
been of limited impact since environmental enforcement sector of clean technology
has not been effective enough to increase firms' demand Chile For forestry activities
for these expenditures. Moreover, it is reported that Colombia For abatement invest- Income and value-added
firms are using these incentives inadequately because of ments in the industrial tax rebates for abate-
the lack of proper fiscal and environmental follow-up sector ment investments
procedures to monitor their investments. Ecuador For investments on For investments on
mercury recovery in mercury recovery in
artisanal mining artisanal mining
Jamaica For abatement invest-
ments in free zones
4. Other countries in the region have also used such in- Mexico For abatement invest-
centives. In St. Lucia, a solar water heater subsidy is credited ments in the industrial
with increased sales of such units. In Argentina, a 1995 tax sector
exemption has induced widespread adoption of compressed Venezuela For abatement invest-
natural gas (CNG) vehicles as a more environmentally benign ments in the industrial
substitute for diesel or gasoline vehicles. sector
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dustrial sewage revenue in 1993. It has been re- Deposit-Refund Systems
ported that the new tariff on pollution content has in-
duced pollution control through improved internal Voluntary deposit-refund systems for consumers are
management procedures, substitution of raw materials, reasonably well developed in the countries of the panel
and conservation. (Table 4.2). Moreover, informal collection of paper,
plastic, and other recyclable materials is an important
Sanitation occupation for unskilled workers.
In the case of Guayaquil in Ecuador, a concession was Voluntary deposit-refund systems for returnable
let to an independent Canadian firm. A fee on solid glass bottles are traditionally adopted in most countries
waste collection is applied as a 10 percent surcharge on due to the predominance of the beverage and beer pack-
electricity bills. Although it may not induce rationaliza- aging system. Refund payments for aluminum cans, due
tion of waste generation, the collection costs for such a to the high value-added from recycling and the expand-
scheme are low and effective. ing use of such containers, are now increasing consid-
EBolivia nd Venezuela have recently attempted to erably in Brazil and Venezuela.
introduce waste-volume and landfill-tipping fees, and Recycling of ferrous materials, paper, and to a
Jamaica and Barbados are about to introduce similar lesser extent plastic, are a well-established business in
systerns. Mexico and Chile are also contemplating the the region. Wholesalers collect material from firms and
possibility of adopting these instruments for households informal collectors and then sell the material to recy-
and firms. The Venezuelan case confirms, however, that cling companies. Collection is undertaken mostly at the
these instruments require strong institutional capacity to curbside level and at dumping sites. Cooperatives of
monitor waste volumes in households and firms and to collectors-supported through municipal programs-are
restrict illegal dumping. now common in the major Brazilian cities; this has im-
proved health conditions and collection efficiency.
Energy The introduction of voluntary deposit-refund systems
The removal of energy subsidies has also followed a for consumers in the region can be seen as a good MBI
revenue perspective due to macroeconomic constraints.
Although in some cases it has incidentally induced sub-
stitution with cleaner fuels, pricing-control policies have Table 4.2 MBls and Solid Waste Management
restrained important changes in relative prices as in the Deposit-Refund Solid Waste Levy
case of gasoline in Venezuela. A successful example of Country System and Tipping Fees
energy pricing for environmental purposes was in Ja- Barbados Voluntary for glass Tipping fees under
maica., where lowering the kerosene price induced sub- beverage containers on introducton
stitution for charcoal consumption. . consumer
stitution for charcoal consumption. Bolivia Voluntary for glass, Collection fees based on
paper, and plastics weight
Summary Brazil Voluntary for glass and Flat fees
Although water supply, sanitation (sewage collection aluminum beverage
and treatment), and electricity tariffs have been in- containers on consumers
Chile Voluntary for glass and Flat fees; tipping fees
creased in real terms across the region, only Chile and plastic beverage con- under discussion
Colombia are already fully adopting a long-run marginal tainers on consumers
cost a,pproach. Private participation in the sector, already Colombia Voluntary for glass Electricity surcharge
envisaged in some countries, may speed up the adoption beverage containers on
consumers
of this tariff policy.cosmr Ecuador Voluntary for glass Flat fees paid by mu-
It must be noted, however, that experiences in cost- beverage containers on nicipality
recovery approaches, even in private participation consumers
schernes, have not fully incorporated environmental Jamaica Voluntary for glass Flat fees
costs since private costs are the main concern and envi- beverage containers on
consumers
ronmental costs are only borne when they are imposed Mexico Voluntary for glass Flat fees; levy and tip-
through regulatory or other means. However, cost- beverage containers on ping fees for hazardous
recovery pricing for these services can be regarded as a consumers and compul- waste under discussion
first step toward charging the right price for pollution sory on carbatteries at
and natural resources. In most cases, adoption of cost- Venezuela Voluntary for glass Flat fees
recovery approaches can be carried out with relatively beverage containers on
low legal and institutional barriers. consumers
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opportunity with fairly low legal, institutional, and politi- alty revenue as a supplementary budgetary source for
cal barriers. In fact, such initiatives can count on private general revenue purposes.
participation and public support. Compulsory systems for Royalties in Ecuador and Venezuela are strictly based
firms and consumers, however, will certainly be more on oil revenue. In Ecuador the royalty is a form of tax levy
difficult because of legal and political barriers, and also on oil passing through the pipeline from the Ecuadoran
because the need for monitoring capacity may be an im- Amazon; the levy is earmarked to the Ecuadoran Institute
portant constraint. One of the few cases of mandatory for Eco-Development in the Amazon Region (ECORAE)
schemes is found in Mexico. Car batteries are now under a formed in 1992. Royalty resources in Venezuela, by con-
compulsory deposit-refund scheme through which a new trast, finance the federal general budget.
battery can only be sold with the return of an old one. Re- As can be seen, royalties may turn into an important
sults of this program have not yet been evaluated. source of revenue for environmental agencies and may
also be a powerful tool for natural resource rationaliza-
Resource Use Charges tion. While revenue aims can be achieved through a
small share of the exploitation value, the appropriate
Table 4.3 presents a summary of several types of user royalty level on environmental grounds may require a
charges implemented in the region. In Brazil, Colombia, more complex technical analysis. In some instances,
and Venezuela, a forestry tax is charged for wood con- such as with ECORAE, the actual incentive effects for
sumption when the harvesting is not compensated by rationalizing oil or energy use may in fact be minuscule,
equivalent reforestation activity. These taxes are usually but as with OECD experience, the allocation of such
set at very low levels and with very weak enforcement, revenues to institutional strengthening in the environ-
particularly in frontier regions where monitoring is very mental sector justifies their classification as a "weak"
difficult. Also, royalties paid out of natural resource MBI. Collection costs are low and will not depend much
exploitation are already in place in Brazil, Colombia, on institutional capacity and sophisticated legislation.
Ecuador, and Venezuela with relative success. Political constraints may arise in countries where the
In Brazil and Colombia these royalties, created in private sector is dominant in the taxed sectors and where
the 1990s, are a small proportion (between 4 and 6 per- the sector faces strong international competition.
cent) of gross revenue in hydroelectricity, mineral, and
oil production. In reality, these royalties are earmarked Water Charges
revenue sources for municipalities where exploitation
takes place; some funds are also earmarked for regula- The most active MBI pricing initiatives are water charges
tory and environmental agencies. In the case of Colom- (Table 4.3). These charges can be part of a national charge
bia, the use of royalty funds for preservation purposes is scheme already in place, as in Mexico and Colombia, or in
more strictly earmarked than it is in Brazil. Therefore, the context of a river basin authority, as is the case of the
the Brazilian experience has been one of using the roy- Brazilian legislation under consideration by congress.
Table 4.3 User Charges in Latin America and the Caribbean
Charges on Natural Water Chargesfor
Country Forestry Taxation Resource Exploitation Use and Pollution
Brazil On forestry activities without adequate Over mineral and hydroelectricity pro- Sewage tariffs based on pollution con-
reforestation duction to compensate municipalities tents are in place in some states. Full
where exploitation takes place water charges based on river basin
authority already approved in some
states and under discussion at the fed-
eral level
Colombia On forestry activities without adequate Over mineral and hydroelectricity pro- Charges based on cost-recovery partially
reforestation duction to compensate municipalities implemented and replaced by charges
where exploitation takes place reflecting full environmental costs
Ecuador On oil to finance environmental
research and an institute for
environmental management
Jamaica Under discussion
Mexico Wastewater discharge at national level
partially implemented and under revision
Venezuela On forestry activities without adequate
reforestation
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Mexico Colombia
Pollution charges in Mexico have been in place since In Colombia, water charges for effluent discharges and
1991, but they have revealed enormous enforcement water use have been applied since 1974 by the regional
problems. The Mexican water legislation allows the environmental agencies. The very few applications of
National Water Commission (CNA) to apply the these charges were implemented with a cost-recovery
polluter-pays principle on water discharges from mu- approach attempting to cover the operating costs of moni-
nicipalities and industrial plants exceeding determined toring systems. It should be noted that the relevant legisla-
standards for organic matter and suspended solids. For tion also contemplates uses of other renewable resources,
volume discharges below 3,000 cubic meters, a simpli- such as air, fisheries, and forests. The fishing and forest
fied approach is adopted based on volume rather than charges were poorly implemented, as in the case of water,
pollution content. whereas air pollution charges were never applied.
Lack of enforcement has substantially reduced the Failure to expand coverage and introduce pollution
revenue raised. Although revenue has increased from and usage criteria in determining charge levels was be-
N$17.4 million to N$52.4 million since implementation of cause of reasons similar to those in the Mexican case:
the law, this still represents only a minor percentage of lack of appropriate design of the instrument, lack of
potential revenue. Poor monitoring and opposition from information about impacts, incompatibility with the
polluters are the main reasons for enforcement failures. available monitoring system, and inadequate planning of
The national scope of the water system has required its coverage. These factors have resulted in fierce public
monitoring resources that are beyond the current finan- and political opposition and have undermined political
cial capacity of the CNA. Lack of private and public support.
participation, along with the general lack of reliable in- Only US$116,000 were collected from a potential
formation or careful analyses of expected impacts, has tariff revenue of US$90 million. Interestingly, in the few
motivated polluters' opposition on grounds of competi- cases where these constraints were overcome, it is re-
tiveness and distributive considerations. ported that successful application of the charges induced
The current revision of this legislation on water changes in water use patterns as well as reductions in
charges is aimed at removing these political barriers by consumption and pollution.
enhancing participation, information, and institutional In 1993 new environmental legislation (Law
capacity. A more participatory and realistic approach 99/93) was passed in Colombia in which pollution
may create an excellent opportunity for Mexico to im- charges are clearly specified based on the criteria of
plement an effective system of economic incentives for full environmental costs (Box 4.1). That is, the charge
water management, while also providing financial re- level must be defined according to the value of envi-
sources to develop institutional capacity. ronmental services and the cost of environmental dam-
Box 4.1 Colombia's Proposed Environmental Tax: Practical Difficulties of Implementation
Title VII of Colombia's new Environment Law 99/93 states that the environment ministry (MinAmbiente) or the re-
gional autonomous corporations (CARs) will establish a system of tariffs to be levied on the effluents and emissions
of polluting industries. The tariffs were to be based on the following factors and requirements:
* For each of the factors that are included in the establishment of a tariff amount, MinAmbiente or the CARs will
define quantifiable variables that will permit the measurement of environmental damage.
* Each factor and its variables should have a coefficient that permits the weighting of damage together with the
factors and variables considered.
* The coefficients should be calculated based on resource availability and scarcity, diversity of the regions, pol-
lution assimilation capacity, the contaminating or polluting agents, the socioeconomic variables of the popula-
tion affected, and the opportunity cost of the resources.
* The factors, variables, and coefficients thus determined and measured would be integrated into mathematical
formulas that permit the calculation and determination of the corresponding tariffs.
MinAmbiente set out to assess the costs of pollution treatment as a way of establishing the tariffs to be levied within
this context. However, ultimately this environmental tax system was discarded because 90 percent of the CARs de-
clared that the technical requirements were too rigorous for them to implement.
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ages. In fact, the new criteria attempt to bring charge The main disputes arising from these bills are related
levels to optimum levels in the Pigouvian sense meas- to (a) jurisdictional overlaps between various levels of
ured by economic welfare losses. government and the agencies located in specific river ba-
This new legislation eliminates the cost-recovery sins, (b) whether criteria for applying water charges should
limitations of charges, which now may be set on a tax be based on cost-recovery or the cost of damages, and
levy basis. However, now the constraints discussed pre- (c) whether allocation of charge revenue should be in
viously are even more severe. The new rules demand a terms of general funding or basin-specific budgets. Politi-
sophisticated institutional capacity since the new charge cians are reluctant to create one independent jurisdiction
determination is complex and bound to vary significantly that conflicts with existing state and municipal jurisdic-
with activity and spatial factors. In addition to this tech- tions, and users are concerned with avoiding new forms of
nical constraint, the administration of these new charges taxation and bureaucratic procedures. Environmental
can be extremely costly. The resulting higher uncertainty agencies are confused about how to reconcile current stan-
in economic and social impacts is, consequently, gener- dards with fines for noncompliance and legal penalties. It
ating strong opposition among polluters and users. is also argued that the country lacks the institutional ca-
Aware that the complexity of some proposed MBIs is pacity to deal with such innovative management at the
exceeding domestic institutional capacity, the Colombian national level without creating additional bureaucratic
environmental agency is attempting to streamline current barriers and wasteful agencies. That seems to be a plausi-
legislation and regulations; charge levels are to be deter- ble argument since the institutionally fragile environment
mined in stages where rates are gradually estimated and ministry has so far failed to find ways of clarifying and
implemented. Moreover, attention has been paid to a care- addressing these constraints.
ful analysis of economic and social impacts for future In the most developed states, where environmental
negotiations with polluters and users. The necessary ad- agencies are more active, such legislation has already been
justments for the existing institutional capacity vis-a-vis passed or is about to be approved. Nevertheless the politi-
the charge system are also being considered. cal constraints faced by the federal bill are now impeding
Once more, as in the Mexican case, these charges implementation. In these cases, while water charge reve-
may be an excellent opportunity to promote effective nues are seen as a catalyst among mayors seeking funds to
water management in the country and to generate the carry on sanitation programs, their distribution criteria and
financial resources required to overcome budgetary con- resulting institutional arrangements make consensus diffi-
straints. However, a strong enforcement capability is cult. Users are often absent from official discussions but
needed to secure these financial resources. are very active behind the scenes.
Therefore, the Brazilian experience on water charges
Brazil has been very ineffective because discussions have not
The Brazilian experience on river basin management been participatory among stakeholders. In order to over-
dates from 1978 when river basin committees were come this, the state and federal levels are considering the
formed in some of the most problematic basins to carry introduction of experimental river basin charges on a pilot
out studies and suggest actions to rationalize water use. basis, subject to agreement and consensus among users. It
These committees, composed of users, polluters, is also agreed that such fees should initially be set at a
and government agencies, have no normative power and level to cover administrative and monitoring costs, and
financing autonomy. That is, they do not have a legal then gradually move to levels where use and pollution
basis to impose sanctions and charges. Therefore, most patterns could be induced to change. Based on this experi-
of the relevant committees' proposals were not put into ence, regulations would subsequently be modified to rec-
practice and members' engagement was very weak. oncile competing interests.
The growing degradation of the Brazilian rivers led
several initiatives within the environmental and energy Conventional Taxation
sectors to develop new legislation on water resource
management. The 1988 Constitution has finally intro- Colombia
duced requirements at the federal and state levels that A percentage of property taxes in Colombia are re-
would provide basin authorities with normative and fi- tained by municipalities to pay for expenditures by the
nancing mandates. Since that time several projects based regional environmental agencies. Under the proposed
on river basin authorities have been discussed, and a reform of the fiscal system, there will be a greater reli-
new version has been under discussion in the federal ance on municipal taxes to finance environmental
congress for three years. All projects introduce water management. The driving force behind this approach
charges that are based on use and pollution content, and has been decentralization and the lower transaction
that cover a wide range of activities. costs of these fiscal devices.
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Box 4.2 Brazil's Green Value-Added Tax
Revenue from the state valued-added tax (ICMS) is distributed among municipalities according to origin, generation,
and population criteria. Since 1992, three Brazilian states-Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Parana-have introduced
environmental revenue distribution criteria based on the size of area subject to land use restrictions (watershed and
conservation protection). The main aim was to create a budgetary supplement to compensate municipalities where
land use restrictions, which benefited society as a whole, might impose barriers to local economic development. An
advantage of the scheme is that it did not require a new fiscal instrument. Moreover, it is expected that additional fi-
nancial resources can also promote implementation of sustainable activities.
Introduction of the environmental criteria was carried out with a careful political approach involving mayors
and representatives in the state congress. Because total tax revenue did not change and therefore the new criteria re-
duced the share of other municipalities, political resistance was acknowledged. Studies were undertaken to estimate
budgetary impacts on municipalities where gains and losses were expected. As a first step it was agreed that a very
small share of total revenue (between 0.2 and 3.0 percent) would be devoted to these criteria. Nevertheless, legisla-
tion allows for periodic revisions to the criteria, indicators, and shares based on the results. These revisions have in
fact occurred in Sao Paulo and Parana, where the system has already been in place for about three years. Major
changes announced so far are restricted to redesigning indicators where monitoring difficulties have been encountered.
Brazil Strong opposition to gasoline price increases is a
Another interesting use of conventional taxation for typical case of misinformation and lack of participatory
natural resource preservation is Brazil's "green value- discussion. Gasoline price increases have a marginal effect
added tax" (Box 4.2). The tax is an example of a low- on general price levels. With the earmarlcing of surcharge
cost instrument where political barriers were overcome revenue to public transportation investments, passenger
and where current legislation was used. car owners could change their transport patterns and low-
income groups, relying on mass transport, would enjoy an
Mexico improved transport system with better safety and envi-
A tax representing a very small percentage of the gasoline ronmental standards, and a reduced trip time.5
price--one cent per liter-was introduced to finance the
installation of safety measures in gasoline station storage Final Demand Instruments
tanks to reduce fuel evaporation. The low transaction costs
of this earmarked fiscal source, which is easy to collect Export firms in the region are increasingly introducing
and fumd, has allowed that program to be successfully environmental management procedures to enhance their
implemented. international competitiveness, particularly to comply
The current CAC approach, based on car emission with standards and norms in regional markets, such as
standards and maintenance monitoring, has not achieved the EEC and NAFTA. Certification based on International
desired improvement in air quality. Therefore, a gasoline Standards Organization (ISO) series has been a key fac-
price increase was considered as a potential instrument tor to improve these companies' export performance. In
(Eskeland 1994). But the surcharge on gasoline prices to Brazil, Chile, and Mexico eco-labeling has been the
reduce car use, and consequently, emissions in Mexico City, subject of discussions between governmental agencies
has been facing strong opposition. To induce changes in car and the private sector.
use patterns (characterized by low demand elasticity for For Brazilian exporting firms, ISO 14000 environ-
gasoline) would require much higher surcharges, which mental certification, as with the ISO 9000 quality series,
would certainly provoke strong public reaction. has become an unavoidable commitment. Brazil's par-
Increased taxation on old cars was adopted for reve- ticipation in the respective ISO meetings has been very
nue reasons, but if the level is increased and is differenti- active. In addition, mainly within the domestic market,
ated by vehicle performance, it may offer incentives for
fleet renewal and promote antipollution and fuel con-
sumptSion improvements. Although such tax differentials 5. Esiaeredc, tha siia gaoln sucar, fo
camptonbas implovemented, mostlofth eounhsuh trdifresinth the city of Sao Paulo in Brazil, which also faces serious air
can be easily Implemented, most of the countries in the quality problems, would generate annual revenue of US$500
region actually differentiate taxes in favor of older cars million and allow expansion of the subway system by 20 per-
because of equity issues. cent a year (Ser6a da Motta and Mendes 1996).
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joint efforts with environmental agencies and other nor- The current budgetary constraints faced by the envi-
mative bodies have been made to define criteria and ronmental management sector turn MBIs into an attrac-
norms for eco-labeling tive option for collecting the necessary funds to improve
In Ecuador a successful program was carried out by CAC application. It is very clear that MBI initiatives are
Quito's municipal government in an industrial district, sought as complementary actions to CAC. The imposi-
El Inca, to identify cost-effective pollution prevention tion of standards, licensing, zoning and permits still
measures. While not motivated by environmental con- continues, and in fact MBIs provide innovative and
sciousness, the cost saving in energy, materials, and flexible ways to enforce them.
waste management have been great enough to encourage The administrative demands of MBIs remain high.
firms to join the program. The monitoring requirements, legal design requirements,
public consultation needs, and enforcement or collection
Summary systems related to MBIs are not always noticeably differ-
ent from strict CAC approaches. MBIs are therefore not a
MBI applications currently represent a major initiative in substitute for weak institutions or for CAC; some regula-
environmental management in Latin America and the tory elements are inevitably required and a strong institu-
Caribbean. The potential efficiency gains from MBIs tional base is a prerequisite to MBI implementation. MBIs
have been recognized, but the driving force towards are thus a complementary tool to CAC procedures.
MBI implementation has been, as in OECD countries, The main challenge in these initiatives is to design
the goal of raising revenue. Therefore, the misplaced MBIs that can be successfully applied within the context
conflict between MBI and CAC instruments does not of the same institutional and political barriers that are
seem to appear in the region's experiences. constraining the CAC approach.
5. Additional Issues in Design of
Market-Based Instruments
From an operational perspective, MBIs should be de- Distribution, Poverty, and Tax Implications
signed with a number of key points in mind to ensure
urban sustainability. In general, they should incorporate The dramatic level of poverty and income inequality in
the following elements: the region creates serious barriers to undertaking stricter
* The mechanism should reflect the polluter-pays environmental practices when distributive effects are
principle to ensure that externalities are reduced. unknown. Remarkably, the reviews in the 11 countries
This can be achieved by setting charges or taxes provided very few examples of how various MBIs would
at levels high enough to induce polluters and impact different income groups. Opposition to many
users to reduce their total level of degradation. MBIs, as well as to CAC procedures, is based on alleged
* The complementarity between regulations and in- regressive impacts. This shows that there is, in fact, an
centives must be reflected in the design of all sys- interest in the distributive impacts of various policies
tems; incentive charges, for example, may still be and that the social dimensions of MBIs-as expressed
complemented with some baseline standard that through their potentially regressive nature or repercus-
must not be breached under any circumstances. sions-is a significant concern in Latin America and the
N Revenue generation should be designed in a Caribbean. It is notable that Bolivia, one of the poorest
manner that allows some of the revenue to flow countries in the region, is actively pursuing a policy that
to local authorities to provide an incentive and a supports the progressive use of environmental charges
means for local empowerment. (Box 5. 1).
'TIis chapter addresses additional MBI design issues This reinforces, however, the need to undertake
arising from the above points and relating to (a) social issues more work on the relative impacts of different mecha-
of distribution, poverty, and taxes, (b) prevalence of perverse nisms. Flexible instruments with efficiency and distribu-
incentives, (c) role of tradable permits, (d) role of earmark- tive gains have to be sought as politically viable options
ing, and (e) role of legal redress through advocacy. to the current procedures. Moreover, information about
BoDX 5.1 Progressive Environmental Taxation In Bolivia
Bolivia is the poorest country in South America and the third poorest in the Western Hemisphere. Close to one-third
of the population in functionally illiterate, half of urban households and more than 90 percent of rural ones have un-
satisfied basic needs. The infant mortality rate is high even by Latin American standards (75 per 1,000 live births).
Diarrhea and acute respiratory diseases are the main sources of infant mortality, 32 percent and 19 percent of all
deaths, respectively. The maternal mortality rate is also very high, at 390 per 100,000 live births.
Limited access to safe drinking water and adequate sewage systems are-in addition to malnutrition-the pri-
mary causes of the country's high morbidity and mortality rates (both urban and rural). These problems, in turn, are
the result of historically very low levels of public investment in basic sanitation infrastructure (water and sewage
systems, collectively known in Bolivia as saneamiento bdsico). Only 25 percent of rural households and 75 percent
of urban ones have access to drinking water. Less than I percent of rural households and only 36 percent of urban
ones have in-house sewage systems. Over the past few years public investment in basic sanitation has been less than
I percent of GDP, equivalent to less than 6 percent of total public investment.
Because of this "poverty" focus, MBIs implemented in Bolivia must be progressive in nature to ensure that they
dc, not unduly exacerbate the problems. For example, in 1994 the municipality of La Paz introduced a combination
of polluter-pays and progressive-subsidy principles to solid waste disposal. Also, changes in the structure of water
user fees are being implemented to increase the allocative efficiency of water use, to encourage private investments
in infrastructure, and to allow for progressive subsidies.
Source: Escobar and Mufioz 1996.
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the effect of impacts from differenct mechanisms must The new 1981 water code reintroduced permanent
be made broadly available to all stakeholders; this will water rights, which were completely separated from
permit decisions and compromises to be made in an at- land rights and could be freely traded for consumptive
mosphere of informed choice as opposed to an atmos- and nonconsumptive uses. Conditional use was abol-
phere of uninformed opinion. ished and simultaneous requests were arbitrated
through bidding.
Perverse Incentives Today there are approximately 300,000 water users
in Chile. However, only 35-50 percent of them have
Perverse incentives refer to a class of MBIs that, while in- iegal title. Users are organized in private associations
tended to improve environmental quality, in fact work in the controlled by the General Directorate of Water (DGA),
opposite direction. Presence of such incentives indicates within the Ministry of Public Works, which is responsi-
poor design or inappropriate application of an MBI. The fact ble for water rights regulation, approval of hydraulic
that two types of perverse incentives were relatively com- works, and technical reports of conflict resolution. Irri-
mon in the panel of countries studied indicates that experi- gation has a specific national commission-composed of
ence in developing appropriate MBIs is still imited. public and private institutions-to plan, evaluate, and
First, proposed or existing effluent charge schemes approve public investments in the sector. These invest-
in some of the countries were still based on pollutant ments are coordinated by the Directorate of Irrigation
concentrations as opposed to pollutant volumes or loads. and are executed by private companies.
The effect of using concentrations as an indicator of A revision to this tradable permit system is under
pollution is that it creates an incentive for firms to dilute discussion in congress to avoid speculation and promote
the pollution through, for example, abstracting more trade, address pollution problems, and enhance man-
water and then depositing a larger gross volume of di- agement capacity in planning and monitoring. A com-
luted waste into water bodies. Taxes or charges based on plementary system of tradable water emission permits is
pollutant concentrations may, in fact, have the perverse also under discussion.
effect of reducing water conservation, increasing industrial Transaction records in 1992 showed that trade tends
costs of treatment, and increasing pollutant damages. to be more intense near the Santiago area because of
Second, although tax differentials on equipment can scarcity. In that year, only 3 percent of total water flow
be easily implemented, most of the countries in the region was traded in the area, with an estimated value of
apply differentiated taxes so that there is an incentive to US$366,000. Moreover, 94 percent of total transactions
keep older vehicles on the road for longer periods of time. occurred between farmers and therefore did not involve
Given the poor condition of these vehicles, these tax changes in beneficial use. Trade between urban users
treatments have the perverse effect of increasing fuel con- and farmers did not exceed 3 percent of total trade trans-
sumption, pollution, and maintenance costs; the alleged actions.
"social equity" impacts of such schemes are, moreover, This low rate of transactions may reflect either a
typically specious. failure of the system or a close to optimal allocation of
initial rights. Such an evaluation requires further re-
Role of Tradable Permits search. It is, however, reported that trade has avoided
political disputes and reduced investment expenditures.
The use of tradable permits is currently under strong con- In Chile, tradable water rights have been politically
sideration in countries such as Chile, Peru, and Mexico. acceptable and enforceable because of the country's long
tradition in water property rights. Even water rights that
Water Use are not legally registered are respected and traded.
Tradable permits for water rights are in place only in Chile The lesson from this is clear: assurance and ac-
and are still under discussion in Peru. In Chile, individual ceptance of property rights are particularly important
tradable fishery quotas are also being implemented, but for trading (or even taxing) water rights. Controversial
information is too scarce to analyze the experience. equity issues are bound to arise for this essential natu-
The Chilean experience with tradable water permits ral resource and countries with no similar tradition
dates to the 1920s. A general legal basis was, however, should first legalize existing titles for property rights
set in the 1951 water code that allows the state to give and define criteria for new allocations. The water per-
water concessions to private parties according to water mits already in place in many countries may provide an
use priorities. Water transfers were allowed provided initial endowment.
that use remained the same. In 1969, during the agrarian In addition, fees for permits may be considered as a
reforms, water become state property and trade conces- recurrent source of funding for management and moni-
sions were prohibited. toring activities.
36 Chapter 5
Air Pollution free-market environment of the Chilean economy, the
In 1]991 Mexico passed legislation for tradable air pollu- system's political acceptance was high and private com-
tiori permits for stationary sources, and the system is panies were active in discussing standards and criteria.
currently under design. But again, most of the experi- These lessons can now be of extreme importance in
ence relating to air pollution trading occurs in Chile. the case of Mexico, where a similar system is being pur-
A successful road-auctioning system for bus trans- sued in the Mexico City Metropolitan Area. In Mexico, a
portation licenses has been implemented in Santiago to significant change will be required in the environmental
address pollution from traffic congestion. It is a clear legislation to incorporate tradable permits. Therefore, it
example of introducing an economic incentive within an is important to explicitly support the free-market princi-
existing licensing system, thus benefiting from lower ples embodied in tradable permits and to promote pol-
transaction costs, a fairly high level of revenue genera- luter participation at the beginning of the design process.
tion, and few legal and institutional barriers.
However, the Chilean system for air pollution pernits Policy Synopsis
has not been fully implemented. The system is to be ap- There are numerous opportunities for introducing trad-
plied in the Santiago area, where air pollution problems able permits in Latin America and the Caribbean; the
are very serious. Existing pollution sources are required major constraint to their implementation will be finding
either to comply with standards or to offset excess emis- an equitable initial allocation and trading regime that is
sions by trade. Initial allocations were based on 1992 consistent with local market-reform processes. Their
emission levels (a "grandfathering" system), while new potential to generate revenue is substantial if initial allo-
sources are required to offset all emissions. cation is done by auction and if fees are charged annu-
Offset trading started within the Chilean system in ally for holding both exercised and unexercised permits.
1995 with very few cases, mostly intrafirm. However, it is
recognized that compliance with emission standards-the Earmarking
CAC part of the system-has improved and has yielded
beneficial results in terms of air pollutant concentrations in Although earmarking of revenues is normally avoided in
the Santiago area. public finance, there are certain theoretical conditions
Although institutional capacity was a major con- under which it can be justified. These circumstances
straint to implementing this system (Box 5.2), it is worth usually arise when (a) transactions and administrative
noting that the assignment of air pollution property rights costs are very high, (b) revenues are related to the ex-
was generally accepted by polluters. In fact, because of the plicit provision of a service for a fee, or (c) political
EBox 5.2 Air Pollution Permit Trading in Chile
Decree 04/1992 introduced an implicit emissions trading system for fixed-source particulate emissions in the Santiago
area. The system was based on emissions as reported in March 1992. Implementation of the Chilean trading system is
under the control of the Program for Fixed-Source Air Pollution Control (PROCEFF) within the National Environment
Commission (CONAMA). PROCEFF's initially limited institutional capacity delayed system implementation; private
laboratories worldng with PROCEFF had been corrupted and some technical problems in measurements were also
responsible for constant delays in enforcement.
Currently, PROCEFF has gained additional resources and is training personnel in private laboratories, certifying
the equipment and defining adequate technical procedures. Legislative reforms are also in the works to overcome the
problems encountered so far. The major problems are related to:
* Distribution of allotments. The initial allocation of emissions was not well defined. Companies were claim-
ing larger emissions for the March 1992 baseline date than had been previously reported. The possibility of
increasing the allocations retroactively thus reduced incentives for trading emission rights.
* Legal basis. The original taw was considered insufficient to withstand legal challenges. The new draft law
attempts to overcome this problem by defining emission permits as property rights rather than "transferable
administrative permits" as in Decree 04/1992.
* Uncertainty. Given legal uncertainties, polluters did not believe that many of the provisions would be effec-
tively enforced.
Source: Rfos 1995; von Amsberg 1995.
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pressures for accountability generate effective collection encountered with enforcing strict CAC measures. The
of revenues. In this last case, people may only agree to court system in the country is heavily backlogged, and
pay a specific tax if they are satisfied that it is going to a enforcement and regulation is constrained by inadequate
program or cause they support. Governments around the financial resources.
world are discovering that many of these conditions exist Although there is no legislation in place to mandate
within sectors related to environmental management. corporate liability for environmental damages, in 1990
Specifically earmarking revenues from MBIs to ex- PetroTrin established a voluntary policy of full compensa-
plicit environmental objectives is thus gaining increased tion for environmental damages. The move was prompted
favor in the region. In Brazil and Ecuador, earmarked by a number of uncontained well blowouts through the
resource taxes are used to support environmental institu- 1980s that damaged local homes, flooded farmers' fields
tions. In Mexico, incremental gas taxes were used to with oil, and caused a significant public outcry in response
finance the reduction of fuel evaporation from local to health damages when the company gave no assistance
service stations. In most countries in the region, utility in relocating people to avoid the potentially lethal effects
fees and tariffs are becoming more closely aligned with of the spills. After the voluntary policy was implemented,
the cost of providing basic environmental services, and two notable trends happened: (a) blowout prevention de-
these revenues are increasingly being retained by the vices on wells improved, making spills and leakage less
bodies that are responsible for financing those services. frequent, and (b) when a spill did occur, it was easier to
To date, experience in Latin America and the Carib- contain the impacts and any damages were readily com-
bean has demonstrated that earmarking programs are most pensated. An incident in the early 1990s, for example,
successful where (a) taxes or incentives are linked to ex- required rapid evacuation of about 1,000 residents from a
isting collection mechanisms, and (b) revenues are made village when a blowout occurred; affected people were
available to decentralized authorities for environmental compensated for damaged land and inconvenience, and
programming or for institutional strengthening. At a politi- farms were restored at company expense.
cal level, earmarking is gaining support because it is found
that such a "cost-recovery approach" may make it easier to Colombia
build consensus, remove barriers, and guarantee budget One very innovative liability instrument, devised in
resources to finance environmental institutions. 1992, involves enhancing consumer actions by providing
an economic incentive. Anyone pursuing an environ-
Legal Redress and Advocacy mental liability judicial action is entitled to receive a fee
equivalent to 10-15 percent of the total compensation. It
A number of examples illustrate the use of voluntary is reported that since 1992 the number of actions has
measures and reliance on consumer advocacy to achieve significantly increased.
environmental management goals in Latin American and
Caribbean countries. Policy Synopsis
Consumer advocacy through voluntary measures and pub-
Trinidad and Tobago lic pressure (at times linked to formal or voluntary liability
The 1995 Environmental Management Act in Trinidad instruments) in these cases plays a potentially critical role
and Tobago provides for the use of MBIs in environ- as an MBI in Latin American and Caribbean countries. To
mental regulatory efforts. While few are yet in place, a large degree, these mechanisms are interpreted as sub-
this focus has largely been a response to the difficulties stitutes for historically weak institutional capacity.
6. Concluding Remarks
While the countries examined in this paper encompass
most of the region, and the examples include most major _ _ e o -
issues related to market-based instruments (MBIs), this
is not a comprehensive study. Its observations and rec- REALISM. Be modest. Do not try to implement poli-
ommendations are merely intended to provide regional cies and instruments beyond the available institu-
policymakers with an agenda for future efforts that tional capacity.
should be adapted to each country's specific needs, and GRADUALISM. National or regional projects can be
do not represent a detailed action plan. implemented gradually by pilot projects or ex-
The most important lesson emerging from the study perimental programs. The establishment of plau-
is that a more coherent approach to the use of economic sible and enforceable norms, standards, and
instruments for environmental management is needed in
LEGAL FLEXIBILJTY. Legislation must allow for tlnethe region. Any such approach, moreover, must clearly EALLibilityo l evisionst
recognize and address issues of institutional fragility. possibility of low-cost revisions.
Wirhin this general contextd the study finds that under the INSTITUTIONAL INTEGRATION. Intra- and intergovem-Wigithin tirstgncoe the std findt underthe mental integration must be pursued to overcome
barriers and capitalize on institutional strengths.
management and equity, rationalize markets, reduce social Economic agencies must be included, as well as
costs, and increase institutional revenues. A number of representation from the legislative branch.
important caveats and restrictions nevertheless apply: LEADERSHiP. Those responsible for environmental
* While MBIs can improve environmental man- management must lead the decisionmaking proc-
agement, they normally impose high administra- ess by identifying stakeholders, constraints, and
tive demands and do not represent a "quick fix" the means for building consensus.
to the problems associated with more traditional PARTICIPATION. Participation by stakeholders is
command-and-control approaches. critical and must be based on open sharing of in-
D espite substantial experimentation with MBIs, formation. Issues that may paralyze the process
should be avoided, and equity issues should belimited institutional capacity is pervasive and properly identified, evaluated, and addressed.
constrains their effective utilization in the region; MARKET RELIANCE. The growing relance on markets
* Historically, the primary motive for the use of must be incorporated into the design of environ-
MBIs has been revenue generation rather than mental policy and MBIs. High transaction and
improvements in environmental quality. collection costs should be avoided and reforms
i Budgets for environmental management are lim- should not outpace implementation and accep-
ited, and in many cases resources are poorly tar- tance of market adjustments.
geted or do not effectively advance policy goals. REVENUE GENERATION. Many MBIs can generate
* Public awareness of the costs of environmental earmarked revenues. Although correct pricing of
environmental goods and services is one objectivedegradation and of the management tools avail- of MBIs, a cost-recovery approach may be a more
able to address it remains low, and environ- effective way to build consensus, remove barriers,
mental regulations frequently are plagued by un- and guarantee financing.
certainty that undermines their credibility. HUMAN RESOURCE DEVEwPMENT. Qualified human
* Even though genuine efforts have been made to resources in the environmental field are limited
adapt MBIs to local circumstances, the flow of and remuneration of public sector employees is
information is still predominantly in a North- generally low. Human resource profiles should be
restructured to make the most of limited budgets.
South direction, and ntraregionalcooperation Given these constraints, public sector environ-
remains weak. mental units should be kept small and should rely
Public sector management in Latin America and the to a significant degree on extemal expertise, con-
Caribbean historically has been very bureaucratic and cessions, and research centers.
subject to significant political interference, while legal CONTINENTALusM. OECD experiences and recom-
and regulatory enforcement frequently has been ineffec- mendations should not be rejected out of hand,
tive. Policy implementation often has been poorly tar- but there is a need to increase ties among regional
getLed, particularly for social development. In the past, agencies whose economic and cultural contexts
environmental and other types of regulations have been may be more familiar
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strongly dominated by command-and-control (CAC) This does not mean that MBIs should be avoided,
measures, usually applied in an authoritarian political but rather that their successful use requires adequate
framework. In more recent years, however, social ine- legislation and financing, capable institutions, and ef-
quality, economic stagnation, macroeconomic destabili- fective monitoring and enforcement. Under the right
zation, and weak international competitiveness have conditions, MBIs can overcome significant institutional
induced countries to adopt-albeit haltingly in some barriers and may present important advantages over
cases-liberalization policies committed to free markets CAC measures. MBIs, for example, can introduce
and expanded trade. greater economic rationality into policy decisions,
This new economic scenario, together with favor- thereby reducing social costs. They can also make mar-
able political factors, has helped to elevate MBIs as tools kets more efficient, improve equity outcomes, and gen-
of environmental management in various parts of the erate resources to support institutional strengthening at
region. Some countries already are using economic in- both the national and local levels.
struments such as royalties, user charges, tradable per- However, market-based instruments must be tai-
mits, and green taxes. In many cases MBIs are designed lored to local needs and conditions. While there is posi-
not to replace existing CAC measures (such as environ- tive experience in Latin America and the Caribbean in
mental standards, licensing, zoning regulations, and this respect, there is considerable room for improvement.
permits), but rather to complement them and enhance International agencies and donors still are often prone to
their effectiveness. However, the main impetus behind recommend OECD solutions with little regard to local
many MBIs has been to raise revenues for environmental institutional realities, and the flow of information con-
management rather than to achieve environmental qual- tinues to be predominantly in a North-South direction.
ity goals, reduce environmental impacts, or improve the While regional institutions have attempted to adapt
cost-effectiveness of existing regulations. MBIs to each country's economic and cultural charac-
Reducing excessive regulation and government ex- teristics, Latin American and Caribbean countries could
penditures has become the cornerstone of public sector go much farther in fostering intraregional cooperation
reform, and has gained widespread support from society and information interchange regarding alternative ap-
as a whole. But important opportunities to redefine and proaches to environmental management.
better target regulations and public expenditures-which This study seeks to begin filling that gap, but fur-
can both improve cost-effectiveness and help promote ther initiatives are needed and the countries of the region
critical policy goals-often have been missed. Budgets should take the lead in this process. However, social
for environmental management frequently have been cut inequality, general public sector crises, and weak public
in an ad hoc manner without giving adequate considera- participation inherited from earlier authoritarian regimes
tion to policy objectives and effectiveness, while macro- still present serious difficulties and are a real constraint
economic stabilization has constrained public expendi- to rapid implementation of complex market-based
tures more generally. mechanisms. Sound and enforceable environmental poli-
At the same time as budgets for environmental cies likewise remain elusive.
management have been reduced, environmental aware- To operationalize the use of MBIs more effectively
ness has risen due to democratization, rapid industriali- within this fragile institutional context requires a sys-
zation and urbanization, and international initiatives. As tematic approach. This study recommends that the fol-
environmental agencies are called on to do more-often lowing steps be considered by countries that are contem-
with fewer resources and increasing bureaucratic costs- plating the adoption or reform of environmental man-
there is greater risk of enforcement failures that will agement policies:
discredit polices, legislation, norms, and the agencies 1) Clearly identify the environmental problems that
themselves, and generate increased uncertainty with the policy reforms are meant to address, and set
respect to the application of environmental regulations. clear goals and objectives.
This uncertainty is one of the most serious concerns 2) Take stock of existing instruments, including an
expressed by both the business sector and the communi- assessment of their flexibility and the degree to
ties directly affected by environmental problems. which they help internalize environmental costs.
Under these circumstances, widespread experimen- 3) Analyze existing legal mechanisms and their
tation with economic incentives can be risky since MBIs compatibility with MBIs, and consider the feasi-
are not a simple substitute for CAC measures and do not bility of reforms that would create a more favor-
eliminate the need for strong institutions. In some cases, able legal environment.
MBIs actually increase technical and financial demands. 4) Assess relevant market forces, economic agents,
Therefore, gradual and flexible reforms may be the best and the rationality of economic incentives, pay-
approach as institutions evolve and strengthen. ing particular attention to the potential role of
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market-based reforms to enhance the effective- duction, fiscal revenues) and costs (tax erosion,
ness of environmental management. smaller consumer surplus, inflation) of the pro-
5) Identify environmental damages whose costs are posed reforms.
not intemalized, and their relation to various eco- 7) Investigate the feasibility of introducing specific
nomic and domestic activities (for example, MBIs in terms of their impacts on private costs,
pollutant emissions and transportation, land deg- institutional costs, the marginal cost of revenue
radation and natural resource exploitation, water generation, and legal measures.
pollution and sewerage). 8) Recommend policy, institutional, or legislative ac-
6) Quantify, if possible, the social benefits (envi- tions (such as decentralization, or legislation based
ronmental improvement, social control, cost re- on the polluter-pays principle).
Appendix A: Background Paper Summaries
Bolivia property rights, establish new conflict resolution mecha-
nisms, and set new rules for the use of natural resources.
Bolivia is a very large, sparsely populated, and poor coun- However, these legal changes have broader implications
try in the center of South America. It covers 1.1 million that go beyond the issue of improving environmental
square kilometers, has 6.9 inhabitants per square kilome- quality. Furthermore, there is very little information avail-
ter, and a per capita income of US$760 a year. Geographi- able that can be used to evaluate the environmental impli-
cally, the country is divided into three different regions: cations of these policy changes.
the altiplano, the inter-Andean valleys (some arid, some This paper focuses only on the narrower category of
humid), and the eastern lowlands. These climatic regions urban environmental quality issues. It is argued that
cover 20 percent, 20 percent, and 60 percent of Bolivia's widespread poverty is the main cause of the environ-
territory, respectively, but some two-thirds of the popula- mental quality problems affecting the majority of Bo-
tion live in the highland regions of the country (altiplano livians. In particular, limited access to safe drinking
and valleys). Just over half of Bolivia is covered with for- water and adequate sewage systems are-in addition to
ests (mostly humid, but some semiarid). Hydrologically, malnutrition-the primary causes of the country's high
the country is divided into three major water basins: the morbidity and mortality rates (both urban and rural).
Amazonian to the northeast, the Pilcomayo which feeds These problems, in turn, are the result of historically
Rio de la Plata to the southeast, and the Lake Titicaca- very low levels of public investment in basic sanitation
Lake Poop6 closed basin in the west.' infrastructure (water and sewage systems, collectively
Bolivia is the poorest country in South America and known in Bolivia as saneamiento bdsico).
the third poorest in the Western Hemisphere, after Haiti Only 24.9 percent of rural households and 74.8 per-
and Honduras. Close to one-third of the population is cent of urban ones have access to safe drinking water.
functionally illiterate, half of urban households and more Less than 1 percent of rural households and only 36.2
than 90 percent of rural ones have unsatisfied basic percent of urban ones have in-house sewage systems.
needs (UBN), such as limited access to safe drinking Over the past few years, public investment in basic
water, sewerage, basic education, and health services. sanitation has been less than I percent of GDP, equiva-
The infant mortality rate is high even by Latin American lent to less than 6 percent of total public investment.
standards (75 per 1,000 live births). Diarrhea and acute With the implementation of the bold "Popular Par-
respiratory diseases are the main sources of infant mor- ticipation" and "Administrative Decentralization" re-
tality (32 percent and 19 percent, respectively). The forms over the past two years, Bolivia has taken major
maternal mortality rate is also very high, at 390 per steps that will significantly increase the level of local
100,000 live births. (department and municipal) public investments in basic
Environmental issues in Bolivia can be classified un- sanitation and other key infrastructure projects. At the
der two broad categories: those involving long-term man- same time, the country has adopted quite strict environ-
agement of natural resources, and those directly affecting mental standards, equal or similar to those set for water
the daily livelihoods of significant portions of the urban and air quality by the U.S. Environmental Protection
population. There are three priorities in the first category: Agency (USEPA).
(a) improving water quality, (b) managing rain forests, and This paper argues that significant improvements in
(c) resolving land tenure conflicts, including those of na- environmental quality and living standards for the ma-
tional parks and indigenous peoples' claims. jority of Bolivians will come primarily as a result of
The issue of sustainable management of natural re- higher rates of public investment in basic sanitation in-
sources is very important in Bolivia, but it falls outside the frastructure. On the other hand, effective enforcement of
scope of this document. The country just adopted a new the strict environmental standards recently adopted will
forestry law, is considering a new law for modernizing the at best have a marginal effect on the living standards of
administrative framework of rural lands, and may consider the poor. It is doubtful that Bolivia's public sector has
a new water law in the near future. All these have impor- the institutional capacity to enforce the new environ-
tant environmental implications because they redefine mental standards and it is questionable whether the
country as a whole can afford the cost of adopting such
6. The Bolivia section is extracted from Escobar and strict standards, since doing so involves sacrificing some
Mufioz 1996. income growth.
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The main instrument of environmental policy as it tion and income levels, this mechanism has allowed pri-
relates to urban living standards is the environmental law vate waste-collecting firms (one large company and sev-
passed in June 1992, and its six regulatory decrees issued eral microenterprises) to operate more efficiently.
in December 1995. The law and its decrees introduced In addition, there are a couple of examples of mar-
over 350 pages of strict standards and regulations that rely ket-based allocation mechanisms in paper and glass re-
primarily in command-and-control (CAC) mechanisms for cycling. However, these operate completely as a result
enforcing environmental quality. Although the law allows of spontaneous market signals and have received little or
for the possibility of using market-based instruments no attention from the government. It is expected that
(MBIs), all the work that the Ministry of Sustainable De- these will gradually grow as the country develops. There
velopment and the Environment has done to date in order is significant potential for introducing MBIs in water use
to implement the law has been in CAC mechanisms. in urban areas as the institutional and financing mecha-
This law mandates that all existing public and pri- nisms of water utilities change in the near future.
vate projects, programs, or activities (with some excep- The highest priority area on environmental quality
tions) prepare an "environmental manifesto," a self- in Bolivia's urban areas is facilitating access to safe
evaluation of their present environmental conditions. drinking water. Improvements in this area have signifi-
The law also stipulates that all future projects, programs, cant environmental benefits, since it will directly address
or activities must have an environmental impact assess- one of the main causes of morbidity and mortality in
ment (EIA). Both of these must be approved according urban areas, especially among the poor. There are two
to the environmental quality standards set forth by the major challenges in this regard: (a) to significantly in-
regulatory decrees; firms will have five years to make crease the level of investment in infrastructure, and (b)
the necessary technical adjustments in their practices to to change the structure of user fees.
abide by the new standards. These stipulate, for exam- Higher investment rates in infrastructure are essential in
ple, that the maximum permissible limit for carbon order to increase the number of households with access to
monoxide (CO) in the air is an average of 10 micro- drinking water (especially in Beni and Pando, where distri-
grams per cubic meter in an 8-hour period, or 40 micro- bution networks are deficient or nonexistent, and in the
grams per cubic meter in a 1-hour period, which are country's four largest cities, where the population is growing
exactly the same standards that were in effect in 1989 in rapidly) and to improve its quality (in particular in cities
the United States (Portney 1990). With regard to water such as Oruro and Potosi). Bolivia is considering two
quality, the law stipulates a maximum permissible limit mechanisms in order to meet this challenge: (a) empowering
of 60 milligrams per liter for total suspended solids dis- municipal governments through increased autonomy, taxing
charged, and 80 milligrams per liter for BOD5. powers, and net transfers, and (b) privatizing (or
IThere are no official estimates on the costs and bene- "capitalizing") municipal water companies and cooperatives.
fits (private or social) involved in rigorously applying the Changes in the structure of user fees for water are im-
standards and regulations included in the law and its de- portant to increase the allocative efficiency of water use, to
crees. However, it is clear that implementing the law will allow for progressive subsidies, and to encourage private
have very high transaction costs to be paid by both the investments in infrastructure. The country is making the
public and private sectors. The government at the central, necessary legal changes to facilitate the capitalization of
department, and municipal levels is already facing signifi- municipal water and sewage companies and cooperatives.
cant constraints in implementing the law, primarily due to A second high-priority area for Bolivia is to introduce
lack of qualified personnel and appropriate training of certain key principles based on markets and civil society
public officials. At the same time, demand for qualified participation to environmental management, and to recon-
technicians to fill out environmental manifestos and EIAs sider some of the standards and regulations introduced by
is already inducing many professionals from the public the environmental aw and its regulatory decrees. Specifi-
and private sectors to establish consulting firms for this cally, it is recommended to (a) use cost-benefit analysis
purpose. Both of these phenomena are drawing scarce tools in environmental policymaking, (b) apply regularly
professionals away from other productive activities. the principle of marginal cost pricing for public utilities,
Government-sponsored MBIs have only started to with a progressive subsidy when appropriate, (c) establish
emerge in Bolivia (Table Al). For example, in 1994 the clear property rights for water and land resources, (d)
municipality of La Paz introduced a combination of promote the involvement of civil groups in environmental
"polluter-pays" and "progressive-subsidy" principles for management, (e) strengthen market-based instruments that
solid waste disposal. Households now pay a waste dis- are easy to apply, (f) reconsider some air and water quality
posal fee based on the amount of electricity they consume. standards, and (g) simplify the requirements and proce-
Since most households have electricity meters and there is dures for environmental impact evaluations mandated by
a strong positive correlation between electricity consump- the enviromental aw.
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Table Al Environmental Policy Instruments in Bolivia
Charges, Tariffs, Market Final Demand Liability
Regulations and Sanctions and Taxes Creation Intervention Legislation
Forestry and Biodiversity
Forestry law and environmental law: * License for forest ex- * Concessions over * Certification is * Public reporting or
* Classify forestry land traction (US$1 per fiscal land are required for prod- accusation is possible
* Management plans are required hectare per year) competitive (there ucts under CITES for environmental
* License to clear is required *License to clear are some limita- Convention offenses or crimes
* Sanctions for forest crimes or offenses tions), tradable, Eco-labels * Civil and criminal liti-
* Fines and last 40 years gation is possible for
environmental damage
................................................. ......................................... I...........................................................................................................................................
Soil, Erosion, Salinity
Soil management plan and * Permission to use, * Public reporting or
environmental law: according to zoning, is accusation is possible
* Land classification required for environmental
* Land use zoning * The use of toxic sub- offenses or crimes
stances is prohibited -Civil and criminal liti-
gation is possible for
environmental damage
.................... ........................................... .................. ....................................................................................................................................................
Water Pollution
Environmental law and other sectoral * There are rural * Public reporting or
regulations: markets for water accusation is possible
* Water quality standards rights, nevertheless for environmental
* Discharge prohibition for some toxic they do not have offenses or crimes
substances proper legal recog- * Civil and criminal liti-
E nvironmental impact assessment nition nor institu- gation is possible for
* Noncompliance fines equal to 0.3 tional endorsement environmental damage
percent of the asset's value
.......................................................................... ............................................................................................................................................................
Drinking Water and Sewage System
Environmental law and municipal Tariffs for drinking water * There is an in- * Public reporting or
regulations: and sewage system are creasing demand accusation is possible
Water quality standards determined by income, for bottled drinking for environmental
Discharge prohibition for some toxic type of consumer, and water offenses or crimes
substances quantity consumed (in La * Civil and criminal liti-
- Fines for disposal of human waste in Paz and Cochabamba. gation is possible for
unauthorized places US$0.20 per cubic environmental damage
meter of drinking water
in La Paz
* US$0.40 per cubic
meter of drinking water
in Cochabamba
* US$0.09 to US$0.24
per cubic meter for the
sewage system
.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
Solid Waste
Environmental law and municipal For La Paz and Cocha- * In La Paz the mu- * Public reporting or
regulations: bamba there is a charge of nicipal company accusation is possible
* Distinction between solid waste and -US$30 per ton for in- had contracted one for environmental
hazardous waste dustrial waste big company (80 offenses or crimes
* Prohibition on dumping waste in * US$1 to US$3 per percent of waste * Civil and criminal liti-
unauthorized places month for domestic removal) and nine gation is possible for
* Fines for dumping waste in waste per home small enterprises environmental damage
unauthorized places * In other cities the waste Spontaneous recy-
collecting companies cling of paper,
cannot charge for the glass, and plastic
service
Air and Others
* Air quality standards * Public reporting or
* Prohibition on dumping toxic accusation is possible
substances for enviromnental
*Environmental impact assessment offenses or crimes
* Noncompliance fines equal to 0.3 * Civil and criminal liti-
percent of the asset's value gation is possible for
. Municipal zoning for different uses environmental damage
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Braziil occurred in 1988 when the creation of IBAMA inte-
grated all federal executive agencies. At the upper
This summary discusses first the performance of envi- levels of the system, however, there are still some
ronmental management in Brazil and its approach of constraints that prevent the executive council from
using command-and-control instruments. The Brazilian performing its functions of intervening in the national
experience of existing economic incentives is described planning process and of standardizing governmental
next. Lessons and recommendations regarding potential actions in environmental matters and other related
future economic incentives are presented in the last parts issues.
of the text.7 IBAMA, created as the executive agency of SEMA,
brought together the authority, resources, and responsibili-
Brazilian Environmental Management Sector ties of the Brazilian Institute for Forest Development
During the 1970s, the country started facing severe ur- (IBDF), the Superintendent of Fisheries Development
ban environmental problems because of rapid industri- (SUDEPE), and the Superintendent of Rubber
alization and the mechanization of agriculture. These (SUDHEVEA). In 1991 SEMA received full institu-
changes took place when environmental issues regained tional and budgetary autonomy and ministerial status as
international importance at the 1972 Stockholm Confer- a secretariat directly linked to the Office of the Presi-
ence of the United Nations on Environment. dent. Finally, in 1994, it became the MMA.
The design and coordination of environmental and In broad terms, the distribution of responsibilities
natural resource policies in Brazil reacted promptly to among the different government levels for implementing
new domestic and international environmental realities the NEP is made informally, as described below.
with the creation, in 1973, of the Special Secretariat for IBAMA, in addition to the duties related to budgetary
the Environment (SEMA) within the Ministry of Internal and policy control issues-like license concession, stan-
Affairs. Legal consolidation occurred in 1981 through dards setting, monitoring, and coordination-is mainly
National Environmental Policy (NEP) Law 6938, which responsible for renewable natural resource issues, and in
defines the objectives, priorities, guidelines, instruments, particular the Amazon ecosystem. State agencies are
and duties of environmental policies. responsible for water pollution issues. Municipal agen-
T!he formulation and coordination of the NEP is cies are responsible for drainage, solid waste, and noise
assigned to the National Environmental Management and air pollution issues.
System (SISNAMA), which comprises: a government
council formed by representatives from all ministries; an Command-and-Control Instruments
advisory council (CONAMA-National Council for the Environmental management in Brazil is largely based on
Environment) formed by representatives of the states, command-and-control instruments as stated in the NEP
unions, NGOs, and experts; the Ministry of Environment law. These instruments can be classified as follows:
and Legal Amaz6nia (MMA), which chairs CONAMA; * Environmental standards
an executive agency (IBAMA-the Brazilian Institute of * Land uses based on zoning and conservation units
the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources) * Licenses based on environmental impact assess-
linked to MMA; other public agencies concerned with ment studies
environmental matters; and state and municipal envi- * Sanctions such as fines, compensation for
ronmental agencies. The resources to carry out the NEP damages, and closures.
are financed through the National Environmental Fund The 1988 Federal Constitution reinforces conserva-
(FNMA) under MMA administration. tion of certain ecosystems (for example, Amazonian
Like many government structures in Brazil, forest) that are considered national patrimony, and that
SISNAMA falls administratively between the national therefore require specific legislation for their exploita-
and departmental systems. States and municipalities tion. The new constitution also created the National In-
have seats in CONAMA and play an important role. tegrated System of Water Resources Management.
Moreover, they often have specific environmental laws Another constitutional novelty is that there is liabil-
and very active environmental protection agencies ity placed on firms for environmental damages under
(EPAs) that share with the federal government the as- which firms' managers can be prosecuted. It also con-
sessment and evaluation of many environmental issues. siders damages to fauna and flora as crimes without bail;
SISNAMA only started operation in 1984 when any person can prosecute environmental violators and
CONAMA established its rules. The first radical change governmental agencies failing to enforce the law.
These liability actions have, however, very limited
results. The recurrent overcrowding of the Brazilian
7. This section is extracted from Ser6a da Motta 1996b. judicial system tends to delay court decisions. Moreover,
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governmental agencies are not always able, or are some- because of tight public expenditure control. Fines from
times unwilling, to cooperate when damage estimates sanctions in many states are earmarked for ]EPAs but
are needed or when information must be obtained and they do not amount to a significant part of the total
cleared. budgets. Moreover, fines can be contested in court and
payments delayed, which make them an unpredictable
Implementation Problems source of revenue. Although still small in budget terms,
Command-and-control approaches adopted by EPAs are license fees generate larger revenues on a constant basis
facing two types of problems: for state EPAs. Environmental charges may provide
* Weak inter- and intragovemmental integration large sources of revenues, but they are not fully reverted
* Financial and human resources constraints. to environmental purposes.
The federal environmental agency-IBAMA-is Apart from lack of resources, EPAs have no free-
supposed to act only in interstate cases or in very spe- dom to set their own salary levels according to func-
cific situations where natural sites are under federal tional needs; they are always restricted to governmental
domain such as tropical forests. Pollution issues are by general salary plans. External funds are not allowed to
law almost entirely under state enforcement, and state finance salary expenditures. Such constraints can be
agencies often introduce stricter standards and sanctions regarded as a central cause of the current institutional
than those defined at the federal level. disarray.
Some state EPAs (for example FEEMA in Rio de That financial weakness has also been a barrier for
Janeiro and CETESB in Sao Paulo), created in the inter- and intragovemmental integration since financial
1970s, have been chiefly concerned with pollution resource transfers became a key issue. The lack of inte-
issues such as water and air quality. Forestry, fishing, gration, consequently, has weakened environmental
and land use are often under the responsibility of other planning, which does not give enough room to introduce
state agencies. As for water supply, water capture the environmental dimension in macroeconomic and
licensing and sewage services as well as waste collec- sectoral policies and programs.
tion and treatment are offered either by state or by
municipal companies. Such arrangements have failed Identification of High-Priority Areas
to generate integrated approaches to environmental Water pollution in Brazil is mainly due to domestic ef-
planning at state levels. fluents, agricultural runoff, and industrial discharges.
The federal EPA, however, legally covers all as- Almost 50 percent of domestic sewage is collected
pects of environment protection. The creation of by the general system. However, treatment levels do not
IBAMA was a result of that intention, merging existing exceed 15 percent. Investments needed to offer adequate
federal agencies such as SEMA, SUDEPE, and IBDF. sanitation services would take almost 1 percent of the
IBAMA, however, has not succeeded in playing the role country's annual GDP.
of federal EPA. With the present outcry over deforesta- In 1988 the abatement levels in the industrial sector
tion, IBAMA has devoted much of its efforts to forestry were 73 percent for organic matter and 52 percent for in-
resource management. organic matter. To reach higher rates of abatement with
Federal support and supervision activities on pol- the best available technologies, the industrial sector would
lution control have consequently shown a very poor have to spend around 2 percent of its annual GDP.
performance. In the case of state EPAs, performance Indicators for agricultural runoff are not available
varies according to each state, and differences are to but they may represent more than 40 percent of potential
some extent related to the state level of economic organic emissions in watersheds in Brazil.
growth. Mortality cases due to intestinal infections related
Furthermore, some EPAs, as in the case of Rio de to waterbome diseases are concentrated in children
Janeiro and Minas Gerais, have been badly affected by younger than one year old. Health costs associated with
the economic recession of the 1980s when political these diseases may vary from US$130 million to
will did not favor environmental issues. After the en- US$389 million.
suing budget cuts, the recent concern on environmental Air pollution levels are very high in the major Bra-
matters has not been sufficient to overcome budget zilian cities of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, and in in-
problems. By contrast, the situation is worsening dustrial cities such as Cubatao. Estimates of health costs
because of the increasing demand on environmental in these three cities are between US$2.4 million and
protection services. US$3.5 million.
External funds are becoming essential to EPAs, Solid waste collection reaches almost 90 percent of
although they are not always fully effective because the urban population, although adequate sanitary land-
national counterpart funding often fails to be delivered fills are rarely available.
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Table A2 Charging for Natural Resource Use in Brazil
Annual Revenuea
Instruments Current Status (millions of US$) Purpose
Industrial Sewage Tariff Based on Pollution Content
Siao Paulo state Partially implemented since 1981 13 For cost recovery of sewage treat-
Rio de Janeiro state Implemented since 1986 and ceased in 1994 3 ment stations
Financial Compensation due to Natural Resource Exploitation
Hy-droelectric generation Fully implemented since 1991 315 To compensate municipalities and
Oil production 97 states where production takes place
and also the environmental regula-
MinLeral production (except oil) 41 tion agencies
................................................................................................................................................. ......................................................................................................................... ....................................
Fiscagl Compensation for Preservation Areas (Water Supply and Ecosystem Areas)
Scio Paulo state Implemented in 1994 lgb To compensate municipalities for
Paran:t state Implemented since 1992 53 land-use restrictions based on
Rio de Janeiro state Under discussion in the state legislature 5b environmental reasons
................................................................................................................................................... ...........................................................................................................................................................
Deforestation Taxes
Federal Forest Deposit Fund paid by Implemented since 1973 7 To finance public reforestation
users who do not carry out reforesta- projects
tiori activities
Forest tax in Minas Gerais paid by Partially implemented since 1968 and fully 12 To finance governmental ctivities
users of forest products revised and implemented in 1994 on forest policy
a. Estimated revenue for 1993, except where noted.
b. Arnticipated annual revenue (instrument not in effect in 1993).
Use of Economic Incentives Lessons and Recommendations
The use of market-based instruments (MBIs) in Brazilian Up to now, the use of MBIs in environmental policies in
environmental policies is restricted to a few areas where Brazil was made with the sole objective of raising reve-
they have played limited roles. The important experiences nues. This limited role-acknowledged even in the
already in place are in natural resource exploitation, wood industrial countries-should not be taken as a problem,
consumption, and industrial water sewage. in particular if revenues are used to finance public invest-
WVater, sanitation, solid waste, and energy tariffs do ments and govemment programs related to environ-
not include any environmental costs. The tariffs have mental management Indeed, it can be seen as a necessary
also failed to apply the long-term marginal cost ap- step forward in the development of adequate enforce-
proach, although the current public deficit crisis is forc- ment capability.
ing them to apply more realistic tariff levels. Table A2 shows estimates of annual revenue from
V'oluntary deposit-refund schemes are traditional all environmental charges already in place in Brazil to be
practices for glass and aluminum containers. approximately US$541 million in 1993. Thus, the total
In Table A2, an overview of the existing MBI expe- amount of annual environmental charges will represent
riences is presented. approximately 0.1 percent of 1993 GDP. The main
These MBIs were used with revenue raising objectives problem, therefore, is how to earmark these revenues for
with practically no concem for the incentive effects. The environmental purposes.
lack of incentive purposes implies that charges or taxes are Gradually, however, environmental policies will
not determined on the basis of net marginal costs or on spa- have to be concerned with the use of MBIs as incentive
tial differences in assimilative capacity. Therefore, they do mechanisms. In Brazil, only timid attempts have been
not stimulate efficiency in the use of natural resources. made in this direction and the results were far from suc-
Although they will not be addressed here because cessful. The reasons are, on the one hand, lack of ade-
they are still under very recent discussion, there exist quate technical, legal, and administrative capability in
some important initiatives in environmental auditing and the design of MBIs, and on the other hand, strong resis-
eco-labeling; the Brazilian export-oriented sector is also tance demonstrated by economic agents.
playing an active role in the definition of ISO 14000. The recommendations derived then are to (a) assure
Environmental auditing, however, is becoming the objective of revenue generation for the creation of
mandatory in certain states and there is a similar bill in adequate enforcement capacity, (b) internalize environ-
the National Congress for discussion. These auditing mental objectives in sectoral policies, (c) reconcile the
procedures may be overcome by the voluntary initiatives use of CAC and MBI, and (d) undertake research to
of ISO 14000 and eco-labeling. evaluate MBI uses and constraints.
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Potential Economic Incentives with Jamaica. The issues in Barbados generally include
There still exists a very important federal initiative on the following as key priorities: (a) coastal zone degrada-
water charges within a context of river basin authorities; tion, (b) inadequate land disposal of solid waste,
the legal framework under discussion in the National (c) uncontrolled management of toxic and agricultural
Congress is facing problems related to overlapping chemicals, (d) marine pollution, (e) destruction of natu-
boundary jurisdictions and criteria for charge level and ral forests, (f) lack of environmentally sound planning;
revenue distribution. Several states are also passing (g) fragmentation of institutional responsibility, and
similar bills. In Sao Paulo state, for example, the law is (h) lack of environmental awareness.
already approved but similar problems are now impeding To some degree, the priorities of Barbados are also
its implementation. reflected in the major investment projects currently be-
Another area of intense discussion within the envi- ing undertaken in the country. These include: (a) west
ronmental management sector is the introduction of gaso- coast sewage project, (b) south coast sewage project,
line and alcohol fuel taxes in cities where air pollution (c) solid waste management plan, (d) coastal zone man-
problems are severe. Tax reform under discussion in the agement plan and coastal conservation project,
congress has been seen as an opportunity to introduce this (e) coastal conservation institutional strengthening, and
new tax which, in the city of Sao Paulo alone, could gen- (f) agricultural diversification.
erate US$500 million for public transport purposes. But
negative public reaction to this taxation may reduce Legislation and MBIs in Barbados
chances that such legislation will be sent to congress. The current legislation concerning environmental man-
The introduction of tipping fees in landfills is an- agement in Barbados can be characterized as incomplete
other area of interest in large urban areas in Sao Paulo and fragmented with a high degree of overlap and dupli-
and Rio de Janeiro. Fiscal incentives for the recycling cation. Wastewater standards have not been legislated
sector are also under discussion. and World Health Organization (WHO) standards are
currently being used for major environmental pollutants.
Caribbean Penalties are often inadequate and differ between acts
which are designed to regulate similar offenses. The
In contrast to the other countries and papers in this se- regulation of similar offenses by several different acts is
ries, the case study relating to the Caribbean8 is ap- in itself an area of overlap which creates confusion in
proached from a somewhat different angle to reflect the terms of determining which provisions should prevail.
following "stylized facts" about Caribbean island states: The legislation is weakened by the incomplete nature of
* Small-island vulnerabilities and institutional op- the enactment, the division of responsibility between
portunities are conceptually differentfrom those in several ministries, and insufficient enforcement capa-
larger riparian countries. Extensive research over bilities. Also, a number of legislative gaps exist. For
the past few decades has illustrated that economic, example, the legislation which is designed to protect
environmental, and social vulnerabilities make coastal ecosystems is focused mainly on the prevention
small-island communities more susceptible to ex- of overexploitation and makes little or no reference to
ternal shocks. Also, however, the smaller size can the potential toxicity of contaminants.
be an advantage in pursuing low-cost interventions
with low institutional overheads. MBIs in Barbados
* The "urban challenge" in small-island states does Direct Regulation. Regulation of the tourism sector is
not stop at the city's edge. Although the connec- primarily administered through the planning process. For
tions between urban and rural activities are often example, a condition attached to building permits
less than clear even in large countries, the distinc- requires new hotels, as well as old hotels undergoing
tion becomes even more problematic in small- major refurbishing, to adopt facilities for pretreating
island states with relatively small populations. wastewater before it enters septic tanks. Given that there
As a consequence of these conditions, some of the are no wastewater standards in Barbados, a BOD stan-
MBI prescriptions in this study differ markedly from dard based on the WHO guidelines is being used to set
those in other studies. minimum discharge standards.
The paper concentrates on the island of Barbados
and provides comparative analyses with other Caribbean Duty and Tariff Relief for Importation of Environmental
countries, in particular with Trinidad and Tobago and Equipment for Hotels. Incentives for the importation of
duty-free goods are outlined in the Hotel Aids Act for
8. This section is extracted from Ruitenbeek and new establishments, and in a refurbishing program for
Sawyer 1995. existing hotels that are expanding their operations. For
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existing hotels, applications for the importation of duty- Regulation of Water Charges-Water Permits for Agri-
free goods are made to the Permanent Secretary of the culture. Agricultural water permits are required for
Ministry of Finance. Duty-free goods in both of these agricultural plots above a certain size. To avoid obtain-
programs include environmental technologies. ing the permit and having to pay a usage charge, farmers
report their holdings in smaller parcels. This results in
Fiscal Incentives for Hotels. The hotel industry currently many farmers using water for irrigation free of charge.
receives a number of fiscal incentives through direct or Also, a significant amount of peri-urban agriculture is
indirect subsidies. These include (a) assistance with conducted on the island. Based on the size and number
project financing, (b) tax holidays of up to 10 years, of plots on urban properties, water usage could be quite
(c) relief from multiple taxation, (d) leasing of property, high for this use. But for the most part, calculation of
(e) mnarketing support, and (f) training and support or- water usage and therefore water bills for urban proper-
ganizations. Also, some smaller hotels have had their ties is based on a coefficient that includes the number of
outstanding water bills waived by the Barbados Water bathroom fixtures and bedrooms; the more toilets in the
Authority. residence, the more the household is charged. Given the
lack of metering, and the number and size of urban agri-
Building Regulations and Rebate. Recent demand- cultural plots, in many cases water use will be underes-
management proposals include both CAC and MBI timated and billing will be too low.
approaches. For example, all new commercial build-
ings over 1,000 square feet and all new residences with Pricing and Subsidization of Waste Collection. Approxi-
a roof area or living space in excess of 3,000 square mately 85 percent of households are on scheduled pick-
feet will be required to construct rainwater storage ups by the sanitation service. Disposal services are pro-
facilities. This regulation is being complemented by a vided free of charge and not according to the marginal
rebate of Bds$1 per gallon of installed tank capacity up cost of supply. Many hotels, enjoying tax holidays, are
to a maximum of one-quarter of the roof space. Al- therefore receiving a free service, although some do pay
though existing commercial and residential units are transportation costs to private sector collection services.
not required to install holding tanks, they do qualify The main subsidies result from government subventions
for the rebate. Enforcement is scheduled to begin in channeled to the Sanitation Services Authority (SSA).
January 1996. Between 1991 and 1994, the SSA received subventions
totaling Bds$78.5 million (US$39.25 million). Waste
Building Regulations and Tax Incentives. New commer- collection and disposal accounts for 4 percent of 1995-
cial and government buildings will be required to install 96 government expenditures.
watersaving taps and, where applicable, showers. This
will be enforced through the Town and Country Plan- Deposit-Refund System. When glass bottles were the
ning Regulations. Retrofitting of existing commercial dominant drink containers, manufacturers enjoyed a
buildings and residences will be encouraged by allowing 95 percent return rate for reusable bottles. This high rate
clairms on corporate and personal tax for the amount of was facilitated by a deposit-refund system. With the
the watersaving device. All regular showerheads and introduction and subsequent domination of plastics in
taps should be phased out within five years. Enforce- the bottling industry, the original deposit-refund system
ment is scheduled to begin in January 1996. was canceled. Another deposit-refund system was insti-
tuted in 1985. This program was in direct response to
Water and Sewer Charges. Those connected to the increased foreign competition from regional beverages
Bridgetown sewer and water supply system are charged and was not intended to reduce waste streams destined
a quarterly fee by the Barbados Water Authority. This for landfills. In fact, until recently all of the returned
includes water and sewer charges, where sewer charges plastic ended up in the landfill. The program has faciti-
are calculated on a ratio with water use. Those outside of tated a 30 percent return rate for polyethylene tere-
the Bridgetown project do not pay for disposal services. phthalate (PET) bottles. The major weakness of this
Once the west coast and south coast sewer projects are program has been the lack of incentives to facilitate
operational, sewer charges will be instituted. Some packaging and preparation of PET bottles for recycling.
44,000 water users (approximately 33 percent of all
users) have meters, with another 30,000 planned under New Tipping Fee and Environmental Levy. A new tipping
the south coast sewer project. Water is priced according fee is included in the 1995-96 budget. A fee of Bds$40 per
to a subsidized scheme with domestic charges equal to ton is proposed in addition to item-specific fees for bulky
one-third of total supply costs and industrial users priced wastes. The importation of bulky waste will be subject to
at two-thirds of total cost. an environmental levy. Domestically produced bulky
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wastes will be subject to an increased consumption tax. Tradable permits require that water use data be available
The new tipping fee and the envitonmental evy are antici- on demand, and without accurate metering or a viable
pated to generate armual revenue of Bds$2 million and are equivalent it would be difficult for an administrative
a direct response to anticipated government cost increases office to track water use and compare this rate to the
associated with a new landfill. Recycling businesses will permitted allowance. Without metering for all partici-
also be granted fiscal concessions but specific proposals pants, it would be difficult to enforce and monitor the
are not available at this time. program. If this can be overcome, however, then a num-
ber of conditions exist which support the use of tradable
Summary of New MBI Opportunities water permits for the hotel sector.
By Caribbean standards, Barbados is quite far advanced First, the hotel sector is a major user of water and
in its application of MBIs. Its historical focus on subsi- generator of water pollution. Conservation incentives are
dies has also recently moved the next step toward an not in place, other than the planned tax deduction for wa-
orientation based on charge systems. These charge sys- tersaving devices. Opportunities therefore exist for a pro-
tems, however, are not likely to be adequate to cover a gram which promotes water conservation for this sector.
large share of all recurrent costs (under the polluter-pays Second, the hotel sector can be characterized as
principle) while also providing a buffer for environ- mature, with very few new entrants into the market.
mental emergencies (under the precautionary principle). Most construction activity involves expanding and re-
Two opportunities do, however, stand out as being of furbishing existing hotels. It can be concluded that the
potential applicability in the Barbados context. hotel sector has a relatively stable demand for water.
Stable demand presents an opportunity for tradable per-
Liability Approaches. The basic principle behind liability mits given that a maximum level of water consumption
approaches to environmental management requires only for the sector can be established based on historical use
that legislation be in place that confers relatively straight- and demand. New entrants into the market, or existing
forward rights and obligations to resource users. These operations expanding capacity, must secure water supply
approaches form a legal umbrella for court cases, which within the established cap. The relatively stable demand
then consider the nature and extent of environmental dam- for water by the hotel sector means there is less pressure
ages on a case-by-case basis. These approaches are rela- to increase the cap. To reduce demand, the cap is ratch-
tively new, and have seen very limited application in de- eted down over time, or not expanded to keep pace with
veloping countries because legal systems are themselves moderately increased demand.
weak in such countries. There are, however, opportunities Finally, given the level of water use by the hotel
for voluntary liability mechanisms that do not suffer the sector and the required conservation measures that Bar-
same problems as their formal counterparts; such informal bados faces, political and popular support for the pro-
systems have operated successfully in Trinidad and gram could be forthcoming. This would be contingent on
Tobago to control damages from oil development. some sort of policy analysis that showed that the policy
In the Barbados context, a voluntary liability system would not overly burden or constrain the industry. But,
would be most relevant to the hotel sector. The basic re- given the concern over water supply on the island, po-
quirements are that (a) there is a relatively well established litical support could be forthcoming for tradable water
sector, (b) the sector and individual members of the sector permits for the hotel sector.
have a public image to maintain to assure the continued
success of the sector, and (c) the potential impacts are Institutional Requirements
monitored by an independent body. The hotel sector in The trend in Barbados is toward consolidation of envi-
Barbados, which effects coral reefs and local marine uses, ronmental management functions within a single body to
and has a stable presence, suits these conditions well. Un- minimize jurisdictional overlaps, to streamline opera-
der a voluntary damages scheme, individual hotels would tions, and to provide the ability to deal with environ-
in effect post performance bonds with an industry associa- mental problems on a broader ecosystem basis. All of
tion that would in turn monitor environmental impacts and these moves are consistent with the ideas of institutional
draw down on the bonds in the event of damages being sustainability relating to cost minimization, priority set-
assessed. The role of NGOs would be an important contri- ting, and flexibility. The two most significant constraints
bution to the successful implementation of such a program. to implementing MBIs at a more substantial level, how-
ever, are (a) current lack of self-financing mechanisms,
Market Creation. Market creation may be an option for and (b) lack of specialized training.
tradable permits for water allocation between hotels in
Barbados. The major constraint to implementing such a Self-Financing. Most of the current structures still are
system is that water meters are not in place for all hotels. subsidy based, and even those with a tax or fee element
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are introducing rebates for social reasons or to prevent means for avoiding distortions that may effect the fragile
distortions to economic production. As a result, there are competitive position of many of these economies. As
few self-financing mechanisms in place. Moreover, the such, self-financing mechanisms for many such econo-
scale of industry is unlikely to be sufficiently large to mies are not possible.
provide an incremental tax base that can be earmarked
for environmental institutions. The primary focus of any Role of Voluntary Self-Monitoring. The lack of imple-
MBI effort must therefore be to use low-cost systems mentation capacity has consistently undermined collec-
that promote self-monitoring. tion efficiency, regulatory monitoring, and enforcement
of those charges and regulations that do exist. Even the
Training. The design of MBI systems is constrained by a simplest forms of monitoring, those involving metering,
lack of technical expertise to design and implement ap- have traditionally seen poor performance. As a conse-
propriate structures. While some countries are pursuing quence, even the simplest CAC procedures are likely to
this through grant assistance from foreign donors, Bar- be ineffective unless incentives are put in place that in-
bados has not yet made any such moves at this stage. duce self-monitoring. From this perspective, market
Training requirements in the area of environmental eco- creation mechanisms and voluntary systems of damage
nomic analysis and in decisionmaking based on envi- compensation that take advantage of social (peer group)
ronmental economic information are therefore a prereq- pressures are likely to see broader success rates in a
uisite for effectively implementing most MBI structures. small-island context than they would in a larger country.
Con,clusions Liability Instruments. Liability instruments are an ap-
In Barbados, the conclusions relating to the use of MBIs propriate mechanism that take advantage of the flexibil-
are similar to experience elsewhere in the world. In par- ity inherent in small-island institutions. They have few
ticular, however, the examples from Barbados support administrative overheads and create fewer burdens in a
the general conclusions that: small-island context than they would in a larger country
* Systems based solely on control-oriented ap- where other institutional imperatives might conflict with
proaches often are not enforceable given existing those of the particular liability instrument.
institutional capacity.
* Market-oriented instruments are relatively simple Ecosystem Orientation. Institutional boundaries in Bar-
to design, and allow regulators to target high- bados are being oriented toward ecosystem boundaries,
priority areas, polluters, and resource users first. which is appropriate to a systems analysis and imple-
Local authorities play an important role in the mentation approach. In part, this is dictated by the lower
success of market-oriented mechanisms. implementation capacity available, but it also reflects a
Also, from an operational perspective, MBIs should need to coordinate ecosystem-based problems that over-
be designed with a number of key points in mind to en- lap districts or cross over between urban and rural
sure sustainability. The successful MBIs in Barbados boundaries.
incorporate the following elements:
• The mechanisms reflect the polluter-pays princi- Nonurban Targets. The distinction between urban and
ple to ensure that externalities are reduced. rural interventions should not be regarded as a constraint
• Revenue generation is designed in a manner that to effective MBI implementation. The analysis of
allows some of the revenue to flow to local-level macroeconomic policies, and of selected sectoral poli-
authorities to provide an incentive and a means cies, illustrates that all of the sectors and areas are
for local empowerment. strongly linked either biophysically or through socioeco-
But some of the MBI conclusions in this study differ nomic factors such as migration. The most effective
markedly from those in other studies because of the means for preventing urban decay may therefore be
small-island context. through interventions in rural sectors.
Subsidies versus Charges. Most of the MBI approaches Policy Synopsis
used to-date focus on providing incentives through sub- The policy prescriptions can be summarized as follows:
sidies rather than taxing or charging for damages. Even (a) historically, effective MBIs in small-island states typi-
where damage charges are assessed, a subsidy element cally are subsidy oriented to avoid distorting local com-
in the form of a rebate is often introduced that makes the parative or absolute advantages, (b) any form of CAC
overall intervention revenue-neutral, even though it does structure is likely to be unenforceable unless self-
provide an effective incentive. The role of revenue-neutral monitoring structures are in place, (c) complete decentrali-
systerns in small-island states is seen as an effective zation using liability instruments is readily implemented
Background Paper Summaries 51
within capacity-constrained, small-island institutional adequately collected and disposed at sanitary landfills,
structures, (d) institutional frameworks relying on ecosys- while the remaining 20 percent is less controlled. The
tem boundaries will be more successful than those relying Santiago area generates approximately 60 percent of the
on administrative boundaries, and in many cases the most wastes and houses 40 percent of the population. The
realistic ecosystem unit will include the island as a whole, disposal options for Santiago are landfills. At least two
and (e) the most effective MBIs for tackling urban prob- major problems exist with waste disposal in Santiago.
lems may, in fact, be those outside of the urban areas. First, existing landfills are at full capacity, and second,
there are many illegal dumping sites that do not comply
Chile with minimal sanitary regulations. New landfills will be
constructed north and south of Santiago to solve the
Chile's Economic Policy disposal problem, but they have been strongly opposed
In the mid-1970s, Chile began a major reform process of by the neighboring communities because of the extemal
its economy characterized by a strong reliance on the mar- costs. These costs include depreciation of property val-
ket and a trade liberalization policy.9 Relative price distor- ues and potential health and sanitary risks.
tions were eliminated in a significant way. Government
intervention in productive activities was strongly reduced Industrial Solid Wastes (ISWs). Information on the quan-
through major privatization of state enterprises during the tity and quality of industrial wastes at the national level is
1980s, and a strong and stable system of private property limited. Recent estimates based on the system initiated in
rights was achieved. Growth rates in the Chilean economy 1993 of declaring and tracking ISWs, indicate that for the
have averaged 8 percent during the 1986-94 period. Ex- Santiago area alone the generation of ISWs is approxi-
ports rely mainly on natural resources and have grown at mately 70,000 tons per month, which equals 840,000 tons
an average rate of 6.7 percent during the past 15 years, per year. Part of the ISWs are disposed through the mu-
reaching US$11.645 billion in 1994. nicipal collection system, but they are mainly disposed of
With respect to sectoral policies, few distortions by private firms that deliver the wastes to landfills. Infor-
exist. In the case of agriculture, price bands for wheat, mation about the generation and disposal of toxic wastes is
sugar, and oil seeds were implemented for income stabi- very limited. Indirect estimates suggest that 133,000 tons
lization purposes. The forestry sector has benefited from are generated in Chile per year.
an afforestation subsidy since 1974, which partially ex-
plains the 1.7 million hectares of exotic species planted Water Pollution. Chile has higher morbidity rates for ty-
during the past 20 years; these constitute the basis of the phus and hepatitis than other countries in Latin America.
forest exporting activities. Mining (particularly copper In the case of typhus, for example, the morbidity rate in
mining) is one of the main economic activities in Chile, 1990 reached 52.7 per 100,000 inhabitants in Chile, com-
contributing 8 percent of GDP and 45 percent of total pared with an average of 20.5 for Latin America. This
exports in 1994. CODELCO, a state-owned firm, con- seems contradictory given Chile's high coverage rates for
tributes 52 percent of copper exports. There is strong drinking water and sewerage systems, which for 1992
participation of foreign investment in this sector. were estimated at 97.6 percent and 84.8 percent respec-
tively. The reason for this sanitary problem is the lack of
Environmental Quality in Urban Areas adequate treatment of domestic and industrial effluents,
Santiago is by far the largest urban area of Chile. Its which causes water pollution and results in widespread
population of approximately 4.5 million represents 40 use of polluted water for vegetable irrigation. Historically,
percent of the total population of Chile. Two other im- morbidity rates for typhus in the Santiago area have been
portant but smaller urban areas are Valparaiso and Con- higher than in the rest of the country.
cepcion, which although presenting important environ-
mental problems such as industrial pollution, were ex- Air Pollution. Santiago's air pollution is one of the most
cluded from the analysis because of information limita- evident environmental problems in the country. One of
tions that are not present in the Santiago area where the major consequences is the threat to health from fine
problems have been better addressed and analyzed. particulate matter (PM-10) which can cause premature
death and respiratory diseases such as pneumonia. Ac-
Domestic Solid Wastes. It is estimated that 2.5 million cording to a World Bank study "the population of Santi-
tons of domestic wastes are generated in urban areas in ago is routinely exposed to concentration levels that
Chile. Approximately 80 percent of these wastes are violate air quality standards for total suspended particles
(TSP), PM-10 and carbon monoxide in winter and ozone
(03) in summer." Several initiatives have been taken to
9. This section is extracted from Rios 1995. control air pollution in Santiago, but with the exception
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of TSP, the quality indexes for most pollutants do not emission standards (which in practice makes the use of
show major improvement. A factor to be kept in mind three-way catalytic converters mandatory), and limits on
though is that Santiago's population and economic ac- the operation of vehicles without catalytic converters
tivity continue to grow. based on license plate numbers. Fixed sources pollute
mainly with SO2 and PM-10 (industrial processes), and
Chile's Environmental Policy TSP (street dust and open lands). Regulations for fixed
Even though part of Chile's environmental law was sources include a ban on the use of wood-burning fire-
passed by the beginning of the century, implementation places during the entire year, emission standards, and
and enforcement began less than 10 years ago. Most of decontamination plans for some fixed sources in Santiago.
the existing laws correspond to isolated efforts made by Some MBIs are being used for air pollution control,
individual government institutions. In March 1994 the for example, auctioning of road routes for urban buses in
General Environmental Law was passed, which estab- Santiago, and a system of tradable permits for PM-10
lishes guiding principles and goals for Chilean environ- emissions from industrial sources in Santiago to be
mental policy. Since then efforts have continued to be phased in during 1997. Since 1994, any new emission
made to define water and air pollution control policies source requires compensation from an existing source. In
and to implement a system of environmental impact addition, an initiative for road pricing of private cars in
assessments (EIA), among others. downtown Santiago is being discussed by the congress.
The 1994 law defines six guiding principles that are
to be followed when designing environmental policies Water Pollution. Because of the generalized practice of
and regulations: polluter-pays, prevention, gradualism, discharging polluted waters from sewage systems and
citizen participation, liability for environmental dam- industries without previous treatment, water pollution is a
ages, and efficiency. It is interesting to note that eco- major problem in the whole country. Facilities for waste-
nornic concepts such as having polluters internalize the water treatment are uncommon in most areas. Investment
economic costs of polluting activities (polluter-pays), in interception and deviation facilities are under way in the
aiming for economic efficiency through flexible and Santiago and Valparaiso areas. These investment plans are
cost-effective policies (efficiency), and favoring repara- the responsibility of the corresponding sanitary companies
tiori and compensation for victims of environmental which are autonomous state companies. It is important to
damage (liability for environmental damages) are stated mention that charges for the provision of drinking water
explicitly in the Chilean environmental law. and sewage collection services are based on marginal cost
The implementation and coordination of environ- pricing and full cost recovery including a 7 percent return
mental policy and regulation in Chile, according to the on the invested capital.
1994 law, is the responsibility of the government envi- Existing regulations consist mainly of non-MBIs.
ronmental agency CONAMA (Comisi6n Nacional del Ambient water quality standards exist depending on the
Medio Ambiente). The existence of multiple government use of water. Several bans on the discharge of polluted
agencies involved in environmental management, as waters into rivers and other aquatic bodies used as a
well as lack of coordination in the past, has generated a source for irrigation and/or drinking water are in place.
regulatory framework which is characterized by over- Their enforcement though is weak. Provisional regula-
lapping institutional responsibilities and lack of consis- tion by the Superintendent of Sanitary Services estab-
tency. Currently, most environmental regulations consist lishes effluent standards for industrial sources independ-
of command-and-control instruments, such as emission ently from the type of watercourse receiving the effluent.
standards and technological requirements. In general, As with most environmental laws in Chile, several
Chile's economic policy relies heavily on the market and pieces of legislation on water pollution control do exist,
on lprivate property rights. From this perspective less but do not represent a coordinated framework. CONAMA
resistance should be expected if implementing MBIs for is currently revising a draft proposal for the control of
environmental protection. water pollution which includes effluent standards and
sanctions for noncompliance as well as an MBI consist-
Air Pollution. Air pollution control relies primarily on ing of a system of tradable emission permits
non-MBIs. National air quality standards have been es-
tablished by the ministry of health for each of the im- Solid Wastes. According to Chilean regulations, munici-
portant pollutants, representing goals that every policy palities are responsible for the adequate collection and
should aim at but that are not legally binding. Mobile disposal of solid wastes, and the ministry of health is in
sources contribute significantly to PM-10, NOR, and CO charge of enforcing compliance with technical norms for
emis,sions; major regulatory initiatives include manda- the management and operation of landfills. Since the early
tory retirement of old buses, introduction of vehicle 1980s, municipalities have had the option of subcontract-
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ing the collection and transportation of solid wastes with Management of Domestic Solid Wastes (DSWs). A
private companies. Part of this cost is recovered from rough estimate is that the private costs of DSW man-
households through a flat fee, the collection of which is a agement in the Santiago area are at least US$30 million,
municipal responsibility. The construction of landfills is and are expected to grow by least at 7-8 percent per year.
subject to the approval of the corresponding health serv- Landfills are the only available option for urban dis-
ices agency; for new landfills an EIA needs to be approved posal. Their location is a very controversial issue be-
in order to obtain the construction authorization. Recycling cause of the negative externalities they cause. A reduc-
of paper, cardboard, and glass occurs spontaneously and is tion in the generation of DSWs seems economically
an interesting business in Chile. A voluntary deposit- desirable in the Santiago area, which may not be the case
refund system that is in place for plastic soft drink con- for other areas with higher carrying capacity. Given the
tainers was an initiative of the bottling companies. varied nature of the economic issues related to DSWs, a
With respect to industrial and toxic wastes, the combination of MBIs should be analyzed in more detail
regulatory framework is very vague and weak. Munici- ("one instrument for each goar'):
palities are responsible for "waste" disposal, but it is not * Implementation of differentiated fees by volume
clear if industrial and toxic wastes are included or not. or weight for waste collection and disposal to
On the other hand, according to the sanitary code, health provide incentives to reduce waste generation
services agencies are responsible for the approval of and to recycle and/or reuse certain wastes. This
projects that generate industrial or mining wastes re- is an application of the polluter-pays principle. It
quiring adequate disposal. In 1993 a system for declar- would require gathering information at the
ing and tracking industrial wastes was implemented in household level and improving control of illegal
Santiago to generate information and create an inventory dumping. Administrative costs should be com-
of industrial wastes. This will serve as the basis for ade- pared with the benefits of correcting the existing
quate regulations. The regulation for toxic and hazardous price distortion generated by flat fees.
wastes is incomplete, but the laws needed to fill this * Creation of compensation mechanisms to inter-
void are currently under preparation. nalize social and environmental costs borne by
municipalities housing landfills, which are im-
Other Areas. Other MBIs that have been implemented in plicitly subsidizing all other municipalities (and
Chile include: the corresponding community) using these land-
* The 1981 water code, which established a system fills. A direct mechanism is to have all other mu-
of tradable water rights for water allocation nicipalities pay an extra charge for disposing
among different users. Water rights are com- their wastes at the landfill, which would result in
pletely separated from the land and traded freely higher fees at the household level.
in the market. * Environmental insurance for possible damage
* The 1974 afforestation law, which includes an claims resulting from unexpected environmental
afforestation subsidy, an income tax exemption, impacts caused by landfills. Even though, ac-
and management plans. This law supported the cording to current legislation, landfills are sub-
development of plantation forestry in Chile. ject to EIAs to assure that no major impacts on
* The 1991 fisheries law, which basically includes health and environment exist, long-term damages
non-MBIs such as management plans, seasonal can occur. If the cost of such an insurance is in-
restrictions, global quotas, and control on the cluded in the disposal cost charged to other mu-
number and size of the fleet. Individual tradable nicipalities, part of the environmental costs will
quotas are used for new and in-recovery fisheries. be internalized by all users.
* The 1992 Chilean country program to protect the * Provision of accurate information on the degree
ozone layer in accordance with the Montreal of recyclability or cost of disposal of a given
Protocol. This includes, among other,compo- product would allow consumers to discriminate
nents, an product ozone seal to allow for con- among products. If the consumer population has
sumer discrimination among products and a a positive willingness to pay for recyclable
monetary subsidy for technological reconversion. goods, but no reliable information is available (as
is the case in Chile), it will not translate into
High-Priority Areas higher prices and/or consumption choices.
The following two high-priority areas were selected on * Monetary incentives to encourage more recy-
the basis of gross estimates of environmental benefits cling. Even though recycling occurs on a sponta-
and costs as well as their priority in the government's neous basis in Chile, and there is significant eco-
agenda. nomic activity in recovery of paper, cardboard,
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plastic, and glass, household involvement is still * Privatization of sanitary companies. In light of
minimal. Specialized private recycling firms ob- the major investment plans in water treatment
tain recycled materials from seperators or adopted by EMOS (and the lack of resources) as
"cartoneros" that collect at the curbside level be- well as the serious management failures evi-
fore municipal collection, and industrial plants denced in recent months by some of these com-
that sell their wastes directly. panies, privatization seems a reasonable option,
particularly given the existence of a well-
Abatement of Domestic Water Pollution. Total annual constituted supervisory authority, the Superin-
benefits of wastewater treatment have been estimated at tendent of Sanitary Services.
between US$24 million and US$77 million. This in-
cludes savings in health costs by preventing typhus Colombia
caused by contaminated water in the Santiago area,
avoiding agricultural export losses from possible health- The objective of this paper is to provide a practical study
related trade restrictions in the event of a cholera out- of the use of economic instruments for environmental
break, a lower incidence of cholera, expanded farm out- management purposes in Colombia.'0 The paper focuses
put, and reduced consumer costs. Estimates for the cost on two high-priority areas for environmental policy:
of reducing water pollution in the Santiago area, basi- control and reduction of water pollution in urban areas
cally by building a network of wastewater interception arising from industrial sources, and control of air pollu-
and treatment facilities to meet Chilean water quality tion from fixed and mobile sources.
standards for unrestricted irrigation, are estimated at
US$78 million per year. The decision made by EMOS, Environmental Management and Law 99/1993
the sanitary company for the Santiago area, to invest Prior to the passage of Law 99 in 1993, environmental
massively in treatment plans to cover the entire area, management in Colombia was characterized by severely
does not seem economically sound. Other alternatives to limited success in controlling environmental and natural
be analyzed are the following: resource degradation, mainly due to the following factors:
* Incrementalism for investment plans. The goal of * Environmental management was scattered over a
unrestricted irrigation seems too ambitious given multitude of institutions, which made design and
the current benefits of treatment plans; a lower application of environmental policy difficult, and
standard for certain areas at least should be con- made the environmental sector politically weak.
sidered. A more gradual approach seems more As a result, there was a failure to introduce envi-
advisable, especially considering that willingness ronmental concerns into sectoral and economic
to pay for environmental goods increases with policies in general.
higher income and environmental education. * In many cases environmental regulation was a
Some supplementary actions to minimize the responsibility of sectoral ministries. For exam-
risks of a cholera outbreak can include chlorin- ple, management of the basic natural resources of
ating of irrigation channels and public education. the country was the responsibility of the ministry
* Agricultural zoning. There is an important dif- of agriculture, which also was required to pro-
ference between the cost of using clean water mote agricultural production and productivity,
(underground or treated effluent) versus unclean resulting in a higher degradation rate for forests
water for the production of vegetables in the and natural resources.
Santiago area. Different zones in Santiago have * Together with the scattering of authority for en-
different water supply sources, thus implying vironmental management, the definition of poli-
that there might be an efficient solution if a pol- cies was too centralized and there was little in-
icy of agricultural zoning is implemented. volvement of local communities.
* Certification mechanisms. The existence of reli- * Budgetary constraints, which were reflected in
able information on some specific environmental personnel and technical limitations (low salaries
characteristics of goods such as use of clean wa- and technical skills).
ter for irrigation might allow for the creation of a * Excessive political influences in environmental
market for "clean vegetables." Consumer de- management. As a result, employment of manag-
mand for safe products would develop in this ers and skilled labor was very unstable. It was
market if adequate and reliable information were
available. Currently this market is being eroded
by lack of consumer confidence. This type of 10. This section is extracted from Ramirez and
certification might be a cost-effective instrument. Cubillos 1995.
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also common to relax enforcement when envi- * In general, failure to apply pollution and user
ronmental regulation was in conflict with politi- charges has been related to design problems, tech-
cal interests. nical and institutional weaknesses in the environ-
* There was practically no presence of environ- mental management sector, and lack of political
mental authorities in the cities. Environmental will together with pressure from the private sector
management in Colombia was historically re- to not apply such charges.
lated to rural areas, especially the more devel- Nevertheless, there are two elements that should be
oped rural areas, while poorer areas like Ama- underlined from the Colombian experience with water
zonia or the Pacific Coast were not under the pollution and user charges.
control of environmental authorities. First, it is an experience of more than 20 years that
With the 1991 Constitution and Law 99/1993, envi- serves as a basis for refining these instruments and their
ronmental management was completely reorganized: the application. Second, there are some specific experiences
Ministry of the Environment was created together with that suggest the potential of this instrument for environ-
16 more regional EPAs (for a total of 34) and 4 urban mental management: for example, a regional EPA had to
EPAs in the most important cities. In addition, five envi- increase water use charges threefold in 1990, and by
ronmental research centers were established. Law 99 70 percent in 1993 due to a drop in water supplies. As a
also defined new sources of income for the environ- result, consumption of water was reduced by 50 percent.
mental sector, new incentives and economic instruments In another example (quoted by environmental economist
for environmental management, and new possibilities for Guillermo Rudas), the threat of applying a water pollution
public involvement. tax to the largest iron and steel plant in the country (the tax
was never effectively applied because of legal disputes)
MBI Experiences before Law 99/1993 was enough to induce the plant to control pollution to
The use of economic instruments in environmental leg- avoid the charges it calculated it would have had to pay
islation has a longer tradition in Colombia than in many every year if the tax were implemented.
Latin American countries. In 1974 resource use charges
and taxes to offset recurrent expenses were introduced Current and Potential Use of MBIs in Colombia
for the first time. In 1982 charges were introduced for Law 99/1993 covers, as one of its most important goals,
atmospheric emissions resulting from commercial ac- the use of economic instruments as an essential tool for
tivities, and in 1984 they were extended to wastewater environmental policy "to encourage natural resource
discharge as well. users to comply with environmental standards, to modify
In spite of this, the effective use of economic in- their consumption patterns and to induce the adoption of
struments as a way to achieve restoration and conserva- processes and consumption of goods produced through
tion of resources has been almost nonexistent: clean technologies." Here we summarize some of the
* Although such instruments were envisioned in the key issues related to experience in the use of MBIs and
legislation some of them were never applied, such their potential application in Colombia, emphasizing in
as the charges for air pollutant emissions, which each case the advantages and disadvantages.
were not implemented because the ministry of
health never drafted the necessary regulations. Market-Based Reforms. Colombia has two characteristics
* Although during the past 20 years the Regional that help to promote the use of MBIs in environmental
Autonomous Corporations (CARs)-regional policy: first, the economy has been one of the most stable
EPAs-have applied compensation charges for in Latin America over the past 30 years; second, a trade
wastewater discharges and for the use of water liberalization process was started in 1991 together with a
and forests, those charges were not systemati- set of market-based reforms in the labor and financial
cally billed except in a few cases: US$116,000 markets, health and social security, infrastructure and
was collected from a potential of US$90 million! public services, and other sectors.
The forest and fishing use charges have not been The liberalization process can help to increase
successful either. competitiveness, as well as lessen environmental im-
* In the few cases where retributive tariffs were put pacts. The renewal of a good part of capital stock may
into effect, they were implemented on the basis of have resulted in adoption of cutting-edge technologies
the operating costs of a water quality monitoring with lower environmental impacts in several manu-
program rather than as part of a resource restora- facturing sectors. The efficiency changes induced by
tion plan. the liberalization process can also help to lower gen-
* The charges have been too low to induce a more eration of wastes, and thereby decrease emissions per
rational use by resource users. unit of production.
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A key issue is to evaluate the possibilities of using objective of designing a system of urban environmental
economic instruments to stimulate the adoption of less indicators and to propose a data generation strategy in the
polluting technologies. This is one of the current priorities medium and long run that can serve as a basis for defining
in the definition of environmental policy in Colombia. priorities and strategies for environmental policies.
On the other hand, there are some problems for the
use of MBIs in environmental policy (specifically for Economic Instruments: Pollution Taxes. Law 99/1993 and
environmental taxation at the national level) arising from the National Development Plan emphasize the priority
current macroeconomic issues: (a) existence of a grow- given to the use of economic instruments, and especially
ing fiscal deficit, and (b) tendency toward the simplifi- the use of retributive and compensatory pollution charges
cation of tax structure and administration of fewer taxes. or taxes.
In this respect, environmental taxation is complex and The concept of a retributive tax refers to the com-
discriminatory, taking into account differences in pollut- pensation that should be paid in exchange for using the
ants, resources, and assimilative capacities. environment for the provision of a service, such as
Recently there was a tax reform that included some serving as a dump for refuse generated by both the
enviironmental proposals like incentives for importing commercial and residential sectors. The retributive
capital goods for pollution control purposes, incentives charge refers to the compensation required to guarantee
for conservation of natural forests, and elimination of the the quality of a resource.
value-added tax for income associated with the Montreal The way in which the new legislation defines these
Protocol. A more relevant reform for environmental charges is innovative. While traditionally they have been
purposes could be the regional tax reform (at the mu- used to permit coverage of the administrative costs of
nicipality level) that is currently under preparation. Ini- the maintenance and control of resources, the new con-
tial results from a study for the ministry of environment cept is that the tax must reflect the social cost caused by
suggest that it is at a local level (regions and municipali- the pollution. In this cost, the negative impact generated
ties)i where fiscal and other economic instruments for by activities (whether productive or not) on the welfare
environmental purposes might have more relevance and of the community is a balance between the internaliza-
applicability. tion of the cost of the externality and the benefits arising
from its control. Theoretically, the result must be an
Institutional Basis and Administrative Capabilitv. With optimum reduction in welfare losses.
the recent creation of the ministry of environment and The task of implementing a tax is not easy. Proposals
several related environmental agencies, institutional vary from the extreme position of applying the charges
capability of environmental management has improved according to the exact terms of the law, to a tax based on
significantly in Colombia. Some of the achievements the costs of treatment or on the actions taken by contami-
related with this reform are: nators to rehabilitate the affected resource. In addition, in
* Establishment of the ministry of environment as this scheme it is not necessary to focus on the revenues
the head of environmental management in Colom- generated by the tariffs, but rather to focus on a tax that
bia, with increasing political power and influence. promotes a change in the mode of production that leads to
* Creation and consolidation of regional environ- an improvement in the environment or a reduction in con-
mental authorities in charge of environmental tamination. The scheme would work by trial and error,
management in their respective regions. seeking an adequate level for the tariff; this is expected,
* Decentralization of environmental management for example, to correspond to about 6 percent of profits in
with more presence of regional concerns and lo- the tannery and wood industries. This figure suggests that
cal involvement in the definition and implemen- the inflationary impact of the taxes would be low.
tation of environmental policies. Nor does it seem probable that industrial growth
At the same time, capability and efficiency of envi- would decelerate as a result of these taxes. To the con-
roninental management in the future will depend on two trary, it will promote efficiency and growth in produc-
main efforts: (a) increasing the technical capability of tivity in the use of resources.
the environmental management sector, and (b) improving Finally, the resources collected from the tariffs are
environmental information and related databases, mainly beneficial from an environmental management perspec-
in urban areas. Different studies on environmental prob- tive. Some of the regulations have introduced mechanisms
lems have emphasized lack of information as one of the for income generation for the environmental sector. That
most important restrictions affecting the capability of is the case for watersheds, where part of the environ-
environmental authorities to effectively regulate use of mental costs derived from such activity are internalized.
natural and environmental resources and to control pol- Likewise, 30 percent of the Royalties Fund, which is
lution. Currently, there is a study under way with the financed by the exploitation of nonrenewable natural
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resources and their exports, goes to preservation and to Experience with Market-Based Incentive Approaches
fund priority environmental restoration work in regions Ecuador is investigating appropriate instruments for envi-
where such resource exploitation takes place. This con- ronmental policymaking. In the govemment of Ecuador's
stitutes a compensation for the environmental deteriora- Proposal for Political Environmental Strategies, the pre-
tion associated with such resource exploitation. cursor to the National Environmental Action Plan, the use
The importance of these income-generating instru- of market-based incentives and correction of perverse
ments for the environmental sector is indisputable. macroeconomic distortions is mentioned frequently. In
These resources will represent around 500 billion pesos addition, in the Agendafor Development 1993-1996 of the
during 1994-98. Colombia is the only Latin American present administration, an important agenda item is (a) to
country where the environment sector has such income- evaluate the problem of solid waste and industrial effluent
generating systems, which are stable and easy to collect. and (b) to apply as a first priority market incentives and as
In contrast, some other instruments such as pollution a second priority regulatory fines.
charges imply serious technical and administrative com- There are examples in Ecuador where economic
plications, as analyzed further on. It is not yet possible to instruments have been utilized, the most recent of which is
assess the impact of these financial mechanisms on envi- the Quito Effluent Charge (Mark Kenber, personal com-
ronmental preservation and improvement. Undoubtedly, munication with author).
their success will depend in good part on the efficiency
of environmental expenditures. The Quito Effluent Charge
As part of the reform of Municipal Ordinance 2910 for
Legal Mechanisms. Another potentially powerful tool the Prevention and Control of Fixed Source Pollution,
for environmental change and protection is the set of the Municipal Environment Directorate (DMA), in col-
legal mechanisms that originated in the constitutional laboration with Fundaci6n Natura, Ecuador's most
reform of 1991, such as the "Citizens' Rights Action" prominent NGO, has designed a pollution charge system
(Acci6n de Tutela), the "Compliance Action," and the to control industrial organic effluents and combustion
"People's Action." The last of these mechanisms has the emissions. The system is similar for both types of dis-
character of an economic instrument since anyone who charge so the description here concentrates on liquid
files a People's Action has the right to compensation of organic wastes.
between 10 and 15 percent of the total value of the work Originally all firms had to remove 80 percent of the
necessary to correct the environmental damage caused. combined organic content (combined content = f2BOD
The effectiveness of these instruments has been proven + ChOD]/3 + suspended solids) from their liquid waste
in a short time: in three years there have been almost 300 stream, which was assumed to guarantee at least 2 milli-
"tutelas" (Citizens' Rights Actions) related to environ- grams per liter of dissolved oxygen in the two rivers.
mental disputes. The new mechanism is a hybrid between the establish-
ment of a norm and a pure effluent charge, based on
Ecuador national water quality regulations that establish eight
different water quality standards depending on the use to
Experience with Command-and-Control which the resource is to be devoted.
Regulatory Approaches The DMA will set the discharge norm at the level re-
Ecuador has had adequate legislation and institutions quired to guarantee in the short-run the least strict of the
to encourage proper environmental stewardship." The water quality standards in the city's two rivers. At present
problem has been lack of political will, overlapping this is around 56 kilograms of combined organic discharge
institutional mandates, limited capacity, and meager per firm per day. Firms whose emissions are below this
budgets to implement the laws. As a result, until very level pay no charge, while those whose emissions exceed
recently, there were no examples whereby the polluter- the norm pay a per-unit charge equivalent to the cost of
pays principles were enacted or whereby an industrial municipal treatment (US$0.36 per kilogram). In time, and
concern was fined or charged for illegal effluent dis- in keeping with a predetermined and published schedule,
charge. Quito presents the most optimistic view the discharge norm will be made gradually stricter, so that
whereby industrial plants have been requested to do the quantity of emissions exempt from payment of the
environmental audits, and the municipality is beefing charge will correspondingly be reduced. Each reduction
up the environmental unit to better monitor emissions will correspond to a new level of water quality. After a
and effluents. period of 8 to 10 years the discharge norm will be at a
level which assures an ambient water quality such that the
rivers can be used downstream for irrigation, cattle, and
11. This section is extracted from Huber 1995. drinking after primary treatment.
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On the basis of firms' biannual discharge reports, industry to phase out leaded fuel. However, this is an
the combined organic discharge is computed and the six- expensive proposition. A major investment would be
month charge (the total discharge for the period less the required to produce unleaded gasoline at the Esmeraldas
value of the norm multiplied by 125 days, all multiplied refinery. To be specific, US$490 million (in 1991 dol-
by UIS$0.36) is calculated, based on the assumption that lars) would have to be invested to retrofit the refinery to
a firm's discharge levels will not be reduced (or in- produce unleaded fuel.
creased) during the period. If a firm subsequently intro- There are examples in which private industry has
duces some new form of reducing its effluents, it can identified cost-effective pollution prevention measures.
apply for a reevaluation by the DMA, and if its claim is This approach, which involves assessments of the use of
corroborated, the new lower charge level will be applied energy and chemicals to identify waste prevention op-
from the date of the application. portunities, has been applied successfully by Quito's
municipal government in a pilot program carried out in
Other Direct Incentives an industrial district, El Inca. Pollution prevention was
Regarding direct incentives, price instruments in effect implemented in Guayaquil by a company that manufac-
in Ecuador are stumpage fees for forest exploitation, tures nonferrous metal products and ceramics. During
deposit-refund schemes for bottled products (beer and the last two years, it has invested approximately US$1.5
mineral water), and effluent charges on industrial waste. million to upgrade bumers, replace pumps, recover sal-
Recently, in Quito, fines on mobile air pollution sources able by-products from tile cuttings, and switch to chemi-
(cars, trucks, and buses) have been introduced that are cal additives that are environmentally preferable ac-
higher than the cost of fixing the problem through adop- cording to the U.S. vendor. These innovations, which
tion of appropriate technology or a tune-up. Here is a reduced energy consumption as well as the volume and
clear example of where the positive marginal costs of toxicity of process wastewater, had nothing to do with
reducing emissions are outweighed by the marginal environmental regulations, subsidies, or tax breaks. The
benefits. This is the implicit economic rationale for Mu- reengineering and yield enhancement was not motivated
nicipal Ordinance 3120, which went into effect on Janu- by environmental consciousness, but rather to improve
ary 2, 1995 and which targets large vehicles. Owners of the firm's competitiveness in a marketplace that is
vehicles with exhausts that do not meet the norm set moving toward free trade. For this company and many
forth in the ordinance are subject to a fine equal to five others in Ecuador, the need to avoid waste of energy,
minimum monthly salaries. Currently, that fine is worth water, chemicals, and other inputs is blurring the dis-
US$ 160. In addition, violators face a 375,000 sucre fine tinction between technological change aimed at reducing
(equal to US$155 at current exchange rates) and must pollution, and innovation aimed at containing costs.
post a guarantia of 1,125,000 sucres (US$465), which is Indirect price instruments do not exist. However,
approximately double the cost of making the repairs subsidies on agricultural inputs (pesticides and fertiliz-
needed to bring an engine up to standard. Nearly ers), fuel oil, and gasoline (with the exception of diesel)
US$-l00,000 in fines were collected in January 1995. have been phased out. Air pollution improved over the
By 1995, tariffs on private automobiles had fallen last two decades because of substitution of cleaner fuels
from 200 percent to 40 percent and duties on private such as natural gas and hydroelectricity for dirtier ones
buses and heavy trucks amounted to just 10 percent. such as wood, charcoal, and coal. The substitution
There are no tariffs on vehicles imported from Colombia reached the poor because of fuel and electricity subsidies
or Venezuela or on buses used for public transportation. that peaked at 7 percent of GDP in 1980. However,
Between 1988 and 1993, the number of vehicles in the while energy subsidies might have diminished pollution
country rose by 5.8 percent per annum, reaching a total by stimulating a switch to cleaner forms of energy, they
of 450,000. This tariff structure is designed to keep pub- simultaneously affected air quality for the worse by en-
lic transportation costs low, and may be considered not couraging energy-intensive industry and the use of motor
only a subsidy for the poor, but also an incentive for the vehicles.
public to take public transport, thereby diminishing air Industry had enjoyed large energy (fuel and elec-
pollution and traffic congestion. Air pollution in the tricity) subsidies since the early 1970s and reacted to an
central historical district (where buses, cars, and trucks end to these subsidies with protests and lobbying. Like-
discharge 2,511 tons of combined emissions annually) is wise, subsectors that use water intensively, including
affecting tourism revenues. Named by UNESCO as a pulp and paper, textiles, and chemicals, have complained
cultural World Heritage Site, tourism revenue in an his- about diminished water subsidies. Positive environ-
toric center is certainly affected by poor air quality. mental benefits have arisen from the end of subsidies
'Possibly the most appropriate case for the introduc- because industry has reacted to higher prices by trying to
tion of a market-based incentive would be to encourage conserve energy and water. For example, tanning and
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textile enterprises are much more interested than they to the gold miner. This is an example of subsidizing the
used to be in the recovery and reuse of process waters. cost of appropriate technology for environmental and
No examples of quantity-based or technology eco- health benefits. The cost of a retort is about equivalent to
nomic instruments for environmental policymaking such 1.5 grams of gold, but will provide a 5-10 percent im-
as tradable emission permits were found. One interesting provement of capturing gold in the amalgamation process.
solution to a recurrent problem of cost recovery in solid
waste is the 10 percent surcharge on electricity that pays Jamaica
for solid waste management. This solution to cost recov-
ery has been highly successful because electricity has This study is a preliminary survey of existing approaches
the highest incidence of payment. Nonpayment is met to urban environmental problems and associated re-
with electricity cutoff and illegal hookups are quickly source management.12 It pays particular attention to the
found and disconnected. extent to which market-based instruments are used and
Regarding solid waste management, in Guayaquil, could be used to improve environmental protection.
Ecuador's largest city, trash collection has been con- Three areas regarded as high priority are selected for
tracted out with some success. The municipality of detailed consideration: solid waste management; urban
Guayaquil asked for bids to haul garbage from the city to water quality including coastal, surface, and groundwa-
a landfill. The contract was awarded to a Canadian firm ter; and urban water resources.
that is paid US$9 per ton (the lowest bidding price by Jamaica has been giving creditable attention to en-
more than half) for garbage delivered to the state-of-the- vironmental management. Standards are being set and
art sanitary landfill. While they may lose money in the regulations are being put in place. In addition to com-
residential pickup areas, they are making money on the mand-and-control measures, market-based instruments
larger scale industrial pickup sites. Original estimates are being considered. Where some of these concern tra-
were that they would be delivering 1,200 tons per day ditional measures such as user charges for public utili-
when in fact they have been delivering 1,600 tons per ties, there is increasing recognition of the need to move
day. The contract is up for review and renewal every from subsidized and free services to cost recovery and
five years, guaranteeing that they will serve the residen- market pricing systems, which use marginal social cost
tial neighborhoods well. This represents an interesting principles.
incentive because the private-sector solid waste man- Jamaica is fortunate in that the need for a wide ar-
agement company is paid by the ton to deliver garbage, ray of policies including market-based instruments is
thereby encouraging them to pick it up. Whereas in other more widely appreciated than in many other developing
cities solid waste management is of poor quality and countries.
imposes a net cost, in Guayaquil the municipality may The most cogent reason why a wider array of policy
turn a profit, because deliveries multiplied by the US$9 instruments needs to be considered is that although in-
fee are less than revenues from the 12 percent surcharge creasing attention is given to environmental policies, their
on electricity bills that finances solid waste collection existing state is far from what is required for sustainable
and street cleaning. development. And the consequences are dire, leading to
One environmental institution, the Ecuadoran In- the poor state of services in areas such as waste manage-
stitute for Eco-development in the Amazon Region ment and water supply, and serious enviromnental degra-
(ECORAE), is funded by revenues from a tax levy on dation, poor air and water quality, careless handling of
oil. ECORAE, formed in 1992, is responsible for the toxic materials, poor management of water resources, and
sustainable development of the Amazon region and is intolerable risks and consequences to health.
funded through a levy on petroleum that passes through While present economic circumstances are not propi-
the pipeline that brings oil from the Ecuadoran Amazon tious for moving quickly to the adoption of full cost recov-
to the refinery in Esmeraldas, on the coast. ery in areas such as waste management and water supply,
appreciation of its need is increasing and in some areas
Subsidy for Conversion to Retort Amalgamation to great progress is possible in improving the framework of
Minimize Mercury Loss in Artisanal Mining Processes policies and in beginning to move in the right direction. In
Finally, an MBI was utilized to promote the use of re- some areas, affording change is difficult, but without
torts to reduce mercury loss in the amalgamation process change, degradation would reach intolerable levels-in
of artisanal gold mining. While not heavily taxing mer- some cases it has already reached such levels.
cury at its point of entry (that would have been some-
what ineffective because mercury results in less than
1 percent of total costs to the artisanal gold miner) an 12. This section is extracted, with permission, from
incentive is being offered to reduce the costs of the retort Persaud, Wright, and Benfield 1995.
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Water Quality of autonomy and independence and it can reduce its
The poor state of coastal and groundwater in Jamaica dependence on government subvention. Very little
can be largely attributed to major inadequacies in sewer monitoring is done on air and water quality and on the
systems, the run-down state of treatment facilities for handling of harmful wastes. The NRCA has the power to
liquid waste from sewers and industrial waste pipes, set compulsory requirements for users of toxic sub-
poor garbage disposal practices, high chemical use in stances and harmful emissions, implement pollution
export agriculture, and illegal waste disposal by cruise taxes, and license and monitor emission standards. It has
ships. The most notable example of the severity of begun to set standards, but even in command-and-
Jamaica's urban water pollution problem is the degrada- control measures it has a long way to go. In relation to
tion of water quality and ecosystem health in Kingston economic instruments, the NRCA appreciates their need
Harbour. About 12 million tons of untreated sewage but it has scarcely begun to move in this direction.
flow into the harbor daily.
The 1992 survey of the harbor showed that the Solid Waste
ambient BOD value in the harbor ranged from a low of The solid waste situation can also be considered critical,
1.2 milligrams per liter, to an extreme of 102 milligrams especially in relation to the location of existing sites, poor
per liter, with the highest value greatly exceeding the organization and management of disposal services, and the
BOD standard of 20 milligrams per liter for sewage ef- lack of proper monitoring by regulatory agencies. Approxi-
fluent levels. Fecal coliform levels have exceeded mately 2,726 tons per day of domestic solid waste and 562
maxi:mum allowable levels in some samples. There are tons per day of industrial solid waste are disposed of at the
high levels of lead and zinc. High levels of pesticides 25 official dump sites in Jamaica. Only two of these sites
and mnetals were found in fish. Species diversity and the have available cover material and only one operates in a
numbers of benthic organism living within the harbor manner similar to that of a landfill. No leachate flow di-
decreased significantly. The natural ecosystems, especially version provision is found at any of the sites, nor are any
pelagic fisheries and shrimp populations, were degraded. lined to prevent groundwater contamination.
This meant lost income to the marine fisheries industry; The dangerous nature of some of the waste disposal
increased costs in order to utilize fisheries resources also at these sites poses risks to both humans and livestock
greatly affect recreational and tourist activities. The threat which frequent the dumps. They are a breeding ground
to the valuable tourist industry is real because of the high for vermin and pose serious risks for the spread of dis-
pollution levels in some coastal waters. ease. In some dumps, such as the Riverton City site,
In the Kingston Metropolitan Area about 30 to 35 scavenging is a major economic activity practiced by
percent of the population receives sewage collection and members of the surrounding community. The free access
treatment. But of the 26 sewage treatment plants, 23 are that scavengers have to the dump also poses a threat to
scarcely functioning. the wider public, since disposed food items sometimes
Groundwater provides about 80 percent of the Na- find their way back onto the market where unsuspecting
tional Water Commission's supply of potable water. persons may purchase them. In addition, the persistent
However, wells are having to be abandoned because of fires at the Riverton, Lakes Pen, and Six Mile dumps are
high nitrate levels and this could increase dependence on believed to be responsible for the high incidence of up-
surface water which is costly to procure and distribute. per respiratory tract infections recorded for the Kingston
There is a large reliance on septic tanks for sewage dis- Metropolitan Area.
posal but because of the limestone formations, wells Due to the porous geological substrata over which
sometimes become contaminated. Both underground and most of the dumps are situated, leachate from decompos-
surface water could benefit from a more controlled use ing material finds its way into groundwater and surface
of agricultural chemicals. water sources. Medical wastes are carelessly handled and
An urgent need is the improvement of sewage indiscriminately disposed in municipal dumps. The
treatment and a great extension of the sewered popula- amounts of toxic waste generated by local industries are
tion. There has been a significant response to this need. unknown, but about 300,000 tons of hazardous material
The facilities at Montego Bay and Kingston are being were imported into Jamaica in recent years.
exten(led. While a survey of pollution in 1992 found that levels
Further advances in the work of the Natural Re- of total suspended solids were below Jamaica's standard,
sources Conservation Authority (NRCA), the umbrella in three sites in urban areas-Montego Bay, Harbour
institution with the leading role for the preservation of View, and Half Way Tree in Kingston-samples indicate
the quality of the Jamaican environment, could do much levels of 260, 139,. and 158 micrograms per cubic meter
to arrest the degradation of water quality and the envi- respectively, when the maximum allowable level in
ronment in general. The NRCA has an appropriate level Jamaica is 150 micrograms per cubic meter. Lead con-
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tamination is a serious problem-sampling has shown To address the problem of diminishing water re-
elevated blood levels, especially among children, and there sources, the study recommends the introduction of:
have been cases of blood poisoning. * Quantity-based water charges
It is important that the waste management program in * A quantity-based charge by the Underground
Jamaica seek to incorporate the informal groups whose Water Authority for water extraction from un-
livelihood is bound up with the recovery, recycling, or derground sources
reuse of materials from the dumps. This would result in * A utility regulatory board for water which would
the employment of the otherwise unemployed, laying the control monopoly pricing but also help to ensure
base for the development of a recycling industry. efficiency in treatment and distribution
The study recommends the introduction of domestic * Improved monitoring of water quality
waste disposal charges and landfill tipping fees in ways * Greater enforcement of watershed protection
that would be broadly related to the amount of waste regulations
generated and take into account ability to pay. Success * Improved access to land, by easing the pressure
in imposing disposal charges and landfill tipping fees on hillside farming.
would depend on adequate policing against illegal
dumping. Deposit-refund schemes have begun to be Conclusion
adopted, but integral to the extension of such schemes is Market-based instruments can greatly help to provide
the expansion of recycling. The deposit-refund system more efficient, less costly, and more effective environ-
should be more widely used to facilitate recycling. In- mental policies. But they also require institutional
centives might be needed to encourage recycling activi- strengthening. In the process of their introduction, and to
ties. Disposal facilities need to be greatly improved. achieve sound environmental management generally, the
Sites should be better chosen and regulations against ability of the NRCA to carry out its functions must be
illegal dumping need much stronger enforcement. Litter strengthened. A determined effort on the part of policy-
laws need to be strengthened and enforced. makers is needed to make the legislation work. It is not
enough to have the legal and institutional mechanisms in
Water Supply place without the capacity for monitoring and enforce-
The National Water Commission (NWC) has the overall ment. Pollution taxes should on the whole play an in-
responsibility of providing and distributing water in creasingly significant part in fiscal policy, but market-
Jamaica. Financial constraints, poor management prac- based instruments can be adopted on a wider basis.
tices, and inefficient water collection and distribution
systems have limited the Commission's ability to effec- Mexico
tively provide a satisfactory service.
In addition to the above problems, water shortages The objective of this study is to contribute to discussion
in urban areas are caused by uneven rainfall and frequent of the potential use of economic instruments in environ-
droughts, lack of conservation practices generally, and mental management in Mexico.'3 Although application
the degradation of watershed areas. Jamaica is particu- of these tools has been limited, their potential is cer-
larly susceptible to watershed degradation because ap- tainly wide. The high-priority areas chosen are contami-
proximately 80 percent of the land surface is hilly. Of nation of air and water, and disposal of solid and toxic
the 33 watersheds on the island, 19 are badly eroded. waste.
The main causes of watershed degradation and resulting While few practical cases exist where economic in-
shortages in water supply have been infrastructure de- struments have been implemented in Mexico, the debate
velopment and deforestation arising from agricultural on their possible application has gained strength. What
intrusion and charcoal production. has accelerated the discussion of economic instruments
The NWC currently has a volume-based pricing in Mexico? Three factors are worth mentioning. First,
structure in order to allow for full recovery of operating there has been an increase in the number and intensity of
costs and to encourage greater efficiency in use, but a environmental problems, along with their consequent
significant number of households are not metered and risks for the population. Second, ineffectiveness of other
water is provided free in some areas through public policies has been a contributing factor. Third, there is a
stand pipes. The NWC also applies a rate differential necessity to look for solutions in economically adverse
between households and firms, with firms paying a
higher price. This has not encouraged economy in the
use of water, especially among domestic water consum-
ers. Even at the subsidized rates, price adjustment to 13. This section is translated from Belausteguigoitia,
cover inflation is sometimes slow. Contreras, and Guadarrama 1995.
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situations, where the resources dedicated to the envi- sector. There are 18 OMNs for atmospheric contamina-
ronment are scarce. tion: 5 for monitoring, 5 for stationary sources, and 8 for
The most significant example of increasing envi- mobile sources. Norms for solid wastes have also been
ronmental problems is in the Mexico City Metropolitan published, as have norms for hazardous goods and use of
Zone (MCMZ), which harbors more than 30,000 pollut- natural resources. In general, the authorities require en-
ing companies. Three million vehicles circulate daily vironmental impact studies and operating licenses for
and 20 million people reside there. The high incidence of different economic activities.
atmospheric pollution, as well as the greater water de- Besides the OMNs, there are control measures, es-
mand for residential and industrial use, put the well- pecially in the case of air pollution in Mexico City. The
being of a large number of people in danger. Increased most important is the "Don't Drive Today" program that
incidence of pulmonary and gastroenteritis are occurring. restricts circulation of 20 percent of the vehicles of the
T'he environmental problems in Mexico City are not MCMZ on a revolving basis. Verification of vehicular
restricted to the valley because 30 percent of the water emissions is required at least once per year. Catalytic
used comes from places more than 100 kilometers away. converters have been required since 1991.
In other cases, discharges of wastewater are deposited in In addition to the water OMNs, the National Envi-
agricultural lands, causing water quality deterioration. ronmental Commission (CNA) demands that the indus-
In addition to the high levels of atmospheric pollu- trial sector treat its effluent. At the same time, the CNA
tion and water demand in the MCMZ, the border area has substantial resources for the installation of treatment
with the United States presents a widespread problem of plants and the development of hydraulic infrastructure.
toxic and hazardous substances. This area has rapid in- The establishment of hazardous wastes norms has
dustrial and population growth from assembly factories. been supplemented with other actions such as invento-
To date, the Mexican authorities have faced the prob- ries, identification of disposal sites, and classification of
lems of environmental deterioration by imposing laws and wastes. Nevertheless, the results of these initiatives have
operational norrns. The environmental administration in not been encouraging. Environmental deterioration con-
Mexico is based legally in the constitution and detailed in tinues, and Mexican authorities are forced to look for
the General Environmental Protection Law of 1988. At the alternative solutions to environmental problems. Three
same time there are several related laws and regulations, MBIs are under discussion: a market for tradable permits
the most important being the water law and the hazardous for SO2 mitigation, rights for wastewater discharges, and
wastes regulations. Regarding general policies, it is worth a gasoline tax in the MCMZ.
highlighting the National Program of Environmental Pro-
tection 1990-94, as well as the subsequent sectoral plans. Tradable Permits
Table A3 summarizes the main instruments used for Norm 085 was approved in 1994 and establishes maximum
environmental improvement in Mexico. atmospheric emission levels for carbon monoxide, nitrogen
The main instruments derived from the Mexican oxides, sulfur dioxide, sulfuric acid rain, and suspended
laws are the Official Mexican Norms (OMNs); these particulates. It also sets requirements and operating condi-
give specific guidelines for the quality of natural and tions for using combustibles in stationary sources.
environmental resources. There are 33 water OMNs that Within this norm, local "bubbles" have been created
set specific standards for wastewater discharges and that allow the trading of SO2 emission permits for sta-
establish limits for pollutant emissions in each industrial tionary sources. The intent is to maintain the levels of
Table A3 Main Instruments Used for Environmental Improvement in Mexico
Air Hazardous Wastes Water
Comnmand-and-Control Instruments
Regulations and Sanctions * 18 norms * 7 norms * 33 norms
* "Don't Drive Today" program
* Vehicular emission verification
* Inprovement in the quality of gasolines
......................... ................................. ............................................................. .............. ................................................................................................................................
Economic Instruments
Charges, Taxes, and Pernits * Gasoline tax * Rights for discharge of wastewater
. Environmental tax * System of prices and introduction
of electronic meters
Market Creation (tradable * Norm 085
pernits)
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pollution inside the established limits. It is hoped that percentage of tax within that total price is very low; it is very
the markets will begin operation by 1997. likely that consumers do not realize that a tax exists.
Markets that operate in the designated bubbles will Another problem is that the earmarking of the tax is
be designed during the period between approval and not permanent. Although the revenues are currently allo-
enforcement of the norms. The bubbles, in turn, are cated to gas station conversion, there has been no an-
specified based on the seriousness of the local emissions nouncement about future investment targets (after two
problem. One of these bubbles integrates the Federal years) once the conversion program is complete.
District and the municipalities. The tax therefore still is not a clearly defined long-
To implement a system of tradable permits, how- term instrument. This hinders the decisions of individu-
ever, it is necessary to modify the General Environ- als to make technological substitutions that improve
mental Protection Law so that it incorporates concepts energy efficiency or reduce fuel consumption. It is there-
such as "bubble pollution." Once the legal framework is fore not clear what long-term environmental impact this
modified, a market of tradable permits will be created. instrument will have.
The detailed design of the MBIs is under discussion.
The participating companies will comply with the norms Wastewater Discharge Rights
once measurements are made, either for current emissions Water pollution has generated concern because it causes
or emissions allotted under the permnits. Also, to assure serious health impacts. The cost is about US$3.6 billion
compliance, it will be necessary to determine a series of annually, which includes the cost of illnesses related to
applicable sanctions. These should be severe enough that water and food contamination.
the company opts for satisfying the environmental norm Pollution loads are concentrated in a few basins. Of 218
instead of simply paying the corresponding sanctions. basins in the country, 20 basins generate 89 percent of the
total load. Just four basins-Panuco, Lerma, San Juan, and
Gasoline Tax Rafts-accounted for 50 percent of wastewater discharges.
The tax was designed as a mechanism for the Depart- These receive the discharges of the main cities, as well as
ment of the Federal District to use to finance gas station those coming from industrial and agricultural activities.
remodeling in order to reduce and recover vapor emis- Population growth in zones where water is scarce,
sions. The tax has been in operation since January 1995. coupled with the high cost of developing new water sup-
Because the price elasticity of gasoline varies plies, dictates using wastewater recovery methods to
between -0.4 and -0.8, the imposition of a tax that rep- satisfy the growing demand for water. However, existing
resents 0.5 percent of the fuel price will have marginal water treatment capacity in the country is limited, treat-
impacts on consumption. However, in terms of collec- ing only about 5 to 10 percent of total effluents.
tion, the tax represents an important source of financing Besides direct investment in treatment, Mexico uses
for environmental projects. In the Federal District the direct control such as OMNs, as well as a system of
amount collected could reach US$20,000 per day, given charges tied to wastewater discharge rights. This last
a consumption of about 13 million liters in 1993. system was put into practice in October 1991 to decrease
One of the advantages of this tax is the low transac- the volume of wastewater and to induce companies to
tion cost, since collection occurs directly through the pur- invest in water quality improvements. It was one of the
chase of gasoline. The amount collected is given to the first environmental management instruments based on
Secretary of Finance, but the redistribution mechanism is the polluter-pays principle and market incentives.
automatic. While the tax has many advantages as an in- The design and calculation of the economic instruments
strument of environmental management, some problems is based on the Federal Water Rights Law. The amount paid
exist. First, the law did not contemplate the possibility that for the right for each cubic meter of discharge is set in
a local authority could implement a gasoline tax. Second, accordance with intervals established under the law. Inter-
a tax is never easy for society to accept; it was necessary vals are set both for water quality (for example, suspended
to earmark the revenues for gas station conversion. Fi- solids) and for total discharges. There is also a simplified
nally, there is a belief that an increment in energy prices in procedure that is applied when the monthly volume of the
turn raises the prices of other products, causing inflation. discharge for a user is less than 3,000 cubic meters. In this
This last point has been studied by Weihmann for the case case, the charges are dependent only on discharge volume.
of Mexico; the study indicated that less than 10 percent of One of the problems has been that the polluters
total costs were energy related. generally do not pay the required amounts for their dis-
The tax in Mexico City lacks the dynamic incentives charges. This is the case in practically all of the munici-
characteristic of a long-term solution. The amounts collected palities and a great proportion of industries. In 1992,
are independent of consumption or type of vehicle, and do N$17.4 million were collected; revenues grew to N$24.2
not influence marginal consumption decisions. Also, the million in 1993, and N$52.4 million in 1994. This in-
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crease is due to various measures taken by the CNA, but * Lack of confidence in the anticipated results.
although collections increased, the impact in terms of the * People do not find it moral or ethical to permit
total amounts owed is not very significant. contamination through a polluter-pays process.
In conclusion, although the purpose of the economic
instruments is to induce agents to change their behavior Administrative obstacles
by means of intemalizing costs, the charges have not * New administrative institutions are required.
been high enough to modify behavior. Once taxpayers * A strong policy tradition exists in command-and-
get used to the established norms, the CNA will collect control approaches.
based on unit discharges instead of only collecting from
those that exceed the permissible levels. Legal obstacles
Finally, it is necessary to recognize that early use of * Mexico's legislation does not explicitly include
this economic instrument has not generated the intended the use of economic instruments.
results. However, these procedures require further revi-
sions if they are to create a permanent stimulus for pol- To overcome these obstacles, it is not only neces-
luters to find new technologies and practical processes to sary to facilitate the implementation of the economic
reduce emissions. instruments, but also to address environmental policies
as a whole. To achieve maximum effectiveness of envi-
Final Considerations ronmental policies, economic instruments should be
Economic instruments until now have suffered from a used in combination with other policy instruments
number of practical flaws. In some cases these flaws relate (education, regulation, infrastructure investments, etc.).
to the very design of the mechanisms, while in others the Finally, the application of economic instruments may be
obstacles are of a more general nature. These obstacles used to promote the integration of policies.
must be overcome before economic instruments are exten- Also, a key obstacle facing decisiomnakers in envi-
sively adopted within Mexico's environmental policies. ronmental policies is that there is not enough reliable
The constraints may be summarized as follows. data. Although work has been carried out on this matter,
there is still a long way to go. Information changes con-
Economic obstacles tinually and often does not have the historical consis-
* Costs to industry. One must consider the current tency required for certain types of analyses.
economic situation that the country faces, as well Finally, there is a general understanding that envi-
as the situation of competitiveness of the industry. ronmental policies until now have not been effective and
* Costs of monitoring. Faulty institutional and that in general they have resulted in high costs to soci-
administrative capacity increases the costs of ety. Now seems like a good time to try new alternatives
monitoring. that reduce costs and that are consistent with the eco-
nomic changes the country faces.
Political obstacles
* An economic instrument could make environ- Peru
mental groups and other NGOs feel that they are
left without "legal space." These groups might Environmental Policy
perceive the application of any economic instru- Peruvian legislation on natural resources-especially
ment as a type of threat, because in effect it forests, wildlife, and water-has been relatively well
"permits" pollution. developed for more than 50 years, though its application
* Lack of consensus regarding implementation. has been limited.14 Currently, new laws proposed for
* Economic instruments could have negative dis- these resources are awaiting approval.
tributional impacts. Traditionally, natural resource management
* Lack of consistency with other government ("green") issues have attracted the most attention in
measures. terms of legislation and institutional capacity building.
* The application of economic instruments is per- By contrast, the development of a legal and institutional
ceived to be inflationary. framework related to environmental pollution ("brown")
* Lack of a "body of support" toward these in- problems is very recent.
struments. Before 1990, when the first Environment and Natu-
ral Resource Code was promulgated, the country only
C:ultural obstacles
* Lack of information on their operation.
* Lack of information on likely impacts. 14. This section is extracted from Tolmos 1995.
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had scattered and conflicting legislation with widespread quality and regulation, and coordinate with the sectors in
noncompliance. The code was a significant step forward, establishing permissible limits for environmental protec-
which tried to set forth a working outline for an effective tion, (d) propose mechanisms that facilitate international
national environmental policy. However, it has been cooperation to help acheive national environmental policy
subject to criticism since its inception, and various objectives, (e) establish general criteria for conducting
amendments to the code have diminished its effective- environmental impact assessments, (f) supervise imple-
ness and made its application difficult. mentation of national environmental policy and directives
The code did not set up a specific environmental by agencies of the central, regional, and local govern-
authority, nor the financial mechanisms that would allow ments, (g) serve as the final administrative authority in
its effective application. These points reduced its resolving challenges to acts or resolutions related to the
strength. Other important limitations included lack of environment, (h) propose legal standards, play an official
adequate financial mechanisms to carry out the mandates role in environmental controversies that affect the country,
of the code, weak environmental institutions with few and issue opinions in environmental matters in cases
resources, and lack of sectoral regulatory frameworks, where it is requested, (i) initiate appropriate administra-
including standards for effluents, emissions, and envi- tive, civil, and/or criminal actions in cases where the poli-
ronmental quality. cies, regulations, and directives mandated by CONAM are
The have been no norms for effluents, emissions, not followed, (j) help to recover and preserve indigenous
and environmental quality in most sectors since the code knowledge and technologies related to the environment,
was promulgated in 1990. Also, the periods set for car- (k) consolidate environmental information from the vani-
rying out the code's mandates were very short. ous public agencies, (1) develop a national environmental
The Democratic Constituent Congress of President action plan, (m) propose the creation and strengthening of
Fujimori's prior administration (1990-95) approved a the means, instruments, and methodology needed to de-
law creating the Consejo Nacional del Ambiente termiine the value of the country's natural heritage and
(CONAM), which serves as the national environmental resources, and (n) make an annual report on the state of
authority. the environment in Peru.
The country had never had an environmental
authority at the central level, nor an institutional struc- Environmental Conditions in Urban Areas
ture for environmental management that allows coordi- Acute pollution of water resources and coastal zones is
nated actions for environmental protection at the local, perhaps the most important environmental problem Peru
regional, and national level. Currently, the functions of faces. Most of the rivers flowing through the most im-
the executive branch in environmental matters is exer- portant cities are polluted with discharges coming from
cised through the environmental offices of various min- domestic users, industry, and agriculture. Also, these
istries such as the presidency, agriculture, fisheries, de- rivers are used as final disposal places for solid wastes.
fense, interior, health, mining and energy, industry, It is also common for coastal waters to be contaminated
tourism, transport and communication, housing and con- by untreated wastewater from industrial and domestic
struction, international commercial trade integration, and sources. For example, it is estimated that 16.5 cubic
the foreign office. This multiplicity of government agen- meters per second of untreated industrial and domestic
cies involved in environmental matters produces redun- wastewater is discharged along the metropolitan Lima
dancy and overlapping responsibilities. Each ministry coastline. Also, coastal pollution by wastewater from
resolves whatever issues fall within its sector, in effect fish meal production is widespread along the Peruvian
becoming 'judge in its own case" and leaving other af- coastline. Other problems are the scarcity of water to
fected parties with no venue for administrative appeal. supply cities, aquifer exhaustion and pollution, insuffi-
Civil society and government have come to recognize cient collection and inadequate disposal of solid wastes,
that it is necessary to have a central point of coordina- and air quality deterioration in large cities.
tion, regulation, and policy that serves as a guiding in- The situation in the Lima metropolitan area is criti-
stitutional framework for these currently dispersed sec- cal and is the best illustration of the state of the envi-
toral activities. ronment in most urban areas. The Rimac River, the main
CONAM's main functions are to (a) formulate, coor- source of water for domestic use in Lima, has pollution
dinate, lead, and evaluate national environmental policy levels far beyond the maximum limits set by the General
and ensure that it is strictly carried out, (b) coordinate Water Law and prevailing international standards. Sam-
sectoral activities with the environmental activities of the ples taken in 1991 at the intake for the La Atarjea treat-
central government as well as regional and local gover- ment plant, which supplies drinking water for Lima,
ments to acheive harmony with established policy, (c) revealed total coliform levels that were on average 5.5
establish general criteria and guidelines for environmental times higher than allowed, 90 percent of the time. Fecal
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coliform levels exceeded limits by an average of 15.5 tional requirement was lacking from 1990 until CONAM
times, 90 percent of the time. There is no industrial was created.
wastewater treatment, and along the river there are Natural resource conservation and environmental
dumping sites for solid wastes. The Rimac River also is protection in Peru are based on environmental legislation
affected by discharges from mining centers in the higher that depends exclusively on direct command-and-control
parts of the basin and by pesticides from agricultural regulations. These instruments include a system of natu-
activities. ral protected areas, ecological zoning, sectoral environ-
I'he average production of drinking water in the mental impact assessments, and fines and penalties,
Lima metropolitan area in 1989, from wells and treat- among others.
ment plants, was 20.75 cubic meters per second, while In Peru, experience in the use of economic instru-
demanid was 23 cubic meters per second. Total urban ments for environmental protection does not exist. In-
demand (industrial and residential) is expected to reach stead there is an ever-increasing number of sectoral and
30 cubic meters per second in 1997, and 35 cubic meters national environmental norms, which are based exclu-
per second in the year 2000. sively on command-and-control instruments such as
T'he water supply problem facing Lima makes it one fines, penalties, or environmental impact assessments. In
of the worst-supplied capital cities in Latin America, practice, the amount collected from fines and penalties is
with a high percentage of its population going without minimal or nonexistent.
adequate service (that is to say, a continuous water The newly proposed water law, based mainly on the
source 24 hours a day and 365 days a year, with ade- Chilean experience, allows for water trading through
quate water pressure, no chlorine residues in the net- water use rights. This constitutes the first effort to incor-
work, water supply adequate to meet demand, low rate porate economic instruments in a particular sectoral le-
of loss in the system, and tariffs that cover real costs). gal framework.
For 1990, statistics indicate that nationwide only 52 Few people in public and private institutions know
percent of the population was connected to the drinking about the use of economic instruments in environmental
water supply system, and only 39 percent to the sewer- policy. There is little information about the advantages
age system. In the same year, 65 percent of the urban and disadvantages of these instruments for environ-
population had drinking water service and 53 percent mental protection.
had sewerage service. CONAM is carrying out a national consultation to
Regarding air pollution, the most polluted city in learn about environmental problems, institutional priori-
the country is the Lima metropolitan area, which has ties for environmental management, and needs in terms
nearly 7 million inhabitants-almost 30 percent of of human and financial resources. CONAM is interested
Peru's population. In 1995, sedimentary solid pollutants in incorporating economic instruments in the design of
exceeded the Pan American Health Organization's stan- the Peru environmental action plan, for which it is re-
dard in 27 of the city's 33 districts. sponsible.
Solid waste collection and disposal service seems to
Regulations and Economic Instruments face a problem of poor pricing. This in turn causes un-
Environmental law in Peru is extensive but extremely derbudgeting of the service. Today municipalities seem
dispersed among a number of different pieces of general to be aware of the importance of conducting a study to
and sectoral legislation. estimate tariffs based on real costs. Tariffs charged by
The 1990 Environment and Natural Resources Code municipalities should reflect differences in the types of
marked an important milestone in the environmental solid waste generated-that is, their different densities
sector, representing a first attempt at developing a com- and volumes.
prehensive regulatory framework for environmental Pricing problems also are present in the case of
management in Peru. It introduced the idea that any per- water supply and sewerage services. Again, this results
son has the right to demand quick and effective legal in underbudgeting of services and the waste of water. At
action in cases of environmental protection. On the other the present time the tariff for water supply is based on
hand, it also incorporates a certain form of the polluter- average consumption and not on real consumption and
pays principle by establishing that "the costs of preven- the real cost of service. Although tariffs charged for
tion, monitoring, recovery, and compensation for envi- water supply include a percentage to cover sewerage as
ronmental degradation are to be paid by the party that well, in practice this amount is insufficient to finance the
causes the damages." construction of treatment plants. For this reason indus-
Unfortunately, the code delegated several duties and trial and domestic wastewaters are being directly dis-
responsibilities to the "competent authority," which was charged into rivers and the ocean. In the case of Lima, a
created just this year. This meant a fundamental institu- tariff based on the real costs of treating those industrial
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and residential wastewaters-17 cubic meters per sec- emissions and effluents and for ambient air and water
ond are discharged into the ocean and 1 cubic meter per quality will be resolved once CONAM establishes na-
second into the Rimac River-needs to be introduced. tional standards.
Also, a water supply tariff based on the real cost of There is a lack of coordination regarding the re-
service is needed. sponsibilities of different institutions participating in
Regarding industrial wastewaters discharged into environmental management (for example, local govern-
the Rimac River, a system of charges could be imple- ments, the ministry of health, and the various economic
mented. Charges should be based on toxicity since many sectors). This lack of coordination is especially evident
mining and other highly polluting industries discharge among govemmental institutions and among different
their wastewater into the Rimac River's upper basin and departments within the same ministry (for example, in
because the volume discharged by all sources- the ministry of agriculture). Also, it is fundamental that
including residential wastewater from some shanty the ministry of economy participate in discussions about
towns-is only 1 cubic meter per second. Toxicity and financial resources for enforcement activities and the
water pollution levels are a crucial issue since water implementation of economic instruments.
entering the La Atarjea treatment plant is not considered Avoiding overlapping responsibilities, for instance,
treatable for domestic consumption. Because the Rimac between the recently created CONAM and INRENA
River is Lima's only source of water, the plant must (the Institute of Natural Resources), which is under the
incur very high costs to make this water drinkable. ministry of agriculture, is a fundamental issue that
However, implementing a system of charges would should be taken into account. Any rivalry among institu-
imply some requirements such as the establishment of tions might result in conflicting situations that can delay
standards for heavy metals and other contaminants, and any initiative for successfully implementing economic
appropriate institutional capacity. Determining the instruments as part of environmental policy.
charge level would be a key issue. Given the macroeconomic and fiscal discipline pur-
At present, the PROMAR project (Project for sued by the new govemment, it is hard to think about
Wastewater Management and Coastal Pollution Con- applying economic instruments for environmental pro-
trol), which is under SEDAPAL (Lima Water Company) tection without getting support and collaboration from
and is funded by the World Bank, is starting a study on the ministry of economics. The target of 13.9 percent for
the regulatory framework and institutional requirements taxation in 1995, after having fallen as low as 6 percent
needed to effectively and efficiently deal with wastewa- during the Garcia administration (1985-90), could make
ter management and coastal pollution control in the the use of economic instruments even more difficult,
Lima metropolitan area. It is important to point out that especially because the industrial and business sectors
one of the study's specific tasks consists of identifying consider the current tax level excessive. Some entrepre-
and evaluating the potential use of economic instruments neurs argue that imports of clean technologies and
in the context of these environmental problems. equipment should be tax-exempt. This proposal is not
accepted by govemment.
Future Scopefor Market-Based Instruments in Peru At present, the free market policy advocated by the
There are three institutional constraints which prevent government seems to have priority over other policy
the implementation of economic instruments for envi- considerations, including the environment. Under current
ronmental management in Peru: (a) lack of standards for circumstances, it is going to be problematic to apply
emissions and effluents and for ambient air and water economic instruments for environmental protection if
quality at the national level, (b) unclear establishment of these instruments affect the demand for imported goods.
responsibilities among governmental and nongovern- For example, INDECOPI (the National Institute for De-
mental institutions that participate in environmental fense of Competition and Intellectual Property) recently
management in Peru, and (c) lack of an enforcement questioned the appropriateness of five directives from
strategy and experienced institutions at different levels the ministry of agriculture. In INDECOPI's opinion, the
of government. agriculture ministry sought excessive sanitary require-
In recent years, in part due to lack of a national en- ments that are incompatible with the free market. An-
vironmental agency, each sector (energy and mining, other example is the highly polluting secondhand buses
fisheries, agriculture, industry, and health, etc.) has es- and cars that have been freely imported since 1991.
tablished its own environmental norms, and in few cases Government does not regulate or levy a tariff on such
its own emission and effluent standards. These standards imports even though air quality in Lima and other big
have been set up without paying adequate attention to cities is getting worse. Using tariff and nontariff barriers
ecological and health criteria. It is expected that this as part of environmental policy probably would be seen
confusing situation of setting up sectoral standards for as contradicting the government's free trade policy.
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Institutional capacity to carry out enforcement ac- given the critical economic and social problems cur-
tivities is almost nonexistent. For example, there is a rently facing the country.
complete lack of liability legislation in environmental
matters. Also, there is no allocation of enforcement tasks High-Priority Areas for Environmental Management
among institutions participating in environmental man- Oil exploitation and import substitution policies have
agemrient at all levels, and these institutions do not have determined patterns of development in Venezuela that
the human and financial resources needed for carrying have affecting environmental conditions in past decades.
out enforcement tasks. In particular, the import substitution scheme generated
Given CONAM's relative authority and autonomy, light manufacturing industries highly dependent on for-
and its role as the institution responsible for designing eign technology and primary resources. As a conse-
and implementing environmental policies, it would be quence, industrial activity is not adjusted to national
worthwhile for the World Bank and other institutions to resource availability and it tends toward excessive pro-
provide their expertise in enforcement issues. CONAM duction of wastes. The previous economic factors have
does not have the expertise and the staff to deal with also implied explosive urban growth, geographically
issues of enforcement and economic instruments. An concentrated in the traditional northern centers, with the
additional point for discussion is whether an enforce- consequent negative impact on air, soil, and water quality.
ment agency is going to be created outside of CONAM, The following urban environmental problems are
or if that capability will be established within CONAM, identified as high-priority areas for environmental man-
or if existing environmental institutions are going to agement, based on their economic and ecological impact:
share the task of enforcement. * Energy Subsidies. Internal price control for
Economic instruments could be implemented once gasoline causes excessive fuel consumption; in
these constraints are overcome. High-priority areas for September 1995, 87-octane gasoline was sold at
implementing economic instruments could be urban a local price which represented only 27 percent
water and air pollution from industrial and domestic of its international value (f.o.b.). The local price
sources, solid waste collection and disposal, coastal for 95-octane gasoline was adjusted to equal 65
pollution from fish meal plants and harbor operations percent of the international price. However, the
(for example, oil spill and leakage), and water and air most important problem related with gasoline
pollution from mining activities. production is the coexistence of unleaded gaso-
line, which meets international environmental
Venezuela standards and is exported by the industry, with
leaded fuel which is sold in the local market. The
Environmental policy in Venezuela is characterized by state-owned oil industry argues that the financial
the irnplementation of direct controls; experiences in- deterioration of the domestic market is an obsta-
volvirig economic instruments are scarce and isolated."5 cle to improving gasoline quality inside the
As a result, management of natural resources and pollu- country. Air monitoring regularly shows high
tion relies on the enforcement of extensive and complex concentrations of lead in the Caracas metropoli-
legislation. Environmental cost accounting and pricing tan area and other important cities.
of natural resources are not developed within the exist- * Water Quality. The study focuses on the Lake
ing market system. According to the economic theory of Valencia case to analyze water quality issues.
environmental policy, market-based instruments can lead The Lake Valencia basin encompasses very im-
to the achievement of social environmental goals and portant urban and industrial areas (in recent dec-
economic efficiency. Another potential advantage of ades more than 60 percent of private manufac-
mechanisms such as pollution charges is the collection turing activity has become concentrated in this
of resources for pollution abatement. area). The ecological impact of pollution in the
To evaluate market-based incentives as environ- basin and the cities of Valencia and Maracay is
mental policy instruments in Venezuela the study analy- considerable. Since 1985 the area has been the
ses the current legal and institutional framework related subject of an Integrated Environmental Sanita-
to environmental policy. On the other hand, assessment tion Program, partially financed by the Inter
of the macroeconomic, social, and sectoral impact of American Development Bank. Within the sani-
environmental management employing microeconornic tation program a special legislative framework
instruments has enormous importance in Venezuela regulates industrial activity, imposing water
quality standards for effluents discharged into the
lake. There is a decentralized institutional struc-
15. This section is extracted from Orlando 1995. ture of environmental authorities in the area, as
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well as an NGO presence. Enforcement of stan- crimes and sanctions (fines and imprisonment). As in
dards has been problematic, even though most other Latin American countries with command-and-
firms have treatment plants. control environmental policies, compliance and en-
Hazardous Waste. Oil production, the heavy- forcement has been problematic in Venezuela. With
metals industry, and the manufacturing sector direct controls, optimal reallocation of environmental
make management of hazardous waste a critical resources is not guaranteed.
problem. The country has no landfills that are At the local level, special regional agencies are
safe for toxic waste disposal, and sanitary land- taking an increasingly important role in enforcement of
fills for domestic solid wastes are very scarce. standards, sanitation programs, and environmental edu-
Thus, dangerous substances have to be stored in cation. Municipalities are directly responsible for solid
enormous concrete containers that are expensive waste management. During the 1990s these institutions
and are difficult to monitor. have been gaining strength both politically and finan-
cially. Municipalities have the right to collect their own
Institutional and Legal Framework-Command-and- taxes, and have control over industrial, commercial, and
Control Instruments and Economic Instruments agricultural establishments within their areas. Neighbor-
Environmental policy in Venezuela underwent a dis- hood associations are represented at the municipal level.
cernible change in emphasis over the past two decades, Hence, the municipal level is a potential unit for envi-
from a conservationist policy to an economic develop- ronmental monitoring and management programs re-
ment policy based on rational resource utilization. Envi- garding air, water, and soil quality.
ronmental objectives and policy strategies have become As mentioned in previous paragraphs, environ-
more independent since the Eigth National Plan (1990), mental management in Venezuela has followed a com-
which also included the possibility of using Pigouvian mand-and-control approach. In addition to standards,
taxes for environmental management. enforced by fines and environmental damage liability
The environmental authority of the central gover- and prosecution, land use restrictions are applied for
ment is the Ministry of the Environment and Natural preservation of forests, watersheds, and other ecosys-
Resources (MARNR), established in 1976. MARNR's tems. Currently, licensing is also being used as an in-
main activity has been to provide public resources for strument for environmental management. It is important
sanitation efforts. Therefore, joint environmental man- to observe that market-based incentives per se have not
agement incorporating firms and NGOs does not receive been considered, but there are some experiences with
enough human and financial resources. The organization economic instruments or instruments that consider eco-
of the ministry has evolved from a centralized structure nomic costs of pollution and environmental degradation.
to a horizontally decentralized one in which specific Some of these instruments implicitly recognize envi-
environmental problems have a corresponding unit. ronmental problems as an externality, even if no ac-
Some of the most important divisions of the current counting of environmental costs in the price system is
MARNR configuration are watershed conservation, air generated by their implementation:
quality, and environmental education. However, these * Fiscal Incentives. Abatement of corporate taxes
divisions are not financially independent and the minis- was implemented during the 1970s and 1980s,
try's budget depends on the national treasury. These and was ended in 1991 by reforms in the Corpo-
factors are important in discussing the feasibility of im- rate Taxes Law. The purpose was to compensate
plementing market-based incentives. for investments in equipment, technology, or in-
Venezuela's legal framework on environment is frastructure devoted to improvement or preser-
considered very advanced in terms of its standards and vation of the environment. The abatement was
scope. Nonetheless, several authors point out the fact for up to 15 percent for five years. This instru-
that it grants excessive discretionary power and assigns ment did not produce improvements in resource
overlapping responsibilities to diverse entities. In some allocation and might have led to excessive in-
cases the energy ministry and defense ministry share vestment in capital-intensive pollution abatement
enforcement responsibilities with the environment min- mechanisms.
istry; the public health ministry and agriculture ministry * Industrial Tariff System Based on Volume of
participate in formulation of standards. Some environ- Solid Waste. The purpose of this instrument is to
mental standards are so far-reaching as to be unenforce- recovery the costs of the municipal collection
able or not suited to particular ecosystems. The main and disposal system. It has been implemented
legal instruments addressing environmental quality are with relative success in the north-central region
the Organic Environmental Law (1976), and the Crimi- and Zulia state. The main problems confronted
nal Environmental Law (1992) defining environmental are scarcity of sanitary landfills and monitoring
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difficulties. Tariffs for solid waste disposal are put, high inflation, and increasing tax pressure. Conse-
important in the operational costs of certain in- quently, creating additional taxation by using MBIs has
dustries and provides an incentive for innova- to be carefully evaluated in terms of its effects on output
tions to reduce solid waste production. and prices. Nonetheless, considering the magnitude of
* Financial Compensation from Natural Resource the public sector deficit, the role of MBIs as a way of
Exploitation. Traditionally this occurs in the collecting resources for pollution abatement is especially
Venezuelan economy within the concession re- important. Another of the prevalent elements character-
gime for oil exploitation. The general objective izing Venezuela's economy in the 1990s is the high level
of this instrument is to stimulate rational utiliza- of uncertainty regarding government policies. Uncer-
tion of resources. Royalties together with the in- tainty complicates the analysis of market-based incen-
come tax from the oil sector constitute the major tives. Therefore, in general, theoretical benefits from
income source for the government. MBIs would not necessarily take place in the context
* Deforestation Taxes. National forest restoration described, with the exception of certain ones that pro-
taxes, paid by forestry companies that don't con- vide incentives for pollution abatement.
duct their own reforestation programs, finance Despite the ambiguous effects of MBIs on eco-
public reforestation projects. Deforestation taxes nomic efficiency in the allocation of environmental re-
have not been effective because the tax rate does sources, in a situation where there are price controls,
not cover the marginal cost of reforestation. macroeconomic instability, and other market distortions
* Final Demand Incentives. These include self- the implementation of some market instruments at the
imposed environmental management practices local or regional level has the advantages of:
based on international standards and concern for * Stimulating cost-effective pollution abatement
domestic corporate image. * Increasing consumer awareness
* Recycling. Deposit-refund systems have been * Providing local authorities in charge of specific
very effective in glass recycling. Recycling of environmental problems the resources for envi-
aluminum containers and paper is increasing ronmental management plans.
considerably. Specifically, in the context of Lake Valencia's
sanitation program, the regional basin authority monitors
Market-Based Instruments as Part of Environmental effluents that could be subject to pollution charges. Mu-
Policy within the Venezuelan Economy nicipal taxes (paid by firms twice a year as a percentage
The most important factor to consider when evaluating of sales) that create incentives for cleaner technologies
market-based incentives within the Venezuelan economy and pollution control could also be implemented.
is the current dysfunction of the market system itself. At the national level, environmental education, eco-
Because markets for industrial goods are highly concen- labeling, and performance bonds under MARNR's su-
trated, the allocative advantages of MBIs might not occur. pervision can have effects both on the supply of goods
Since 1994, economic policy has been characterized by and on final demand.
interventionism, including price controls and a fixed offi-
cial exchange rate. The products under price controls are General Recommendations for Environmental Man-
basic consumer goods as well as goods and services pro- agement
vided by state monopolies (gasoline, electricity, and water). * Progressive elimination of energy subsidies
Labor markets are regulated as well through a minimum * Improvements in water pricing
wage. Distortions caused by price controls affect multiple * Construction and management of sanitary land-
markets and periodically cause shortages of some food fills for toxic and solid wastes
items. Firms also face restrictions on international currency * Revision of current standards on water and air
exchange, which constrains their operations considerably. quality
Macroeconomic conditions give rise to an environ- * Extension of MARNR's decentralization at the
ment in which there is a combination of shrinking out- regional level.
Appendix B. Buenos Aires Seminar Participants
Seminar on Economic Instruments and Environmental Policy in Latin America
Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 30-July 2, 1997
The seminar was organized by the World Bank (the Economic Development Institute and the Environmentally and
Socially Sustainable Development Unit for Latin America and the Caribbean), in collaboration with the Argentine
Business Council for Sustainable Development and the Secretariat of Natural Resources and Environment. Funding
was provided by the Canadian International Development Agency and the Japanese Government.
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